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SOCRATES ENTERS ROME.

GEORGIO LINCOLN HENDRICKSON
OCTOGENARIO
FELICITER.

The present paper is hardly more than an excursus to E. K. Rand's *The Building of Eternal Rome*. When I read his inspiring chapter on the Foundations, which paradoxically but convincingly establishes Plato's rank among the founders of the eternal city, I recalled an old observation of mine linking Plato with Polybius and Rome. This I now submit to the judgment of Harvard's distinguished classical scholar and mediaevalist, and at the same time to that of the beloved and venerable man to whom this paper is dedicated.

I

I am concerned with Polybius' famous pages on the education and character of the young Roman who later became Scipio Africanus Minor.¹ It is our great fortune, and certainly no mere accident, that they are preserved among the excerpts, made at the command of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, in the volume which is entitled: *On Virtues and Vices*. If they were lost we should still possess a shadowy reflection of them in Diodorus (XXXI, 26 f.) and perhaps a still more shadowy and distorted one in Pausanias (VIII, 30, 9). We should have found reflections in Plutarch's biography of Scipio and in Livy's and Cassius Dio's relevant chapters, had they come down to us. For the

¹ Polybius, XXXI, 23-30 Büttner-Wobst, Paton (Loeb Edition) = XXXII, 9-16 Bekker, Hultsch = *Excerpta Historica*, edd. Boissvain, etc., II, 2 (ed. Roos), pp. 187 ff.

impression made by those pages of Polybius must have been deep. Though formally a "digression" (παρέκβασις, XXXI, 30 — XXXII 16), they were meant to impress upon the reader the conviction that without this formative influence on Scipio's personality the course of the Scipionic period would have been different. Their importance is made clear by two facts: the author had already prepared for them in an earlier passage, now lost, to which he deliberately refers at the beginning; and at the end of the episode he emphasizes that it is meant to enhance the credibility of what he is going to narrate in the following books—achievements which one might easily, if wrongly, attribute to chance, though they were founded on principles (κατὰ λόγον γεγονότα). There can be no doubt that in these later parts Polybius must have pointed back, at least implicitly, to the pages under discussion; and we have actually one chapter (XXXV, 4) treating of young Scipio's early deeds in Spain: here he is praised for exactly the same virtues—self-control and fortitude—which we shall presently find in our "digression." It is quite possible that also a passage in Cassius Dio's *History* (XXI, 70, 4) on Scipio's character and achievements preserves something from those later books of Polybius, who may have spoken with similar words of Scipio's planning at leisure and his acting on the spur of a moment, his devising comprehensive plans of war and his personal boldness in action, his scrupulous rectitude, his moderation and amiability, his readiness for all occasions.

The theme of the digression is twofold, as Polybius himself states at its beginning, and as he must already have made clear when he prepared for it in the preceding book. The first point is "how Scipio's reputation in Rome spread so far and became so brilliant at an unusually early time of his life"; the second "how this friendship with Polybius grew so great that it became known in Italy and Greece and even beyond." According to these outlines—though in reverse order—the author gives first his famous conversation with young Scipio, then a detailed analysis of Scipio's character and its unfolding.

These two parts are joined together by a double link, the first element of which is with good reason considered as the conclusion of part I, the second element as the beginning of part II. In both linking sentences the emphasis is first on the beginning of the friendship: "from this mutual agreement on" and "from

this time on"; in both he goes on to stress the continuity of the intercourse: "the young man was inseparable from Polybius" and "they constantly lived in an active communion"; and finally, while the first dwells on the highest value of this companionship for young Scipio, the second characterizes their mutual love as one between father and son or near relatives. Immediately afterwards the analysis of Scipio's character begins. One can hardly doubt that the foundation of the friendship between the older and the younger man and the formation of the latter's character are meant to be closely connected. A symbol of this connection may be the fact that the above-mentioned starting point "from this agreement on" and "from this time on" is later referred to by the comment: "during the first five years Scipio's renown for *sophrosyne* became widespread," the "five years" apparently being counted "from that agreement on."

What is the main point in this first decisive conversation? The young Roman asks the Greek gentleman whether he, too,—as most of the others—thinks of him as over-quiet and inactive; in a word, as un-Roman. Polybius answers that his very concern proves his "high-mindedness." He presents himself as the one who could help the young man "to speak and to act in a manner worthy of his ancestors"—he might well have said, who could help him to consummate that "high-mindedness." And Scipio emphatically echoes the very words his friend had chosen: "worthy of the family and the ancestors."

So much for the leading concept in Polybius' conversation with Scipio. Now what are the main points in the following analysis of Scipio's character? It divides into three parts, dealing first with his moderation or self-control or however one may render the untranslatable *σωφροσύνη*; second, with his high-mindedness in money affairs; and third, with his fortitude. *Σωφροσύνη*, identified with *εὐταξία*, good order (of the soul), (inner) discipline,² apparently is the foundation of virtue in general; and this is the reason why, after contrasting Scipio's self-control with the ruling dissoluteness of his period, Polybius ends this part of his analysis by borrowing the words *ὁμολογού-*

² τὴν ἐπ' εὐταξία καὶ σωφροσύνη δόξαν, Polybius (= *Excerpta Historica*, II, 2, p. 190, line 7). Diodorus (= *Excerpta Historica*, II, 1, p. 287, line 11) gives a careless excerpt: τὴν ἐπ' εὐταξία σωφροσύνην.

μενος, "coördinated," and σύμφωνος, "harmonious," from the Stoic vocabulary, in which both were used to define "virtue."³

The second part of the moral analysis deals with Scipio's high-mindedness and integrity in money affairs. This virtue Polybius traces back, first to his natural gift, and then to the influence of Aemilius Paulus, and, at the end, he identifies it with *sophrosyne* and *kalokagathia*, so that the second part appears closely connected with the first; after all, it is the same virtue which shows in his hatred of lust and in his quite un-Roman generosity.

In the third part Scipio's fortitude becomes the leading concept. The practice of this virtue is traced back to the young man's passion for the hunt, and here again, as in the field of high-mindedness, the father is the guiding force. But toward the end, Polybius himself steps in as the one who shared, and therefore strengthened, that enthusiasm.

This short survey will have revealed one apparent lacuna in the author's analysis. At its very beginning, in dealing with *sophrosyne*, he refrains from stating who was responsible for Scipio's devotion to this first and basic virtue. But he need not have done so expressly; he had just spoken about the young Roman's inseparableness from himself and about their mutual love as between father and son. Probably no one has ever failed to realize, when he read the next sentence, that it was Polybius himself who had guided Scipio's zeal for *sophrosyne*. It now becomes evident, if it was not so to begin with, how the two main parts of the digression—the establishment of Polybius' and Scipio's friendship and the analysis of Scipio's virtues—are linked together. Polybius' educational influence accounts more than anything else for the consummation of Scipio's natural gifts.

II

It was Mommsen's opinion that "Plato and Aristotle have been without essential influence on Roman culture."⁴ This paper, however, will add new evidence to E. K. Rand's conclusion, so surprising at first sight: "Plato was invisibly but potentially one of the builders of Rome."

³ Cf. H. v. Arnim, *Stoicorum Fragmenta*, III, p. 5, frag. 12; p. 48, frag. 197; p. 63, frag. 262; p. 72, frag. 293.

⁴ T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, II^o, p. 412.

I wish to point out a marked resemblance between that colloquy of Polybius and Socrates' unforgettable conversation with young Alcibiades in Plato's dialogue, the so-called *Greater Alcibiades*. This resemblance I observed many years ago, and I have often since asked myself whether it can be reduced to chance. I doubt it, but first of all the similarities must be considered. How my observation is to be interpreted will be discussed presently.

Before I call attention to the main points of similarity, let it be made clear that this harmony is to a high degree one of opposites. In both cases we find a colloquy of the experienced teacher with the young man who is to be his pupil—the most extraordinary of his pupils. The teacher is, in the one case, the man of action whom fate turned into an observer and historian; in the other case, Socrates. The young men are destined to be, the one the greatest statesman of Rome, the other both the most brilliant political figure of Athens and its destroyer.

1. In both cases there is a resolution of a remarkable tension. Polybius' intercourse with the two sons of Aemilius Paulus had already lasted some time, yet young Scipio felt neglected and one day asked Polybius why he always conversed with his elder brother and paid no attention to him. In Plato's dialogue the conversation is opened by Socrates but he anticipates Alcibiades only by a moment, as the latter is presently made to say. Socrates points out the contrast between the young man's other admirers, who have dropped away, and himself, who has not so much as spoken to him. Alcibiades answers that he was about to ask Socrates why he persecutes him with his attention. It is a decisive moment: in Plato a long tense silence is broken by the first colloquy; in Polybius this first serious colloquy transforms a long and friendly, but in Scipio's opinion quite unsatisfactory, relationship.

2. A characterization of the younger interlocutor follows in both cases. Scipio feels himself looked down upon as unworthy of the family he springs from and asks whether Polybius shares this opinion; whereupon the latter answers that Scipio's very words prove how high-minded (*μέγα φρονῶν*) he is; and thus Polybius helps Scipio to gain a first insight into his own aims. Alcibiades is characterized by Socrates: he is not only high-minded (*μέγα φρονῶν*), but he fancies himself to be more than

the high-minded ones (μεγαλόφρονες); among other things, he springs from a mighty family; he is also rich, "though this is something of which you seem to be the least proud (high-minded)"—words which are strongly similar (in an opposite vein, to be sure) to those in which Scipio is addressed by Polybius: "for it is apparent that you are high-minded because of these things" (Plato: δοκεῖς δέ μοι / ἐπὶ τούτῳ / ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν; Polybius: δηλὸς γὰρ εἶ / διὰ τούτων / μέγα φρονῶν).

3. After having characterized Scipio in this manner, Polybius adds: "I wish to dedicate myself to you and to become your helper (σύνεργος) in reaching your goal, which is education toward speaking and acting worthily of your ancestors." And again: "In your present situation you can find no better helper and fellow-combatant than I am." Socrates, after having revealed to Alcibiades his ambitious aspirations, adds in a similar though ironical manner: "You cannot reach your goal without me; nobody else can help you to the power for which you are striving except me." The expression "helper and fellow-combatant," used by Polybius, has its exact analogy not in the *Greater Alcibiades* but in the *Symposium*, where it is again Alcibiades who says to Socrates: "I am striving to perfect myself as much as possible (ὥς βέλτιστον γενέσθαι), and nobody can lend a helping hand better than you." (Plato: τούτου δὲ οἶμαι συλλήπτορα οὐδένα κυριώτερον εἶναι σοῦ; Polybius: δοκῶ μηδένα συναγωνιστὴν καὶ σύνεργον ἄλλον εὐρεῖν ἂν ἡμῶν ἐπιτηδειώτερον.)⁵

4. Scipio, seizing Polybius' hand, expresses his fervent assent: "May I see the day on which you dedicate yourself to me alone and live together with me!" Then, with the repeated "from this encounter on" (ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀνθομολογήσεως) and "from this time onward" (ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν), their inseparability and mutual affection are made manifest. In Plato's *Greater Alcibiades* one must look to the end of the dialogue for the corresponding moment, as pathetic and enthusiastic as the one in

⁵ It may be mentioned, at least in a footnote, that the very word σύνεργος occurs in a similar syntactic context in another passage of the *Symposium*, 212 B: ὅτι τούτου τοῦ κτήματος τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει σύνεργον ἀμείνω Ἔρως οὐκ ἂν τις ῥαδίως λάβοι. Σύνεργος is here Eros, not Socrates. But may it be remembered that Diotima's Eros has many traits of Socrates, and that Socrates is Eros' appearance on earth. Yet I prefer to ascribe this analogy to chance rather than to weaken my demonstration by a doubtful detail.

Polybius' *History*—even more so, since it occurs not in second-century Rome but in fifth-century Athens. "From this day on" (ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας), says Alcibiades, "I shall be your inseparable companion (παιδαγωγός)," and Socrates confirms this promise with the strong metaphor of the stork's love which hatches love in the stork's children.⁶

5. The new fellowship is directed toward the same aim in Polybius and in Plato, and in both cases it is the young man who expresses the aim. Scipio: "From that moment on (αὐτόθεν) I shall at once think to be worthy of my house and my forefathers." Alcibiades: "I shall begin from now on (ἐντεῦθεν) to strive for justice." The difference of the expression is that between Rome and Athens—the one thinking in terms of ancestry, the other in terms of virtue; but the meaning and even the form are essentially the same.

6. Polybius, in spite of all that had gone before, had yet one scruple "when he reflected on the high position of Scipio's family and the wealth of its members." It is not made clear whether the rank and the riches of the Aemilii might contain a hindrance for Polybius or a danger for young Scipio; probably one as well as the other is meant. Socrates expresses his apprehension unambiguously: "I am afraid," says he, "lest the might of the state may overpower you and me." Plato puts in Socrates' mouth a prophecy which was fulfilled. Polybius' words sound like a soft echo—they hint at a possible danger which never became reality.

At this point I should like to note that the second part of Polybius' digression also contains at least one strange similarity to Plato. To be sure, it may be accidental that those three virtues in which Scipio is educated—self-control, magnanimity, and fortitude—occur again in the *Greater Alcibiades* (122 C) among others in a long series of virtues which are attributed to the Spartans. The Stoics had similar lists.⁷ But it cannot be due to chance that Polybius compares young Scipio's nature with that of a well-bred hound (κατὰ φύσιν οἰκέως διακειμένου καθάπερ εὐγενοῦς σκύλακος), whereas in Plato's *Republic* (II, 375 A) the

⁶ My student, D. Sachs, drew my attention to the parallel in Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorae*, § 24, where the pupil says to Pythagoras: ἀντιπελαργήσω τρόπον τινά.

⁷ H. v. Arnim, *Stoicorum Fragmenta*, III, p. 64.

nature of a well-bred watch-hound is likened to that of young men of good stock (οἷοι οὖν τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;). Polybius had this passage well in mind. There are others from the *Republic* which he quotes with or without the express remark "as Plato says";⁸ and it is well known that he abundantly uses and criticizes theories from the *Republic* and the *Laws*.⁹

III

The similarities which we have pointed out between the two episodes in Plato and in Polybius do exist. How, then, is this relationship to be accounted for? One cannot explain it in terms of literary tradition or literary imitation. For what Polybius tells his readers is not the less but rather the more an exact and highly reliable report because the historian is a participant in the event which he reports.

Two questions must be asked: Can it be established as probable that Polybius knew Plato's *Greater Alcibiades* or at least as improbable that he did not know the dialogue? And in this case, how can one understand the strange fact that an unquestionably historical event bears definite resemblance to a literary model?

To turn to the first question first, it is known—and we have already stated before—that Polybius was well acquainted with Plato's philosophy, most of all with his great political works, probably at an early period of his life. His intimacy with the Academy dates back to his years in Arcadia, whereas he probably was not steeped in the Stoic doctrine before he met, in the Scipionic circle, that great Stoic and humanistic philosopher, Panaetius.¹⁰

But Polybius not only quotes, uses, and criticizes Plato freely,

⁸ See R. v. Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* (Stuttgart, 1890), I, pp. 97 ff.

⁹ See the survey in v. Scala, *op. cit.*, p. 122. T. R. Glover's statement in *C. A. H.*, VIII, pp. 4 f.: "His references to Plato do not suggest great sympathy," might be equally applied to many passages in Aristotle. Would it not be misleading in the one case as well as in the other?

¹⁰ R. v. Scala, *op. cit.*, p. 201. It is unnecessary to go into details, since the book of v. Scala presents the whole material. See also J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 204, though Plato has not his appropriate place in the picture.

he enters into a competition with him. Referring to what one may call the central postulate of the *Republic* (473 C-D, 479 B-C), the identity of ruler and philosopher, he demands in almost the same words that the active statesman write history or that the historian have an active rule in the state: "Until this happens there will be no end to the ignorance of the historians." He himself is convinced that in his person are merged the philosopher and the statesman, the statesman and the historian, and his very wording shows how strongly he felt himself to be on a par with Plato—whereas his antagonist Timaeus was in his judgment "an unphilosophical and entirely uneducated writer" (ἀφιλόσοφος καὶ συλλήβδην ἀνάγωγος συγγραφεύς, XII, 25, 6).

It seems to be a contemporary point of view to single out the statesmanship and generalship of Polybius and to minimize his philosophic thought.¹¹ But he himself felt differently; and it may be said in general that there has never been a great historian without a meta-historic philosophy.

Philosophy, for Polybius, is linked, almost to the point of identity, with education, culture, παιδεία. Censuring king Prusias as "cowardly and wanton" (δειλὸς καὶ ἀσελγής),¹² he traces these defects to a lack of "education and philosophy" (παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας), for Prusias knows nothing of the theorems, or visions, or intuitions (θεωρήματα)—which apparently are the result of philosophic training—and has no notion of "what the beautiful is" (καλὸν τί ποτ' ἔστιν), where the very formula testifies to the philosophic, in the last instance Platonic, schooling of the man who uses it. Scipio, in sharp contrast to Prusias, combines the virtues of self-control (σωφροσύνη) and valor (ἀνδρεία). He owes them, after his natural gifts and the example of his father, to the formative influence of the historian's "education and philosophy." Thus we must judge in reading Polybius, and this was the judgment of Diodorus (XXXI, 26) who still possessed his entire work. Scipio, he relates, was from his youth steeped in Greek education. At eighteen he began to devote himself to philosophy, having as his "tutor" (ἐπιστάτης) Polybius of Megalopolis, the historian. Appian, too (*Punica*, 132), commenting on the conversation of the two men in view

¹¹ See, e. g., F. W. Walbank, in *Cl. Q.*, XXXVII (1943), p. 86. See also note 13, *infra*.

¹² Polybius, XXXVI, 15 Büttner-Wobst = XXXVII, 2 Bekker.

of Carthage's smoking ruins, simply calls Polybius the "teacher" (διδάσκαλος) of Scipio.¹³

Polybius, the admirer of Rome, the first to carry to the world abroad the right estimate of Rome, nevertheless criticized one thing in Roman life: the lack of education (Cicero, *De Re Publica*, IV, 3, 3: *disciplinam puerilem ingenuis . . . in qua una Polybius noster hospes nostrorum institutorum neglegentiam accusat*). But in what sense could he speak thus? He knew very well the training of the young Roman in the juridical and political life of the forum under the supervision of an elder statesman. This, consequently, was not the thing he felt to be missing. This sort of practical training, culminating in lawsuits and political handshaking, he directly contrasts with the form of life of young Scipio. What the Romans lacked and what Scipio was the first to be imbued with is "philosophy and culture." His education, then, was not an isolated happening. It was a work which Polybius, aided by Panaetius, carried on among the young generation of the Roman nobility. "Your Plato," says Laelius to Scipio in Cicero's dialogue *De Re Publica*, exactly where Roman education is the point in question (IV, 4); "our Plato," says another person of the dialogue, probably Scipio, still in the same context (IV, 5). For, after all, it was Plato—though Plato himself would have said: not I but Socrates—who was still the highest educational force in Greece and who became this force in Rome through the agency of Polybius. One cannot express it with plainer words than Cicero does again in the same work (III, 5, 3), when he puts in the mouth of one of the interlocutors the formula: "Scipio and his friends added to the native usage of our ancestors the teaching of Socrates coming from abroad" (*ad domesticum maiorumque morem etiam hanc a Socrate adventiciam doctrinam adhibuerunt*).

¹³ In Eduard Schwartz' chapter on Polybius in *Charakterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur*, p. 79, one excellent and very pertinent sentence ("Polybius verdankte es der hellenischen Philosophie . . .") is followed by an analysis which is directly refuted by Polybius' own account ("nicht als Philosoph, sondern als Mann des praktischen Lebens"—"nicht zur Tugend oder zur Weisheit will er seinen jungen Freund erziehen sondern zum römischen Nobile"). One might find it worth while to dwell on this departure of Schwartz from his own right understanding: it seems to me characteristic of a particular bias in modern, most of all in German, thought.

Philosophic communication—this was what Polybius himself had absorbed as a living Greek tradition. Its greatest representation in literature was for him, as for everyone, the work of Plato; its unequalled living master had been—no, still was—Socrates. Is it, after all, likely that Polybius had studied not only the *Republic* and the *Symposium* but also the *Greater Alcibiades*? One ought to prove rather that the widely read historian did *not* know the work among Plato's dialogues which bears the most fatal name of Greek history, a name so famous even among the Romans that they erected at an early period the bronze statue of Alcibiades when an oracle had told them to honor the most valiant of Greeks (Plutarch, *Numa*, 8). Polybius must have seen this monument in the forum. He could not have overlooked the dialogue which the entire classical world read among Plato's writings, and which the Academy, at least the later Academy, used as the "entrance gate" to Plato's philosophy: *Alcibiades or concerning the nature of man*.¹⁴

How, then, can one explain the strange similarity between the historical event which Polybius narrates and the scene shaped in Plato's imagination? That conversation of the year 167/6 B. C. remained sharply outlined in the memory of the historian. Is it necessary to say that, fortunately, we have no phonographic record of it but its condensation in a great piece of historic art? The event, probably at the very moment when it happened, and certainly at a later time when it was written down, evoked the scene from Plato's dialogue in Polybius' mind. He saw Scipio and himself as the more fortunate counterparts of Alcibiades and Socrates. The educational work which he accomplished with the son of Aemilius and consequently with the young Roman nobility he felt to be initiated, directed, and sanctioned by the great example. And he was not mistaken, of course. The power that was Socrates, recorded by Plato's art, had engendered both an event of the highest historical importance and "one of the most

¹⁴ See the introduction of Proclus' and Damascius' Commentaries: *Procli Opera Inedita*, ed. V. Cousin (Paris, 1864), pp. 281 ff.; *Initia Philosophiae ac Theologiae ex Platonicis Fontibus Ducta*, ed. Creuzer, II (Frankfurt, 1821), pp. 3 ff. It is perhaps not inappropriate to mention that Lucilius had read the *Charmides* when he wrote the twenty-ninth book of his *Satires*, i. e. between 132 and 123 B. C. See *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae*, ed. Marx, I, vv. 830-833, with Marx' commentary, II, p. 288; Cichorius, *Untersuchungen zu Lucilius*, pp. 68 ff., 177.

delightful passages in all ancient history."¹⁵ Polybius was at the same time the Socrates who acted in this event and the Plato who described it.

And herewith be this excursus to *The Building of Eternal Rome* turned over to the author of *Paideia* as material for his next volume.

IV

I have, throughout, spoken about the *Greater Alcibiades* as a work of Plato's, though as is well known, its genuineness has been doubted from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since I have already discussed this question three times in detail¹⁶ and since a Dutch scholar has recently taken it up in a thorough dissertation, he too deciding in favor of authenticity,¹⁷ I do not intend rehearsing the problem again.¹⁸ Whatever objections have been raised against Plato as the author of the work can after all be reduced to the criticism: I don't like it. We now know how much Polybius liked it—or better, that his aspect of philosophic education was shaped by it. One cannot prove that he read it as Plato's, but the opposite view is more than improbable, considering the unanimous judgment of antiquity.

I do not want to let this opportunity pass without presenting another eminent writer who seems to have known the *Greater Alcibiades*—Aristotle. His *Eroticus* is lost, together with his other dialogues and popular writings so famous in antiquity. But tradition has been especially unfriendly toward this particular work. Its outlines are still less recognizable than those of most of the writings in the group to which it belongs, and neither Bernays nor Jaeger has been able to contribute to its reconstruction. Only a few anecdotes about mythical and historical lovers have been preserved; and two general sentences, one of which has a more personal note (frag. 96, Rose): "Aristotle said that the lovers glance at no other part of the body of

¹⁵ W. Fowler, quoted by T. R. Glover, quoted by E. K. Rand.

¹⁶ *Der Grosse Alcibiades* (Bonn, 1921); Zweiter Teil: *Kritische Erörterung* (Bonn, 1923); *Platon*, II: *Die Platonischen Schriften*, pp. 233 ff., especially pp. 243 ff.

¹⁷ C. Vink, *Plato's Erste Alcibiades* (Amsterdam, 1939).

¹⁸ Even the few objections in P. Shorey's *What Plato Said*, pp. 652 f. cannot induce me to do so.

the beloved than into their eyes in which modesty, reverence, dwells." This is charmingly said, but it is quite insufficient to give an idea of the whole of which it was once a tiny part. Whether or not future research may yield a more complete picture remains to be seen.

The title *Eroticus* (or *Erotica*) and with it some elements of form and content were carried on in the Peripatetic and Stoic literature, but only some love stories and some scattered remarks on the inexhaustible subject are preserved from Theophrastus, Clearchus, and Aristo.¹⁹ The first book under the title which has come down to us, not in a few remainders but in its entirety, is the charming dialogue by Plutarch. His contribution is the setting in contemporary Boeotia and possibly the emphasis on marital love; yet it must contain more pieces from the lost work of Aristotle than the two fragments (frags. 97 and 98, Rose)²⁰ expressly quoted under his name. Moreover, since all the fragments from his and his followers' books on love are found either in Plutarch or in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*, there is a strong presumption that this huge basin may contain other trickles from the same source. When one reads in Athenaeus (XIII, p. 566 D) the sentence: "Did not Socrates the philosopher, so contemptuous of all the rest, yield to the beauty of Alcibiades, and likewise the most solemn Aristotle to his pupil from Phaselis?" may it be ventured, though only as a conjecture, that Aristotle had made himself and Theodectes of Phaselis persons of his dialogue or that at least he referred in it to this beloved pupil?

But to return to what is more general and more certain, it has become common knowledge to what extent those popular writings of Aristotle were meant to vie with Plato's dialogues: the

¹⁹ Theophrastus, frags. 107-115, Wimmer; *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. C. Mueller, II, pp. 313 ff.; *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, ed. v. Arnim, I, pp. 75 ff. I do not wish to take up the problem of the distinction between Aristo the Peripatetic and Aristo the Stoic; see Gereke and v. Arnim, s. v. "Ariston," *R.-E.*, II, cols. 953 ff.; A. Mayer, "Aristonstudien," *Philologus*, Supplementband XI (1907-1910), pp. 483 ff.; C. Jensen, "Ariston von Keos bei Philodem," *Hermes*, XLVI (1911), pp. 393 ff.

²⁰ C. Hubert's note in *Plutarchi Moralia*, IV, p. 367: "'Αριστ. fr. 98 R., sed est Arist. Chalcidicus (Realenc. s. v. Aristoteles, nr. 14)" is very improbable.

Eudemus with the *Phaedo*, the *Gryllus* with the *Gorgias*, the *Protrepticus* with the *Theaetetus* and the *Euthydemus*; Aristotle's *Symposium*, *Politicus*, *Sophistes*, *Menexenus* show by their very titles that they were "conditioned by their namesakes in Plato's work" (Jaeger). It would be a miracle if the *Eroticus* should not have had a similar relationship, most of all to Plato's *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. The rivalry may often have consisted in toning down the exaltedness of the master to a level of exhaustive experience and common sense. It will not be astonishing, then, to find the above-mentioned sentence from the *Eroticus* suggestive of a passage in the *Greater Alcibiades* (133 A ff.), that passage which—as I once put it—would by itself be sufficient to guarantee the origin of the dialogue from the master's hand; one of the several passages which—according to Paul Shorey²¹—"it is hard to attribute to any lesser hand than Plato's": If an eye wants to see itself, it cannot look at any other part of the facing person's body except that part which is similar to itself; it must look into another eye and into its most precious part, in which is located the eye's excellence, which is the vision (power of seeing).

The similarity in the wording, I think, is such that chance could hardly bring it about:

Aristotle

τοὺς ἐραστὰς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ
σώματος τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀποβλέπειν
ἢ εἰς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐν οἷς τὴν
αἰδῶ κατοικεῖν.

Plato

τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν
. . . εἰ δέ γ' εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου βλέπει . . . τοῦ σώματος
εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει
ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγυνομένη.

The thought, to be sure, is by no means identical. In Plato the Delphic postulate, "Know yourself," is made clear by a startling simile: as the lover sees himself in the eyes of the beloved, thus Alcibiades' soul is challenged to see itself in the mirror of Socrates' soul. In Aristotle it is a general experience with a moral and proverbial turn,²² still graceful, though by no means extraordinary. Is this not exactly what one expects when Aristotle

²¹ Shorey, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

²² Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, 6, 1384 a 35: ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ.

imitates Plato? The passage of the *Greater Alcibiades* was famous at least in late antiquity. One may not be able to prove it beyond any doubt, but it is more likely than unlikely that Aristotle had it in mind when he wrote his *Eroticus*. I have formerly set forth the probability that Xenophon in his *Memoirs* drew from the *Greater Alcibiades*—as he did from other dialogues of Plato²³—and that Aeschines the Socratic, in writing his *Alcibiades*, from which significant fragments are preserved, was deeply indebted to the same work. Between those Socratics and Polybius, Aristotle has a good claim to have profited by Plato's *Greater Alcibiades*.

There is, of course, a possibility that Aristotle did not draw on Plato's dialogue directly, but, say, on Aeschines' imitation of it. But we do not know whether Aeschines' book contained such a passage, and even if it had there is no reason to believe that Aristotle would have preferred the far inferior work of an imitator to that of his own teacher and master.

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²³ See Heinrich Maier, *Sokrates* (Tübingen, 1913), pp. 53 ff.; Heinrich Gomperz, "Die Sokratische Frage als geschichtliches Problem," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXIX, p. 384.

THE MEANING OF THE *PHARSALIA*.

In a brief but illuminating study Sikes has shown that the whole conception of the *Pharsalia* would have been different if Lucan had not been a Stoic, and that "commentators have strangely underrated the importance of philosophy as the chief—if not the only—cause of Lucan's complete break with epic convention."¹ He points out the best approach to an understanding of the *Pharsalia* when he states that the absence of myth and the poet's attempt to explain the motives of human actions are based upon his philosophy. Sikes, however, is more interested in the cause of Lucan's failure to give the gods some place in his poetry, as Lucretius had done, or to find some convincing substitute for them by using, for instance, the device of Personification, than he is in the meaning, structure, or aim of the poem.

In this paper I wish to suggest that the *Pharsalia* is an experiment in the technique of epic poetry, and an interesting if a not very successful one. I shall attempt to show that Lucan, who knew Aristotle's statement that the unity of a plot does not consist in having one man as the hero but in having an action that is organically unified, deliberately planned an epic in which the reader's interest was not to be focussed upon one central figure. The poem has been misunderstood because its composition and the deeper meaning of the characters involved have not been clearly seen and because critics have been too intent upon looking for a hero whose selection colors their discussions of the meaning and value of the poem.²

Thus for Teuffel,³ Butler⁴ and Heitland,⁵ Caesar dominates

¹ E. E. Sikes, *Roman Poetry* (New York, 1923), pp. 194-209.

² See for instance Alfred Klotz, *Gesch. der röm. Lit.* (Leipzig, 1930), p. 258: "Das Werk ist also nicht nach einem Plane entstanden, sondern der Dichter hat sein Ziel wesentlich verändert, als ein Teil des Werkes bereits veröffentlicht war. Daraus erklärt es sich, dass das Gedicht überhaupt keinen Helden, keinen einheitlichen Inhalt hat." See also pp. 259 f. Additional references will be found in R. J. Getty, "Who is the Hero of the Poem?", *M. Annaei Lucani De Bello Civili Liber I* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. xxiv-xxix.

³ W. S. Teuffel, *Gesch. der röm. Lit.* (Leipzig, 1910), II, p. 266: "... aber für Pompeius entschieden Partei nimmt, dessen Sache für

the poem, "a hero," says Teuffel "not in virtue of the poet's efforts but in spite of them." Pichon supports the candidacy of Cato for the central position in the *Pharsalia*,⁶ while Plessis would allow Pompey a prominent place in books four to eight, Caesar being the hero of the first books and the Roman people the hero of the whole poem.⁷ Nutting is convinced that Lucan intended to glorify Freedom,⁸ Giraud claims the same position for the Roman Republic,⁹ Merivale is no less certain that the poet's choice was the Senate.¹⁰ According to Summers' view there are three heroes, Pompey, Caesar, and Lucan himself.¹¹ But Duff would prefer Caesar, Pompey, and Cato;¹² "a triumvirate," says Eva Sanford, "from which the Muse of Epic Unity would have averted her face in very shame."¹³ Her point is that epic unity does not demand a single hero but a single theme and she considers the civil war as the theme that gives unity and purpose to Lucan's epic. The suggestion that Lucan may not

den Dichter die von Roms Freiheit und Grösse ist. Da aber der Held der historischen Ereignisse Caesar ist, so ist von vornherein ein Zwiespalt in das Gedicht gekommen."

⁴ H. E. Butler, *Post-Augustan Poetry*, p. 105.

⁵ W. E. Heitland, Introduction to Haskins, *M. Annaei Lucani Pharsalia* (London, 1887), p. lxii.

⁶ R. Pichon, *Histoire de la litt. latine* (Paris, 1930), p. 567. See also Wolf H. Friedrich, "Cato, Caesar und Fortuna bei Lucan," *Hermes*, LXXIII (1938), pp. 391-423, and particularly pp. 421 f.: "Vom Standpunkt Cato's aus betrachtet er das Geschehen, und insofern kann man sagen, dass dieser der wahre Held des Epos sei: Caesar bestimmt die Ereignisse, Cato ihre Darstellung."

⁷ *La Poésie latine* (Paris, 1909), p. 560.

⁸ H. C. Nutting, "The Hero of the Pharsalia," *A. J. P.*, LIII (1932), pp. 41-52.

⁹ For a discussion of his views see E. M. Sanford, "Lucan and the Civil War," *Class. Phil.*, XXVIII (1933), pp. 121-7.

¹⁰ *History of the Romans under the Empire* (New York, 1885), VI, p. 237.

¹¹ *The Silver Age of Latin Literature from Tiberius to Trajan* (New York, 1920), p. 41: "As for its composition, its defects can be summed up very briefly: half the episodes would be better away, and there are three heroes. For the formal hero is overshadowed by the villain Caesar, and the person whom we are expected to admire is—Lucan himself."

¹² J. Wight Duff, *A Lit. Hist. of Rome in the Silver Age* (New York, 1927), p. 329.

¹³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 121.

have intended to build his poem around a central hero is undoubtedly correct since, if this had been his intention, his readers would have been aware of it and there would not be such a multiplicity of eligible candidates to choose from. For, even though he was not a poet of genius, Lucan knew a great deal about the technique of epic poetry. But he also knew that a poet is not a historian and that, to paraphrase Aristotle's *Poetics*, the essential distinction lies in the fact that the historian relates what has happened, and the poet represents what might have happened, that poetry tends rather to express what is universal and typical whereas history relates particular events as such, in a word, that poetry is more philosophical than history.

While Stoic critics recognised the unequalled excellence of Homer in epic poetry they had to exert much ingenuity in order to extract hidden meanings from a mythology which they could not accept literally. We know that the necessity for allegorical interpretations of Greek myths and the use of the supernatural in poetry were subjects frequently discussed among the later Stoics. Heraclitus, probably under Augustus, had explained the allegories of Homer¹⁴ in such an elaborate etymological, ethical, physical, and allegorical manner that he could take his place among the mediaeval commentators of the classics. Homer, he declares, is the fount of all knowledge and has left posterity his whole philosophy to extract from his allegories. Those who are steeped in the philosophical doctrine and have already penetrated within the holy precincts must search for the sacred truth hidden in the songs of the poets. They will realise that, far from writing shameful things about the gods, he constantly veiled deep truths under allegories.

This method had been forced upon the Stoics for, in spite of their admiration for Homer, they could not countenance any "willing suspension of disbelief." L. Annaeus Cornutus, one of Lucan's Stoic teachers and a freedman of the Annaei, had written

¹⁴ On the allegorical interpretations of the Stoics see E. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, translated by Rev. O. J. Reichel (London, 1892), pp. 354-69.

On Heraclitus see Reinhardt's article in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Herakleitos," no. 12. Bibliography in Überweg, *Gesch. der Philos.*, p. 158*; Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. der griech. Litt.*⁶ (Müller's *Handbuch*, VII, 2, 1), p. 368.

an essay on the ethical meaning of mythological tales. He was also interested in the epic genre, and had composed a commentary on Vergil whom he criticised freely.¹⁵ Discussions must have taken place among his disciples about the supernatural machinery of epic poetry, the value of historical epics, and the possibility of reviving a genre which many considered dead.¹⁶ Lucan may also have heard his uncle Seneca express doubts as to the value of the allegorical method of interpreting Homer and the use of allegory in epic poetry.¹⁷

Sikes, with much penetration, has seen that Lucan's abandonment of the gods in his epic poem was a drastic step requiring courage and due entirely to his Stoic philosophy. He believes that if the personifications of Roman religion had been less shadowy and abstract they might, in the *Pharsalia*, have taken the place of the Homeric and Vergilian divinities.¹⁸ But it seems clear to me that Lucan had something far more revolutionary in mind than a mere substitution of poetic personifications for mythological gods.

His imagination had been fired by the doctrines of his Stoic teachers and he intended that his poetic treatment of the civil war should reveal his view of the government of the world and the fate of man. He thought that, by adopting the pattern of the historical epic and, through the use of Stoic philosophy, by endowing the particular men and events with universal significance, he could pour new life into the old mould of the epic. The following pages will show why I believe that, when Lucan chose to write a poem on the Civil War, he conceived a poem with a double theme, the obvious historical one of the vicissitudes of the struggling armies and their generals, the deeper and far more important one of the tribulations of humanity in its struggle toward the Stoic ideal of wisdom and harmony with the divine principle. The long tradition of allegorical interpretations among the Stoics made it natural for him, both as a Stoic and as a poet, to express himself on two levels, to expect his readers to grasp

¹⁵ Aulus Gellius, *N. A.*, IX, 10, 5; II, 6, 1.

¹⁶ For ancient comments on the difficulties of the historical Epic see J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Lit. Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931), pp. 416 ff.

¹⁷ *Ep.* 88, 5 ff.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 205 ff.

the deep ethical and mystic significance of the forces at work in the segment of human history which he was describing and to see their projection on the universal plane. Under the thin covering of the story of the civil war he intended to give poetic and dramatic treatment to the Stoic idea of divine man, and to replace the gods by god-like men whose virtues and vices would make them incarnations of the Stoic conception of Wisdom, Virtue, and Wickedness.

He chose for the setting of his poem a crisis in Roman history close enough to his own time for the men involved to be vividly remembered, as giants perhaps, but also as real, living heroes; and one in which events had been of such proportions that some of these heroes had already become idealised types who had acquired universal significance. If the plot was limited in time and space, the real theme was eternal.

Lucan follows closely the somewhat eclectic philosophy of the later Roman Stoics. His universe is the materialistic universe of the Stoics, created from the primal element, fire, by a divine ruler who has established the chain of causes for all eternity, binding to them man, the gods, and himself. All beings have a common origin and are inseparable from the gods, for all animate and inanimate things contain a spark of the divine fire. This fire, which has given birth to all things, will again consume the universe, for at the end of ages a conflagration will dissolve the whole world which will revert to primeval chaos. Fate, the power which rules over men and gods alike, is the eternally fixed order whose ultimate purpose is good. Lucan at times seems to lose sight of this ultimate end and bitterly complains of Chance and Fortune. We are reminded of Plutarch's criticism of Chrysippus who apparently sometimes attributed the evils that overcame good men to causes which implied a reflection upon Providence. Although lines are found in the *Pharsalia* which express doubts and pessimistic views, they are no more characteristic of Lucan's real thought than similar passages in the works of other Stoics are characteristic of Stoicism. Davidson remarks that optimism is a distinctive trait of the Stoics in their reflective moods, "although, when they were confronted by the actual experience of life's pains and hardships and by the deep-rooted depravity of human nature, they could not help sometimes giving expression

to pessimistic thoughts. This is very noticeable in Seneca, who, even when administering comfort in bereavement, cannot help being despondent."¹⁹ I do not agree with Friedrich's view (*loc. cit.*) that Lucan's conception of the *Pharsalia* was wholly determined by his revolt against the gods' government of the world. Friedrich believes that in regard to the relationship of Fate and mankind Lucan's position was the exact opposite of Vergil's, that for Vergil virtue consisted in fulfilling the will of the gods, for Lucan in opposing it. The pessimistic lines in which Lucan suggests the possibility that the gods may be indifferent and mankind ruled by chance are very reminiscent of many passages in Seneca's tragedies, like the famous Ode to Nature and the Ruler of Olympus in the *Phaedra* (972-988). Again his bitter denunciations of Fortuna have many parallels in the statements of the later Stoic philosophers who, though scornful of the goddess, saw in her betrayals and in the apparent injustice of the gods an opportunity for the wise man to demonstrate his independence of worldly goods and material success. Passages in which Seneca and Lucan express their indignation at such injustice are highly rhetorical and represent passing moods rather than fundamental beliefs.

Again, the fact that Lucan occasionally outlines several theories and seems to be in doubt as to their respective value should not be misunderstood. Seneca also frequently uses the rhetorical device of presenting his readers with several choices without clearly stating his own even in cases where only one of them represents the Stoic doctrine and his own.²⁰

While most of the later Stoic theories are in the background of the *Pharsalia*, what matters most to Lucan is man and his place in the scheme of things. His heroes are men in their different relations to Fate and the Divinity, men who symbolize man's destiny in the world. On a small scale the history of the civil war is the history of all mankind. The constant allusions to the Stoic theory that history repeats itself in a series of cycles serves not only to foreshadow the coming catastrophes but also to give the particular events and heroes of the war universal significance. For there is a close correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm:

¹⁹ *The Stoic Creed* (Edinburgh, 1907), p. 212.

²⁰ For instance *Ad Polyb. De Cons.*, 9, 3; 5, 1; *Ep.* 16, 5, etc.

Invida fatorum series summisque negatum
 Stare diu nimioque graves sub pondere lapsus
 Nec se Roma ferens. Sic cum compage soluta
 Saecula tot mundi suprema coegerit hora,
 Antiquum repetens chaos . . . (I, 70 ff.).

At the very start the struggle is compared to the Gigantomachia and thus raised above the level of an incident in the history of Rome (I, 33 ff.).

It is significant that, of the protagonists in the great contest, Caesar and Cato are the first to appear. For they are two super-human, almost allegorical figures, standing at either pole of the dualistic ethical system of Stoicism, as uncompromisingly opposed as darkness and light. Pompey, who makes his first appearance only near the end of the second book, represents man, buffeted between the powers of good and evil, his life determined by Fate, yet free to choose his course and to determine himself.

The Stoics, and particularly the Roman Stoics, were practical philosophers. As teachers of ethics they realised that the examples of great and virtuous men provided better models than theoretical exhortations. The Schools had therefore adopted a number of wise men whom they set up as models of perfection and whose lives had been idealised in order to make them supremely worthy of imitation.²¹ Thus ethical myths were developed, Roman names being added to the traditional list of the older Stoics, and Cato surpassing them all in wisdom and virtue. Lucan must have thought that powerful inspiration could be derived from such idealised characters if, through epic treatment, they were endowed with warmth, reality, and the breath of life. In so doing he was much influenced by the Stoic textbooks of ethics and especially by Seneca's moral teaching. Thus the Stoic practise of depriving individuals of personal characteristics, of turning them into models to be admired or abhorred, influenced Lucan more when he introduced philosophical types into his epic than the Aristotelian theory of the Universal.²² As Homer had given to the

²¹ E. Vernon Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge, 1911), pp. 295 ff.; Davidson, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 ff.

²² Sikes, *op. cit.* p. 201: "Lucan, however, whether consciously or unconsciously, pushed the Aristotelian theory of the Universal to an extreme from which Aristotle himself might well have recoiled."

Greeks in Ulysses an exemplar of the Sage, so Lucan determined to endow Latin literature with a true philosophical epic of man. He was to be the Latin Homer, thus rivalling the two Epicurean poets of Rome, Lucretius and Vergil:

Nam, si quid Latiis fas est promittere Musis,
Quantum Zmyrnaei durabunt vatis honores,
Venturi me teque legent; Pharsalia nostra
Vivet, et a nullo tenebris damnabimur aevo
(IX, 983-986).

This aim determined for Lucan the choice of subject matter. For the Roman Stoics were agreed that "the immortal gods have given to us in Cato a truer exemplar of the wise man than to earlier ages in Ulysses and Hercules" (Seneca, *Const.*, 2, 1). A perfect Sage other than Cato could not conceivably have become the hero of a Stoic epic in Latin. And since he was to be represented in relation to other human beings, for the Stoics taught that Nature does not intend man to live alone, the Civil War must of necessity be the subject of Lucan's poem.

The architecture of the *Pharsalia* was obviously planned in its minutest details. From this point of view the treatment of Cato is interesting. Since he was to be in direct contrast to Caesar, while Pompey was to be in contrast to both Cato and Caesar, all three characters must be clearly drawn at the start. But if Cato and Pompey were pictured as acting and living together Pompey would be constantly dwarfed by Cato. Therefore Lucan sketched Cato's personality vividly, but in the first part of the poem in outline, giving him only a static character, while he represented him in action as a brilliant orator and a dynamic leader of men after Pompey's death. Thus the five passages in which Cato is mentioned before the ninth book portray the Cato of the philosophical textbooks, the ethical myth of Stoicism, and sound somewhat like versified passages of Seneca.

The demonstration that in the *Pharsalia* Cato incarnates the Stoic ideal of perfect goodness and wisdom need not detain us long. He has attained the state of *ἀραπαξία*, the sublime impassivity of a man truly free because he is under no compulsion and suffers nothing. Like Seneca's good man, he has offered himself to fate (*praeberere se fato*, *Prov.*, 5, 8), conforms his course to the divine law of the universe, bases his judgment on

reason, and is wholly free from irrational desires. Inspired by "the god that dwells within his breast" (IX, 564), Cato has insight into the real values, his intelligence aided by intuition perceives the right course at a glance without the need of any guidance, human or divine. With courage and complete self-control he majestically follows the path of wisdom.

The famous description in the second book in which he is praised as a lover of austerity and the living image of the four cardinal virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice, sounds again like a school exercise on the ideal wise man, or like the versification of some of the numerous passages in Seneca's works in praise of Cato (*Prov.*, 2, 9; 3, 14; *Const.*, 2, 2; 7, 1; *Epp.*, 24, 6; 64, 10; 71, 15; 104, 29, etc.). Cato's duty as a perfect Stoic is to strive actively and energetically toward the common good. But it is characteristic of his godly disposition that he does so without passion. His universal philanthropy and his justice are cold because he is totally devoid of interest in or emotion about any individual. In one passage, Cato sounds less detached, when he declares to Brutus that he will not "without feeling fear himself watch the stars and the world fall down. For, he will not sit with folded hands when the high heavens crash down and the earth trembles with the confused weight of a collapsing world." "O gods," he says, "keep far from me this madness that I should be indifferent while Rome falls" (II, 296 f.). The early Stoics might well have taken exception to this evidence of inner disturbance on the part of a wise man, but not so the Stoics of the later Roman schools. Cicero had stated that emotions cannot be entirely uprooted from the heart of a wise man, *nisi ex eius animo extirpatam humanitatem arbitramur* (*De Amic.*, 48). Speaking of the ruin that befalls one's country in the midst of a war, Seneca says: "I admit the wise man feels such things, for I do not claim that he has the hardness of stone or steel . . ." (*Const.*, 10, 4). He adds that the wise man is not insensible but that he knows how to overcome his feelings, knowing that all things work toward an ultimately good end and that external evils are no evils (*Prov.*, 2, 2).

But on the whole Cato is impervious to human emotions. He passes through life, serene and imperturbable, without a pang, for reason is ever his guide and he knows that God disciplines

those whom He loves (Seneca, *Prov.*, 4, 7). He tells his soldiers that "endurance finds delight in hardship and virtue rejoices in proportion to the difficulties it overcomes" (IX, 403). For Lucan, as for Seneca, he is godlike, sacred, worthy of divine worship (IX, 600 ff.; cf. Seneca, *Ep.*, 64, 10), and his utterances are oracular (*arcano sacras dedit Cato pectore voces*, II, 285; cf. IX, 255, etc.). With great care Lucan has adapted Cato's style to this character, his eloquence is restrained, his arguments sober and always based on reason. Lucan has eliminated from Cato's vocabulary all words denoting emotions, pleasure, desire, fear.

But, because his every action is a manifestation of Stoic virtue, because he has no weaknesses and can neither lapse nor progress, we find in him nothing lovable. "His virtue," as Seneca says of the Sage, "has placed him in another region of the universe and he has nothing in common with you" (*Const.*, 15, 3). He feels no pity, no tenderness, no imaginative sympathy for human suffering. "He is nailed to his pinnacle" (Seneca, *Clem.*, I, 8, 4). Greatness which so transcends the limits of man's nature leaves us cold and unconvinced. Rather than a magnetic leader of men he remains a lifeless abstraction, an allegorical figure.

The splendid artifice of contrast, to borrow De Quincey's phrase, is for Lucan more than a rhetorical device. It is the translation on the literary plane of the dualism of Stoic ethics. Heraclitus, explaining that things are known to us only through their opposites, had said: "Disease makes health pleasant and good; hunger, satiety; toil, rest."²³ Thus evil is the necessary counterpart of goodness and in order to enhance the brightness of his picture of virtue Lucan must oppose to it a symbol of the wicked in all its blackness. The subject matter of his poem again determined the choice of Caesar to become Cato's opposite, the type of all that is evil in the human soul. The idea of contrasting the personalities of Cato and Caesar was of course not new. Every Roman interested in the growth of the Cato legend would remember Sallust's sharp and dramatic characterization of the two men in which every quality of the one is balanced by a phrase describing its exact opposite in the other.²⁴

²³ Frag. 111 (Diels).

²⁴ See Kurt Latte, *Sallust* (Leipzig, 1935), p. 26; cf. T. R. S. Broughton, "Was Sallust Fair to Cicero?," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII (1936), p. 43.

The Stoics had concentrated their teaching upon the virtuous and the good, and spent far less time in analysing the negative quality of evil. They did not have such a set of stock-characters to represent vice as they had in Socrates, Hercules, Ulysses, Cato, etc. to represent virtue. Seneca opposes Alexander to Hercules: "Alexander was considered the equal of Hercules. But what resemblance to him had that mad youth for whom fortunate rashness took the place of virtue? Hercules conquered nothing for himself . . . he was a peacemaker. . . . But Alexander was from boyhood a robber and a plunderer of nations, a scourge both to his friends and to his enemies, one who thought it the highest happiness to terrorise all mortals, forgetting that it is not only the fiercest animals, but also the most cowardly, that are feared on account of their venom" (*Ben.*, I, 13, 3). Alexander was a madman, great only in that which is puny (*Ep.*, 91, 17), driven by his mad ambition to lay waste other men's countries (*Ep.*, 94, 62). His aim was to control all things but his emotions (*Ep.*, 113, 29). His greed and ambition were such that he was ever unsatisfied, being always in need of as much as he still desired (*Ben.*, VII, 2, 6). Adorned and amplified, such passages seem to have become Lucan's model for his outline of Caesar's character. And it is interesting to note that in the beginning of the tenth book he pictures Caesar hastening to the tomb of Alexander:

Illic Pellaei proles vaesana Philippi,
Felix praedo, iacet, terrarum vindice fato
Raptus: sacratis totum spargenda per orbem
Membra viri posuere adytis . . .

. . . non utile mundo

Editus exemplum, terras tot posse sub uno
Esse viro . . .

Humana cum strage ruit gladiumque per omnes
Exegit gentes; ignotos miscuit amnes
Persarum Euphraten, Indorum sanguine Gangen,
Terrarum fatale malum fulmenque, quod omnes
Percuteret pariter populos, et sidus iniquum
Gentibus . . .

Lucan, in this picture of mad wickedness incarnate, so clearly meant to represent Alexander as a prototype of Caesar that I need not point out the numerous verbal parallels between this passage and others where Lucan describes Caesar.

Caesar does not seem to have exemplified wickedness for the Roman Stoics as Cato did virtue. But since Alexander had often been used by Seneca to represent the incarnation of wickedness, Lucan, by this pairing of Caesar and Alexander in conjunction, so to speak, was attempting to introduce Caesar among the traditionally wicked men. Moreover he takes great pains to point out that Caesar is no ordinary human being but an ally of the powers of darkness, of Stygian madness and crime (VII, 168 ff.) "Wherever he wanders, like Bellona brandishing her bloody whip, or Mars urging on his Bistonian steeds and lashing them, terrified as they are by the aegis of Pallas, there a vast darkness of crimes descends, slaughter begins, and a groaning is heard like one great cry, and arms resound with the fall of breastplates and swords snapping swords" (VII, 567-573). Here we have not only Caesar the general but a demon out of Hades, a magnificently evil fiend, a superhuman antagonist worthy of the saintly Cato. Just as in the Stoic system evil served mainly to set off goodness, so in the *Pharsalia* Cato's virtue was to shine more brightly and to be more inspiring in contrast to Caesar's wickedness. That Cato became Caesar's foil instead reminds us inevitably of Milton's treatment of Satan and Christ.

While calm reason rules over Cato, Caesar is all impulse and passion. His actions are controlled by irrational emotions, his end is the criminal assumption of power after a criminal civil war. Thus over and above the individual conflict of the war between Caesar and Cato there is the far more significant eternal struggle between reason and passion. While a wise man's course follows the divine law of an ordered universe, for "where unity and harmony are there must also be the virtues" (Seneca, *V. B.*, 8, 6), Caesar is as unpredictable as the blind forces of nature. He is likened to the lightning which strikes terror into men's hearts and whose course cannot be opposed (I, 151 ff.), to a gale or a great fire (III, 363), to Etna if it were sealed up (X, 447 f.), or again to wild beasts, the mother tigress (V, 405), or the lion, lashing himself with his tail (I, 205). Like theirs his rage is fierce and uncontrolled and Lucan accumulates words like *rabies*, *furor*, *crimina* (VII, 551), *acer*, *indomitus* (I, 146), *in arma furens* (II, 439) to describe him and his actions. As destructive as the elements, he rejoices in devastation, in ruining lands with

fire and sword (II, 440). His mind filled with violent emotions (*ingentes motus*, I, 184), he rushes on frantically and with impetuous haste destroys all obstacles.

Lucan has been sharply criticised for attributing wicked motives to Caesar's every action. But the Stoics always held that before a man could be pronounced good or bad his motives and principles must be investigated. Marcus Aurelius says that "man is worth as much as what he is interested in is worth" (*Med.*, VII, 3). Since Lucan accepted the theory that evil consists in intention and inclination at least as much as in actual deeds, that character counts above all else, he must keep pointing out that what seemed harmless or magnanimous in Caesar only appeared so because of his hypocritical deceit. Inspired by pride and ambition, two passions against which the Stoics had much to say, Caesar aims at absolute power, at enslaving the Commonwealth. He has left behind him peace and legality and burns with desire for a regal throne (VII, 240; V, 668). In this pursuit he is completely lacking in moral principles and his cynicism is such that he cannot believe in the purity of anyone's motives. He knows that "the causes of hatred and of popularity are determined by the supply of food" and that willing service may be bought (III, 55 f.). For no one is more skilled in deceit and trickery than he is. The tears he sheds when he first recognises the head of Pompey are insincere and hide his delight (IX, 1037 f.). He lies when he assures his soldiers that his desire is to return to private life and to play the part of an ordinary citizen (VII, 266), but Fortune alone is aware of his secret ambition to be crowned (V, 665).

The Stoics held that "a wicked and foolish man does not lack any vice. . . . All vices are in all men, but they are not all conspicuous in each man" (Seneca, *Ben.*, IV, 27, 3). In Caesar, Lucan has created a superhuman figure endowed in almost equal degree with all the sins, an exemplar of evil, the incarnation of abstract Sinfulness. We need only review the lists of emotions which, according to the Stoic teachers, constitute the four sinful conditions, to realise that not one is absent from Caesar's portrait: *Omnesque eae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures; aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi*

gestientis animi elationem voluptariam (Cicero, *Fin.*, III, 10, 35). Fear alone is not a prominent characteristic of the great general who rather inspires fear in others. His soldiers are terrified of him (I, 356), conquered men look at him with silent terror (*gaudet esse timori*, III, 82), "he is glad to be so dreaded by his countrymen and he would not have preferred their love" (III, 81 f.). His own physical courage is magnificent but at the same time he is the prey of other fears. He dreads that the weapons and hands will be denied him for the execution of his crimes (V, 368), that his soldiers will return to their senses (V, 309), that he will lose the fruit of his crime as his troops come near to deserting him (V, 242). What is more striking, Lucan has even endowed him with the panic fear of lesser men, so that not one of the major or minor vices may be missing from his make-up. At the start of the battle of Pharsalia he is deeply afraid for a moment (VII, 248) and later, when he is surrounded by his enemies in the Egyptian palace, he feels both rage and fear, "fear of an attack and rage at his own fear" (*tangunt animos iraeque metusque, Et timet incursus indignaturque timere*, X, 443 f.). In his desperate plight he dreads the wickedness of slaves and "like a helpless woman when her city is taken" he wanders uncertainly (X, 458 ff.) doubting whether to fear death or pray for it (X, 542). And at the Rubicon, when the vision of Rome appears before him, "trembling seized the leader's limbs, his hair stood on end, numbness stopped his motion and arrested his feet on the edge of the riverbank" (I, 192-194).

In the catalogue of those morbid emotions which make the exercise of reason impossible, the Stoics emphasised greed, anger, cruelty, grief or worry, fretfulness, disappointed ambition, restlessness, misanthropy, sexual indulgence.²⁵ All these traits Lucan so stressed in his portrait of Caesar as to make it obvious to any disciple of the creed that he meant him to incarnate vice and wickedness. If Cato is a saint, Caesar is the very spirit of evil. Enough passages have already been quoted to show Caesar's inclination to anger and his delight in slaughter and bloodshed. His soldiers prefer to commit sacrilege than to disobey him for "they had weighed his wrath against the wrath of heaven" (III, 439). He hates peace and the absence of a foe (III, 365) and,

²⁵ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 331 ff.

while many degrees and variations of anger are distinguished by the philosophers, his is more cruel, fiercer, and wilder than that of ordinary human beings. Even when he pardons his enemies and appears most humane he does so for evil motives, either to induce others to surrender or to dishonor the men to whom he shows mercy (II, 518).

While a dignified and impersonal form of grief may be experienced by the Sage, as when Cato mourns over his country and deplores the madness of men, grief in its many varieties is a disease unknown to the wise. A few quotations will suffice to show that Caesar is suffering from disappointed ambition, fretfulness, and restlessness. He feels that he has been robbed of the reward of his toil and is filled with bitterness because he has been refused honors and a triumph. He cannot endure a superior (I, 125) and even after he has been loaded with the triumphs of victory he feels frustrated (V, 666 f.). For him "the whole expanse of the Roman world is not enough and he would think his kingdom small if he ruled at once India and Phoenician Gades" (X, 456 f.). No victory can satisfy his impetuous haste (III, 50 ff.), in his folly he follows up each success, ever pursuing the unattainable (*successus urguere suos*, I, 148). Even victory is not worth the price of waiting and, impatient of peace or of any pause in warfare (II, 651), he loathes even a short delay (VII, 241). His reckless energy cannot rest (I, 144) for he thinks nothing done as long as anything remains to do (*in omnia praeceps, Nil actum credens, cum quid superesset agendum*, II, 656). Resignation to what cannot be avoided, acceptance of fate, these virtues of a reasonable man he lacks utterly.

The description of the magnificent feast in the Egyptian palace, a palace equal to a temple in size and luxury, is clearly a companion piece to the description of the austerity of Cato's dwelling; and the banquet in which every choice delicacy that earth, air, the sea, or the Nile produces is served to Caesar and Cleopatra is in contrast to the grave and simple ceremony of Cato's marriage. Caesar's departure from soberness, the "gestientis animi elatio voluptaria" as Cicero defines this sinful condition (*Fin.*, III, 10, 35), is illustrated by his relation with Cleopatra, again in contrast to Cato's virtuous union with Marcia. Cleopatra has won her petition and his favor, not because of the justice of her

cause but because of her "wicked beauty" (X, 105 f.). Caesar not only lacks restraint and self-control but he has succumbed to the temptation of foul pleasure. He has mocked the sanctity of marriage, "mingled adulterous love with his worries, joined unlawful wedlock and illegitimate offspring with warfare . . . given Julia brothers by an abominable mother" (X, 74-78). Even worse, he has endangered the safety of the Roman state, for "just as Spartan Helen with her harmful beauty overthrew Argos and Troy, so Cleopatra stirred up the fury of Italy" (X, 61 f.). As a result of this fateful union, "there was doubt, by the waters of Leucas, whether a woman, and not even a Roman woman, should rule the world" (X, 66 f.).

Thus, although the Stoics held that even the wicked retained some spark of the divine fire, some germ of virtue (*inest interim animis voluntas bona, sed torpet*, Seneca, *Ben.*, V, 25, 6), Lucan has given Caesar no redeeming characteristic. He has made him an undisciplined, unreasonable, and fundamentally wicked figure, the incarnation of evil. The character which was to be pictured for the ultimately greater glory of divine virtue has assumed loftier and more heroic proportions than his opposite. For although they are both symbolic figures, Caesar is more complex, more finely drawn, and far more alive than Cato.

No character in Lucan's *Civil War* has been more thoroughly and more generally misunderstood than Pompey. For most critics have attempted either to make him a pure hero or to deprive him entirely of any admirable quality. If my interpretation of the poem is correct, Pompey is neither black nor white, but represents those men whom the Stoics called *proficientes* (probationers).²⁶ In other words, while Cato and Caesar are universal types, symbols at either end of the ethical system of Stoicism, Pompey is an ordinary man, a very human figure made up of vices and virtues, slowly striving toward the good. While the early Stoics had been unwilling to accept any intermediate steps between the two extremes of goodness and evil, a graded scale of achievement was soon developed, according to which moral improvement and a progressive march toward the ideal were possible. Cleanthes' description of humanity strikingly applies to Pompey: "man lives in wickedness all his life or, if not all the time, at

²⁶ Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 326 ff.

least most of the time. If he ever does acquire some virtue, he does so late and toward the setting of his days."²⁷

At the beginning of the poem Pompey has not yet started on his philosophical pilgrimage. He is a foolish man whose wickedness is caused by the wrong direction of his will. He desires to enjoy external goods and thirsts for power and glory. In the course of his ordeal he will be deprived of all these false goods until in the anguish of his defeat he learns voluntarily to renounce them.

In books one and two, blinded by excess of ambition, Pompey joins the wicked compact which will deprive Rome of freedom (I, 87) and aims at increasing his power. He dreads the prospect of an equal (I, 126), and his jealous resentment of Caesar's exploits urges him, in spite of his declining years, to enter the conflict. Filled with a vanity which knows no bounds, he courts reputation, is lavish to the common people, and is swayed by popularity (I, 132). "It was not virtue or reason," says Seneca, "which persuaded Gnaeus Pompey to undertake foreign and civil wars but his mad craving for false glory. Now he attacked Spain and the faction of Sertorius, now he went forth to enchain the pirates and pacify the seas. They were merely excuses and pretexts for extending his power. What drew him into Africa, into the North, against Mithridates, into Armenia, and every corner of Asia? It was certainly his boundless desire to grow bigger when he appeared to himself alone not to be big enough" (*Ep.*, 94, 64).

Cato has no illusions about the motives of Pompey, who "looks forward to mastery over the world" (II, 321). The theme of Pompey's first speech to his soldiers is his own greatness, his exalted place in Rome (II, 531 ff.), and such a speech is no inspiration to the soldiers. Moreover, because he has always been fortunate, he lacks determination and vigor in time of danger and flees Rome at the approach of Caesar (I, 522). "While all excesses are harmful," says Seneca, "the most dangerous is unlimited good fortune: it stirs the brain, it creates vain fancies in the mind and covers with darkness the boundary between the false and the true . . ." (*Prov.*, 4, 10). Now that Fortune is beginning to prove untrue, Pompey develops yet another fault,

²⁷ *Frag.* 529 (von Arnim); cf. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

"his mind is tortured with doubt and anxiety" (II, 681), he lacks assurance and self-confidence (II, 628).

With the third book, Pompey's thoughts begin to turn toward higher things. In a famous passage Seneca clarifies the moot question of man's progress toward wisdom: "Though he who makes progress (*qui proficit*) is still numbered among the fools, yet he is separated from them by a long interval. Among the very persons who make progress, there are also great differences. They may, according to some philosophers, be divided into three classes" (*Ep.*, 75, 8 ff.). Lucan, still following the textbooks of ethics closely, is going to show Pompey's progress through these three classes.

After his nightmarish vision of Julia in the guise of a vengeful Fury, Pompey knows that he is threatened with death and disaster (III, 36). He may now be numbered among those beginning to strive toward wisdom, the novices whom Seneca describes as those *qui sapientiam nondum habent, sed iam in vicinia eius constiterunt* (*Ep.*, 75, 9). The first indication of this progress is his struggle to rid his mind of the terror of death:

Aut nihil est sensus animis a morte relictum
Aut mors ipsa nihil (III, 39-40).

From now on the theme of death will recur at intervals throughout the poem in passages marking Pompey's development (III, 290 ff., V, 204 ff., VII, 37 ff., etc.). His mind now "made up for evils" (III, 37), his assurance returned, he prepares for the battle, but the huge armies he receives will serve "to accompany the measureless ruin and to provide a funeral procession worthy of his burial" (III, 290). When he next appears, in book five, he is hailed by the senators "who place upon him the burden of their own and their country's fate" (V, 48). He has acquired dignity and a measure of humility (V, 44 ff.) and has already so grown in stature that he is no more a general fighting for his own selfish ends but the leader of a just and great cause (V, 40). Yet traces of his former guilt remain. Though he has renounced his country and accepted the loss of external goods, he is still passionately attached to his wife, and because of her "he is doubtful and afraid of battle" (V, 728 f.). His love for her obscures the clear vision of his duty.

The Stoics taught that marriage was in accordance with the law of nature, and that a man with a sense of duty must marry for the sake of having children. They placed the affection between man and wife among the things to be preferred. When excessive, however, this love became a serious fault, and Pompey's not only lacks soberness but is inopportune on the eve of a fateful battle.

But Pompey has already reached a point from which he cannot fall back. If, near Dyrrhachium, he keeps his soldiers from fighting a battle which might have been followed by victory and peace, he does so not through cowardice but because of a noble weakness, because scruples (*pietas*) hold him from fighting his kinsman and fellow citizens (VI, 298 ff.). And when his officers urge him to return to Rome, the speech in which he refuses because Italy must not become the battle ground shows inner dignity and loftiness of purpose.

In the seventh book, Pompey enters the second class of those who make progress and who, according to the passage of Seneca from which a section has already been quoted "have laid aside both the greatest ills of the mind and its passions, but in such a way as not yet to be in assured possession of immunity" (*loc. cit.*, 13). Just as in the third book a vision preceded Pompey's entrance upon the path of progress, so here again, in the beginning of the seventh book a troubled dream precedes the final renunciation which brings him a step closer to wisdom. He sees in a vision the things which have made him appear great in his own and in his countrymen's eyes. Sitting in his theatre he hears countless multitudes joyfully shouting his praise, he reviews his first triumph and his defeat of the Spaniards and Sertorius, and remembers giving peace to the West and being worshipped by the Senate (VII, 10-44). This dream of past glory is followed abruptly by a passage describing the present rebellious mutterings of Pompey's soldiers who accuse him of cowardice, and by Cicero's taunts and reproaches (VII, 45-85). But Pompey has accepted the change in his fortunes. Calmly he attempts to justify the course he has planned and with sad and dignified resignation bow to the will of destiny (VII, 85-123), stating that "victory is no more welcome than death" (VII, 119). Though fully aware of the fact that Heaven is now against him, he feels no rebellion: *tota vix clade coactus Fortu-*

nam damnare suam (VII, 648 f.). He does not wish to make mankind share his ruin and prays that Rome may survive him (VII, 658); and in order that the Romans may live he is ready to make the supreme sacrifice. He offers his sons and his wife as hostages to Fortune: *iam nihil est Fortuna meum* (VII, 666). If he refrains from courting death it is not through lack of courage but because Fate has decreed that he must not die away from his wife (VII, 676). His supreme solace is that he will now know, as only the conquered can, the love of his true and loyal friends (VII, 726 f.). He relapses for a moment at the start of the battle as he "stands, speechless, with frozen blood" (VII, 339). And his mournful speech to the soldiers (VII, 382) lacks vigor and even dignity. But after his final defeat he seems almost invulnerable. "There was no moaning, no weeping, but only noble grief with dignity unimpaired, such a sorrow as it was fitting for Magnus to feel at the calamity of Rome (VII, 680-682). This passage echoes the description of Cato's noble despair at the start of the war. Pompey has now laid down the burden which Fate and Rome had put upon him (VII, 686). God has so despoiled and disciplined him that he seems already to have died himself along with Rome and the whole world (VII, 617-634):

Ac se tam multo pereuntem sanguine vidit (653).

The war is no longer a struggle between the ambitions of two leaders, a war of conflicting personal interests, but the eternal contest between freedom and slavery:

Non iam Pompei nomen populare per orbem
Nec studium belli, sed par quod semper habemus,
Libertas et Caesar erit (VII, 694 ff.).

Caesar has won the battle of Pharsalia but he has lost in a far greater contest (*vincere peius erat*, VII, 706), and the war will go on after Pompey's death.

Pharsalia marks the last stage in Pompey's conversion. In the eighth book he reaches the third class of those aspiring to wisdom, "who are beyond the reach of many vices, of the great vices, but not beyond the reach of all. They have overcome avarice but still feel anger; they no longer are troubled by lust but are still troubled by ambition; they no longer covet but they still fear.

And, because of their fear, while they firmly withstand some things they yield to others. They scorn death and are terrified of pain" (Seneca, *loc. cit.*, 14).

Seneca's description of the last class of probationers applies very closely to this stage of Pompey's development. At times he is the prey of almost panic fear, but at the very end he reaches the sublime detachment of the truly wise. During his flight from Pharsalia he fears the sound of the wind in the trees, the approach of comrades who join him causes him anxiety for the safety of his own person (VIII, 5 ff.). Trembling, "he slinks, a terrified passenger, into a little boat" (VIII, 39). In the agony of his soul he yearns for anonymity and bitterly resents his past honors:

Nisi summa dies cum fine bonorum
Adfuit et celeri praevertit tristia leto,
Dedecori est fortuna prior (VIII, 29-31).

But before he reaches Lesbos he has mastered this rebellion and the trip from Lesbos to Syhedra gives him time to wrestle with his anguish and to regain his self-control. "Often, burdened with care and loathing of the future, he threw off the wearing anxiety of his conflicting thoughts and questioned the pilot concerning all the stars . . ." (VIII, 165-167). Thus he recovers the vision of his fateful mission. Ambition, his last infirmity, has but one brief moment when, in a belligerent speech, he urges continuation of the war and an alliance with the Parthians (VIII, 262-327). But soon he yields to destiny (*cedit fati*, VIII, 575). If Fate has determined his life, he can at least determine himself, for he has learned the lesson of wisdom, that "the approach of his wretched end is the law of destiny and a decree of the eternal order" (VIII, 569) and that detachment and peace lie in acquiescence. And so he enters the Egyptian boat, knowing that he will perish, not trapped by his enemies but willingly conforming to the law of Fate (*letumque iuvat praeferre timori*, VIII, 576). He has worked out his own salvation and with hardly a thought he leaves behind him his supporters, his son, and wife. Death is his victory and Lucan's description of it is, in its dignity and simplicity, in the best Stoic tradition:

Ut vidit comminus enses,
Involvit voltus atque indignatus apertum

Fortunae praebere caput; tum lumina pressit
 Continuitque animam, ne quas effundere voces
 Vellet et aeternam fletu corrumpere famam.
 Sed postquam mucrone latus funestus Achilles
 Perfodit, nullo gemitu consensit ad ictum
 Respexitque nefas, servatque immobile corpus,
 Seque probat moriens atque haec in pectore volvit:
 "Saecula Romanos nunquam tacitura labores
 Attendunt . . .

. . . Ne cede pudori

Auctoremque dole fati. . . .

. . . Talis custodia Magno

Mentis erat, ius hoc animi morientis habebat

(VIII, 613-635).

He now acknowledges himself fortunate, and his only wish is that his death, which will release him from bondage, may be dignified and worthy of his fame. *Seque probat moriens*—at the last he vindicates himself and for a moment reaches the supreme heights of philosophy and wisdom.

In the purification of apotheosis which follows directly, and which conforms closely to Seneca's theories of the afterlife and of the relation of body and soul,²⁸ Pompey receives the reward of his many virtues. His spirit is released and "steeped in true light." "Gazing at the planets and the fixed stars of heaven" he joins for a moment the heroes (*semidei manes*) "whose fiery quality has made guiltless and has fitted to endure the lower limit of ether" (IX, 1-12). But his life has not been guiltless nor has he raised himself to absolute perfection. Therefore his soul cannot await with those of the perfectly wise the day of the final conflagration. In the clear, bright ether, his spirit has been purged, has smiled at the mockery done to his headless body, and is now worthy to take up its abode in the heart of better men. "His spirit flitted over the fields of Emathia, the standards of bloodthirsty Caesar, and the ships on the sea until, the avenger of crimes, it settled in the holy breast of Brutus and the sacred heart of Cato" (IX, 15-18). Pompey, who had begun his career as an ally of Caesar, in league with all that is evil, after a long and dreary pilgrimage through life is now united with virtue and wisdom. By living in Brutus and Cato his soul will at last attain perfection.

²⁸ *Ad Marciam De Cons.*, 25; *Ad Polyb. De Cons.*, 9, 8-9, etc.

Thus the *Pharsalia* is the epic of humanity according to the later Stoic conception of man's character and position in the Universe. But what was the final aim of the poem? This must depend in part upon the missing conclusion. If the expression of faith in the empire found in the prooemium is accepted as a sincere expression of Lucan's beliefs, the opening lines give us a clue as to the organisation of the end. Since optimism is an essential part of the Stoic doctrine, these lines may foreshadow a final prophecy of the peace, calm, and prosperity of an idealised Roman empire under such a ruler as Marcus Aurelius. All the wickedness of the civil war would then appear to have been a part of the ordered destiny of the world, and, after ruin, carnage, and destruction, after the apotheosis of Cato and the punishment of Caesar, peace would be shown flying over the earth while at last men laid down their arms. Mankind united in the empire would seek its own welfare (I, 35-66). In a final vision the poet might have shown the divine power, driving humanity toward a utopian kingdom where all nations loving one another would live in harmony under a god-like ruler. The reader, having been assured at the very start that "Rome owes much to civil war" (I, 44), would know throughout the dreary recital of evil deeds and wicked warfare that sin has a part in the scheme of things and that all is ultimately turned to good.

This reconstruction seems to be supported by passages in Seneca in praise of the beneficent rule of kings. Perhaps the great hopes universally placed in Nero justified such a conversion to the empire. But verses scattered throughout the poem, in which Freedom is praised and the wickedness of the rule of one over many is stressed repeatedly, argue against it. The very excess of the extravagant praise of Nero in the prooemium may point to a disguised, but to the initiated obvious, satire of the emperor.²⁹ The mediaeval commentators, who had seen ancient commentaries on the *Pharsalia*, are almost unanimous in considering the pro-

²⁹ In a recent article, "Seneca's *Ad Polybium De Consolatione*: A Reappraisal," *Trans. Royal Soc. of Canada*, XXXVII (1943), pp. 33-53, W. H. Alexander argues convincingly that Seneca's *Ad Polybium De Consolatione* is a satire of the emperor Claudius. He suggests that "overstress of laudation results in the acutest satire." The initiated among Lucan's readers would recognise Seneca's technique in the ironic adulation of the Prooemium of the *Pharsalia*.

oemium as ironical and sarcastic, a veiled attack against Nero. If this is so, the description of the murder of Caesar must have been followed by a hymn in praise of Freedom, in the spirit of the many allusions to the avenging sword of Brutus and the punishment of tyranny found in the extant part of the poem (V, 206 ff.; VI, 791 f.; VII, 587 ff.; X, 340 ff., 530, etc.). Pompey's ghost, which was to appear to his son in Sicily (VI, 813), may have prophesied Caesar's murder and railed at his successors. The bitter references to the deified emperors and the lying titles given to the masters of Rome indicate no reconciliation with the empire: "civil wars will make dead men the equals of the gods above. Rome shall adorn them with thunderbolts and haloes and stars and in the temples of the gods shall swear by their shades" (VII, 457-459; cf. VI, 809; VIII, 835, etc.). The passionate attacks against those who have dared to enslave their fellow citizens (see for instance V, 381-402) may suggest some hope that they will be overthrown and that Rome will be liberated from her tyrants. Indeed there is more than a hint of this in the following passage in praise of Cato:

Ecce parens' verus patriae, dignissimus aris,
Roma, tuis, per quem nunquam iurare pudebit,
Et quem, si steteris unquam cervice soluta,
Nunc, olim, factura deum es (IX, 601 ff.).

Again, in the bitter complaint that all future generations were conquered by Caesar's sword at Pharsalia (VII, 641), one feels the spirit of rebellion: "In this battle a wound was inflicted upon the nations more severe than their own age could bear. What perished was more than life and safety. We were overthrown for all time to come. All future generations of the world were doomed to slavery by these swords. How had the sons and grandsons of those who fought deserved to be born in a kingdom? Did we bear arms timidly, did we protect our throats? The punishment of the cowardice of others is fastened upon our necks. To us who were born after the battle, O Fortune, you gave a master. Since you did this you should have given us also the chance to fight" (VII, 638-646).

I cannot help thinking that these passages foreshadow the final call of the conspirator to a general rebellion. Is it too fanciful to see in this appeal to the Romans "to free their necks and

stand upright now or later" (*nunc olim*, IX, 604) the hope that Lucan shared with many of his contemporaries? Already involved in plots against Nero, Lucan may have intended to complete his poem after the successful end of the conspiracy. What he had said in veiled allusions before could then have been proclaimed clearly. A panegyric of Cato's suicide (probably in the spirit of Seneca's *Prov.*, 2, 10 ff.) and an exalted description of his apotheosis, contrasted with the grimness of Caesar's murder, probably was to precede a final vision of the freedom which would follow the end of Nero's tyranny and his assassination. With a return to a strong republic and lawful government, another cycle of history would have revolved, all things and all men, virtuous and evil, would have been instrumental in preparing the ultimate end ordained by a beneficent Supreme Being. Thus Eternal Providence was to be asserted and the ways of God justified to men.

In conception Lucan's poem had no less epic grandeur, no less noble a theme, than the *Aeneid* or *Paradise Lost*. But only the mature powers of a poet of genius could have done it justice. The *Pharsalia* is a failure because Lucan was incapable of keeping the balance between the incidental story of the civil war and its vast philosophical implications and because his lavish use of all the devices of rhetoric could not compensate for his lack of sustained inspiration.

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THE USE OF STAGE BUSINESS TO PORTRAY EMOTION IN GREEK TRAGEDY.

In a study of the means employed by the Greek dramatists to portray emotion on the tragic stage¹ it was evident that these means could be set into two groups: the thought or content of speech, and the expression, including language, rhythm, and stage business. It is the last division of the second group which is the subject of this paper. The use of actions, gestures, appearance, etc., to portray emotions² effectively was popular not only with Sophocles and Euripides but also to some extent with Aeschylus, despite the "statuesque" theory once prevalent³ concerning the type of action of his plays. The indications of action which we find in the dramas are numerous enough to throw some light on the dramatists' ideas for making stage emotion real to the audience. We need not be drawn into making suppositions, however reasonable they might be, as to what took place upon the stage.⁴

¹ *The Technique of the Portrayal of Emotion in Greek Tragedy*, a dissertation accepted by the University of Michigan in April, 1942. See the introductory paragraphs of "The Technique of the Portrayal of Joy in Greek Tragedy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII (1942), pp. 277-92.

² Emotions are classified as follows: Grief: Sorrow, anguish, pity, confusion, remorse, vexation, jealousy. Fear: Apprehension, anxiety, horror, perplexity, hesitation, shame. Desire and Aversion: Anger, hate, love. Pleasure: Joy, joy at evil. The general lines of this classification are adopted from the earliest, as well as the most reasonable, of systematized classifications,—that attributed to Zeno the Stoic or to his school by Diogenes Laertius, *Βίων καὶ Γνωμῶν τῶν ἐν Φιλοσοφίᾳ Εὐδοκιμησάντων Βιβλίον*, VII, 110-14.

³ Cf., for instance, G. Norwood, *Greek Tragedy*, pp. 69-70; for an interesting view of this theory and for opposing views, see J. T. Allen, "Greek Acting in the Fifth Century," *Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Philology*, II (1916), pp. 279-87, and Bethe, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Theaters im Alterthum* (Leipzig, 1896), pp. 319-38.

⁴ It may be well to list briefly the ways in which indications of stage business are made, i. e., the ways by which we can discover what action the dramatists had in mind for emotional portrayal:

The chorus' or another character's statement or description: e. g. *I. A.*, 34-48.

The chorus' or another character's question: e. g. *Phil.* 730-1; *Andr.* 828 (usually a startled reaction). Repeated inquiry in the case of silence, e. g. *Trach.* 307 ff.

The chorus' or another character's command: e. g. *Hec.* 438-43; *Andr.*

Actual stage business, which was practicably possible on the stage and by means of which the dramatist actually meant the actors to portray various emotions, must be distinguished from simulated or suggested stage business, which, though impossible to carry out, was none the less indicated by the dramatist, the suggestion alone being sufficient to convey its emotional connotation to the audience.

The largest class of indications of actual stage business are for action and gesture. One of the most typically Mediterranean and, to our mind, extravagant actions for expressing emotion is that of violence either actually done or attempted against oneself. Rending garments, tearing hair and beard, and slashing at cheeks may show not only grief but apprehension. In *Orestes* 961 ff. Electra shows her sorrow at the pronouncement of death for herself and her brother by *τιθείσα λευκὸν ὄνυχα διὰ παρηίδων*. Hermione's remorse is shown by her action in *Andr.* 826-7 *σπάραγμα κόμας ὀνύχων τε δάι' ἀμύγματα θήσομαι*. Beating one's head and breast portrays anxiety or sorrow, as when Hecuba grieves (*Tro.* 793) over the imminent death of her grandchild: *τάδε . . . δίδομεν πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε κόπους*. Attempted suicide shows despair in *Phil.* 1001, when Philoctetes rushes to the cliff's edge with the intention of jumping over, and in *Tro.* 1282-3 where Hecuba rushes toward the burning towers of Troy, thinking to die in the flames.

Violence attempted or carried out against another takes several forms and expresses anger or hate. Creon in *O.C.* 828 seeks to lay hold of Antigone and (875 ff.) of Oedipus. So in *Hec.* 1126 the blind Polymestor starts up and attempts to seize Hecuba. Orestes (*Or.* 1516-18) threatens the Phrygian slave with his sword; Demophon in *Herac.* 270 raises his staff to

832, or cf. *Cho.* 233 where *ἔνδον γενοῦ*, Orestes' remark, indicates Electra's action.

A character's own statement or description: as *Eum.* 34-8; *Phoen.* 265; *Or.* 961; typically Euripidean.

A character's own question: as *Andr.* 1209 *οὐ σπαράξομαι κόμαν, οὐκ ἐμῷ 'πιθήσομαι κάρη κτύπημα χειρὸς ὀλοόν;*

A character's own command: e. g. *Hipp.* 243-50.

A character's own oath: *πρὸς γενείου* or *δεξιᾶς*, e. g. Sophocles, *El.* 1208.

A character's own use of deictic endings, as *Phil.* 1299; *Ag.* 1404-5, 1433.

strike the herald who is about to seize Heracles' children. The chorus members of *H. F.* 254-5 are told to raise their sticks in the same threatening attitude toward Lycus who has announced the impending murder of Heracles' wife and family. Ion, angry at the advances of Xuthus (*Ion* 524), fits an arrow to his bow, threatening Xuthus' life. The same action gives evidence of Philoctetes' emotion in *Phil.* 1299. In Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 909-10, the herald evidently begins a threatening gesture to accompany his words ἔλξειν ἔοιχ' ὑμᾶς ἐπισπάσας κόμης, for the king stops him with the words οὐτος, τί ποιεῖς; κτλ.⁵

Actions and gestures of supplication are indicated for the expression of distress and for several emotions of fear. Doubtless for every supplication there was some accompanying gesture as the stretching out of the hand, but only actually indicated action is noted here as representing the dramatists' ideas concerning the use of action to show emotion. The most often used supplicatory act is that of kneeling, as Electra does when frightened (Euripides, *El.* 221) and appealing to Apollo for aid. Philoctetes (*Phil.* 485) kneels in distress to beg Neoptolemus to take him back to Greece. Andromache's child (*Andr.* 529, 537) appeals to Menelaus, and Andromache herself (572) falls at Peleus' knees in distress. Usually, in supplication of a person, that person's knees were clasped, as is the case in *I. A.* 1216, for instance (ἰκετηρίαν δὲ γόνασιν ἐξάπτω σέθεν τὸ σῶμα τοῦμόν), and in *Andr.* 892-5 when Hermione, frightened at the prospect of her husband's return and punishment of her, clasps Orestes' knees and begs for protection. In *Helen* 894 also, Helen embraces (ἀμφὶ σὸν πέντω γόνυ) the knees of Theonoe beseeching her assistance, while the distressed Amphitryon (*H. F.* 1208-9) pleads similarly with Heracles to end his veiled silence. Other cases where kneeling—and sometimes clasping the knees also—is indicated to show emotion are *Med.* 324-39, 710; *Hipp.* 605-7; *Hec.* 752, 787; Euripides, *Suppl.* 278-9, 284-5; *I. A.* 900, 911, for distress, and for apprehension *Tro.* 1042; *Phoen.* 923.⁶

Another common supplicatory action was the touching of

⁵ It is possible that the angry chorus of Egyptians actually lays hold of the chorus of the Danaids in a striking and spectacularly vivid choreographic scene, cf. 886.

⁶ The action in *Or.* 1507 is probably complete prostration in the oriental manner.

the beard or face of a person. Iphigenia at Aulis (1227, 1247) touches her father's beard as she pleads with him not to slay her. Medea's distress (710) is shown as she kneels and touches the beard of Aegeus, asking aid. Other cases of touching the beard or chin are Sophocles, *El.* 1208; *Med.* 65; *Heracl.* 226-7; *Hec.* 275, 286, 752; *H. F.* 1208-9; *Phoen.* 923; *I. A.* 909; *Hypsipyle*, frag. 60.

Hands also were grasped in supplication; Phaedra's nurse, fearing disgrace in the sight of her mistress, appears to clasp Hippolytus' hand (605), beseeching him not to speak and divulge the request she has made in secret.

Similar action reveals distress in *Hec.* 275, 752; Euripides, *Suppl.* 278-9; *H. F.* 1209; and *I. A.* 911. Often, of course, two and even three of these supplicatory gestures are made at a time. Among instances of the compound gesture, kneeling and touching the chin are used in *Med.* 710 and *Phoen.* 923; touching of knee and hand in Euripides, *Suppl.* 278-9 (ἀντομαι ἀμφιπύτνονσα τὸ σὸν γόνυ καὶ χέρα), and the triple appeal,—knee, hand, and beard,—in *H. F.* 1208-9 or *Hec.* 752-3 (ἱκετεύω σε τῶνδε γονάτων καὶ σοῦ γενείου δεξιᾶς τ' εὐδαίμονος).

Twice outstretched hands⁷ are indicated, those of the apprehensive maiden chorus of *Sept.* 172 and of Amphitryon, distressed at the state of affairs in *H. F.* 498 and beseeching Zeus for aid. Supplication at an altar and the touching of sacred images are also means of showing distress and fear. Creusa, fearing Ion's wrath (*Ion* 1258-60), takes refuge at the altar; Andromache (43) sits at the altar of Thetis, distressed and anxious for the future. Other similar actions are found portraying distress in Euripides, *Suppl.* 63-4 and *Heracl.* 123-5 (wreathing the altar here, also), and apprehension in Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 208, cf. 188-90, *Sept.* 258, and *Helen* 544, 556. In *Sept.* 94-7 the fearful maidens apparently fall before the images of the gods in supplication and (101) propose putting wreaths and sacred robes on them.

⁷ The attitude of prayer to divinity; cf. Paul Stengel, *Die Griechischen Kultusaltertümer*³ (Müller's *Handbuch*, V, 3), p. 80. Carl Sittl, *Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer* (Leipzig, 1890), p. 187. Undoubtedly such action was usual with invocation and apostrophe, but mention of it does not belong here unless the action really is indicated by the dramatist.

An interesting form of supplicatory act is that of striking the ground rhythmically with the hands⁸ in order to call one's distress to the attention of chthonic powers or the dead. So the ground is struck by the Persians (cf. *Pers.* 683) and Atossa as they call upon Darius the dead king. Wretched Hecuba and the Troades (1305-8) kneel and beat upon the earth. Electra and Orestes do likewise in Euripides, *El.* 678.

Another action or assumed attitude which expresses hesitation, shame, and the emotions of grief is the bent or bowed head with downcast eyes. Examples of this are Creusa's sorrow in *Ion* 241, 244, or Phaedra's shame (*Hipp.* 246) ἐπ' αἰσχύνῃν ὄμμα τέτραπται. Ion's hesitation to accept his new-found father's plans for the future is shown by his action, as Xuthus' question indicates: τί πρὸς γῆν ὄμμα σὸν βαλὼν ἔχεις; (*Ion* 582). Akin to this is the assumption of an attitude of weeping which, though it does not accompany every mention of tears,⁹ seems to be indicated in a number of instances. For example, Electra in Sophocles, *El.* 829 is holding some significant posture which leads the chorus to ask ὦ παῖ, τί δακρύεις; Medea (*Med.* 1012) shows distress in the same way, as the attendant's question indicates: τί δαὶ κατηφέις ὄμμα καὶ δακρυρροεῖς. The old friend of Electra (Euripides, *El.* 501-2) excuses himself while he wipes his eyes to which tears of pity have come.¹⁰

Fainting or sinking to the ground shows sorrow and anguish. Peleus (*Andr.* 1076-80) staggers and sinks down at the news of his grandson's death. Hecuba (438-43) faints in her distress when she cannot persuade Odysseus to spare the life of Polyxena. The situation in *Tro.* 462 is similar, Hecuba's sorrow being for her daughter Cassandra's fate. Iolaus, too, sinks helpless to the ground when Heracles' daughter Macaria is led off to die (*Heracl.* 602-3). Both Philoctetes (820-2) and the charioteer of *Rhesus* 799 sink to the ground in anguish, unable any longer to bear the pain. In *H. F.* 1162 Heracles may possibly sink to a

⁸ Possibly sometimes with the feet, though no such indication is made. Cf. Stengel, *op. cit.*, p. 80; Sittl, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁹ See below, p. 392.

¹⁰ Other uses of the bowed head or the attitude of weeping to express emotion may be found in *Sept.* 873, *Antig.* 527 ff., *Trach.* 307-32, *O. C.* 1709-10, *Alc.* 137, *Med.* 922-3, *Ion* 241, *Tro.* 458, 315-17, *Phoen.* 1333-4, *Helen* 456, *Or.* 957-9, *I. A.* 1122-3, 1433 (sorrow); Euripides, *Suppl.* 289 (pity); *I. A.* 40 (confusion); *I. A.* 851 (shame).

seated position beside the corpses on the ground (1191, 1214), if he is not already there, remaining so after his bonds have been loosed (cf. 1097, 1123). Again later (*H. F.* 1367, cf. 1394) he seems to sink to the ground in sorrow beside his dead wife and children, though the indication is only that of his getting up from such a position (1394). Perhaps he never gets up from his previous position among the corpses, though Theseus insists that he should (1226). It is possible, too, that the action which Eurydice describes in *Antig.* 1188-89 (fainting into the maid's arms) takes place in sight of the audience at lines 1176-79 and is the indication of an action which was meant by Sophocles to portray her apprehension.

Lying prostrate for a length of time is a method of showing emotion that is surprisingly popular with Euripides. Hecuba's distressed state of mind is shown long before she speaks, when the *Troades* opens with her sorrowful figure stretched upon the ground (1-98, cf. 36-7); later in the play, too, after sinking to the ground she lies outstretched throughout a long speech of her own (466 ff.) and, after being led to a low pallet on the ground (506-8), throughout a choral song. Similarly in *Hec.* 438-501 she lies grief-stricken on the ground throughout a choral song and until Talthybius inquires her whereabouts (the chorus answers, 486-7: αὐτὴ πέλας σου νῶτ' ἔχουσ' ἐπὶ χθονί, Ταλθύβιε, κείται ξυγκεκλημένη πέπλοις) and rouses her. Adrastus' distress is shown as the play (Euripides, *Suppl.*, cf. 21-2) opens with his dejected figure lying upon the ground. Iolaus in *Heracl.* 603 ff. is led to a ἔδρα and lies there (cf. 633) in sorrow. Phaedra's lovesickness shows itself as she lies upon her couch listlessly (*Hipp.* 180 ff.).

Turning away shows Hecuba's distress and perplexity (*Hec.* 739-40) as she debates with herself whether to ask Agamemnon's aid (τί μοι προσώπῳ νῶτον ἐγκλίνασα σὸν δῶρ' κτλ.). Medea turns away her face in sorrow when her children's future is mentioned (923; 1006¹¹). Cassandra starts back, and turns away in horror (*Ag.* 1306) from the door she was about to enter. Probably Hippolytus turns away his face, horrified at his father's implications (cf. *Hipp.* 946-7: δείξον δ' . . . τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον δεῦρ' ἐναντίον πατρί).

Fear is portrayed by the act of looking or turning this way

¹¹ Line 1006 is thought by Valckenaer to be repeated from 923, and is bracketed by Murray.

and that. The whole chorus of *O. C.* 117-37 enters apprehensively searching for the daring profaner of their sacred precincts. Polynices in *Phoen.* 265-6 (cf. 363-4) warily approaches his mother and estranged brother within the city gates, fearful of some trick. In the *Orestes* (1251 ff.) Electra and the chorus peer anxiously about for any sign of approaching strangers as they await the outcome of their plans.

Akin to this is starting at a fancied sound, as Polynices does in the above-mentioned passage (*Phoen.* 269). This is probably used also in *Rhes.* 565-6 and Sophocles, frag. 61 to show apprehension.

Becoming suddenly motionless is twice used, in *Hec.* 1070 when the wrathful Polymestor stops to listen for Hecuba's footsteps that he may lay hold on her, and in *Phil.* 730-1 when the intense anguish caused by Philoctetes' wound seizes him.

Wandering or pacing back and forth is meant to portray Polymestor's anguish as well as his anger in *Hec.* 1060 ff. Menelaus' confusion is shown (*Or.* 632-3) as he paces back and forth διπλῆς μερίμνης διπτύχους ἰὼν ὁδοῦς.

Euripides indicates the act of running to hide or escape for the portrayal of fear. The chorus members in *H. F.* 818-19 run to the other side of the orchestra at the approach of Iris and Lyssa. Helen (*Helen* 543-6) runs toward the tomb altar to take refuge when Menelaus comes near, while Electra, frightened at the approach of strange men, runs back toward her hut (*Euripides, El.* 219 ff.) and the chorus women also begin to scatter. Iphigenia (*I. A.* 1340-1) runs away for shame and hides in the house when Achilles approaches.

The struggle to be free of restraint shows anger as Theoclymenus (*Helen* 1627-39) struggles with the servant¹² who prevents him from entering the house to punish his sister. Philoctetes' anguish (814-16) is shown partly by his action of starting and straining upward, as his words show: μέθες μέθες με. Antigone's distress is evident as she struggles with the captors who are dragging her away from her father (*O. C.* 843-7).

Pity is portrayed a number of times by acts of assistance either attempted or carried out. Neoptolemus is caught by Odysseus in the act of giving Philoctetes (974, 1292) back his bow and arrows. Talthybius, though he brings Hecuba (*Hec.* 499-500)

¹² See Murray's note in apparatus criticus.

evil news, helps to lift her up from the ground. Theseus performs a similar action for Heracles (*H. F.* 1398: *δίδου δὲ χεῖρ' ὑπηρέτη φίλῳ*), and earlier in the play (1231) takes off the garment or drapery that has been veiling Heracles' head. A different sort of assistance, attempted but unsuccessful for the plot's sake, is that when some of the chorus, hearing the cries of Medea's children (*Med.* 1275-6) and pitying them, approach the closed doors and perhaps endeavor to enter the house. Once this kind of action portrays anxiety, when the servant, after Aegisthus' murder, rushes on stage to the doors of the women's apartments and pounds on them to warn Clytemnestra of danger (*Cho.* 875 ff.).

A favored means of expressing emotion is the embrace or the clinging to or touching of another person. Sorrow and joy are the chief emotions so indicated.¹³ Orestes and Electra cling to each other in despair (*Euripides, El.* 1321-33) and in an orgy of self-pity (*Or.* 1042-7). Agave, at the end of the *Bacchae* (1363-4), casts her arms about her father's neck in sorrowful farewell. Antigone and Polynices (*O. C.* 1432-7), Hecuba and Polyxena (*Hec.* 398 ff., 409-32), Megara and her children (*H. F.* 485-7),¹⁴ Alceste's child and his dead mother (*Alc.* 402-3), Agamemnon and Iphigenia (*I. A.* 679 ff.), Heracles and his father Amphitryon (*H. F.* 1408-9), Andromache and her son (*Tro.* 727, 761-3) all behave similarly. In *Tro.* 458 (see 617 *ἀποσπασθείσα . . . βίῃ*) Hecuba clasps Cassandra, trying to keep her as long as possible from being dragged away. Oedipus in *Phoen.* 1699-1701 touches the bodies of his dead sons in grieving farewell.¹⁵ A slightly different case is that when Electra, pitying Orestes (*Or.* 262-4) in his fit of madness, and distressed that she can do nothing to relieve him, lays a restraining hand upon him and tries to hold and reassure him in his misery. Twice apprehension is effectively shown by this action, when Megara and

¹³ The use of stage business to portray joy has been discussed in the article cited in note 1, and will not be further treated here.

¹⁴ Possibly; the indication is in the form of a question, perhaps not carried out.

¹⁵ Similar action is indicated for the Suppliants in Euripides' play, lines 815-17; the line ascription in this passage is uncertain, however, and lines 941-8 would seem to prohibit any such action on the part of the chorus here; see Egill Rostrup, *Attic Tragedy in the Light of Theatrical History* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 33-4.

the children persist in clinging to Heracles (*H. F.* 626-32) who has unexpectedly appeared as their only hope of rescue from impending death, and when Andromache's child (*Tro.* 782) clings frightened to his mother.

A very expressive action is the veiling of the head or eyes for the portraying of grief or fear. Hecuba (*Hec.* 487) and Iolaus (*Heracl.* 604, 633) lie with heads muffled in sorrow. Amphitryon sits with garments covering his eyes (*H. F.* 1111: *συναμπίσχη κόρας*), grieving at the results of Heracles' fit of madness. Electra covers her eyes to weep in despair for Orestes' frenzy (*Or.* 280).¹⁶ The whole chorus makes this gesture in *Cho.* 81.¹⁷ Iphigenia (*I. A.* 1122-23) startles her father, who does not know that she is aware of his plans to sacrifice her, by her dejected attitude and veiled eyes. The same action expresses pity also, as when the old attendant in *Ion* (967) veils his head to weep for Creusa. Euripides uses this action to portray shame, once for Phaedra when her secret has been told to Hippolytus (243, 245, 250), again for Heracles (*H. F.* 1159, 1198, 1202, 1204-5, 1226). Possibly all the chorus members of *Ajax* 245 veil their faces in apprehension.

The opposite sort of action, tearing off veils or wreaths, shows grief of a more abandoned sort. Cassandra (*Ag.* 1264-8) tears off her garlands of prophecy and stamps them and the *σκῆπτρα* to the ground in despair. In *Tro.* 451-4 she tears them off and casts them to the winds. Theseus, discovering his wife's death (*Hipp.* 806-7), apparently snatches off his wreath with the words *τί δῆτα τοῖσδ' ἀνέστεμμαι πάρα πλεκτοῖσι φύλλοις*.¹⁸ Hermione, too, in *Andr.* 830-2, tears off her *λεπτόμυτρον φάρος* and throws open her robe in an abandonment of remorseful grief.

There are many other expressive gestures or actions which are too individual to admit classification and have not been mentioned in the preceding discussion. Clytemnestra is made to point to or perhaps to bare her breast (*τόνδε . . . μαστόν*) in her dis-

¹⁶ Possibly also later in the play, 957-9, when she learns of the death sentence upon her and her brother, although these lines are bracketed.

¹⁷ Aristophanes, *Ran.* 911 ff., hints at more of this than we can find actual indication for in Aeschylus.

¹⁸ In the *Alcestis*, 830-2, Heracles also seems to take off his wreath, remorseful at his unthinking behavior in the presence of death. The text, however, merely contains mention of the *στεφάνοις* with no actual indication of action.

tressed appeal to Orestes not to kill her (*Cho.* 896). Electra displays her sorrow as she clasps (ἔχω) the urn in which Orestes' ashes supposedly rest, and will scarcely relinquish it (Sophocles, *El.* 1126-1216). The gesture of pouring ashes on the head is indicated in Euripides, *Suppl.* 827; in the same play (1115) the grief-stricken suppliant women call for attendants to lean on; whether this is actually carried out, however, is uncertain. Peleus (*Andr.* 1223) throws his σκήπτρα to the ground as he abandons himself to sorrow for Neoptolemus.¹⁹ Philoctetes' anguish (*Phil.* 814-16) is made evident by some extremely effective action, when he starts up as if to proceed up the cliff, and stares up into the air. Polymestor (*Hec.* 1080, cf. 1125) makes grasping and clutching motions into the air, while Heracles (*Trach.* 1076-9) in anguish from the effects of Deianeira's poisoned gift, lifts his covering to show his terrible wounds. Io leaps in anguish at the goad which drives her on (*Prom.* 599-600), possibly even making her entrance in this fashion.

An elaborate bit of pantomime is carried out to portray the confusion of Agamemnon (*I. A.* 34-48) who cannot quite bring himself to send for his daughter Iphigenia on false pretences. He writes, then marks out the letters, writes, erases, and writes again, seals the letter, then breaks the seal, throws the tablets to the ground, and sinks into an attitude of dejection. The remorse of Electra and Orestes at their deed is shown when Electra (Euripides, *El.* 1227, 1230-1) kneels and covers the dead body of Clytemnestra. The fearful Bacchae (600-5) cast themselves flat on their faces,—an action which may be like that of the Phrygian of *Or.* 1507.²⁰ Cassandra's action in *Ag.* 1063 was evidently very effective, though it is not clear to us what gestures she made; the remarks of Clytemnestra and the chorus (cf. 1063: *τρόπος δὲ θηρὸς ὡς νεαπέτου*) indicate a series of gestures which express her horror at the realization of the state of affairs in the house to which she has come. Heracles' shame is portrayed (*H. F.* 1218) when, muffled in his garments and seated on the ground, he motions with his hand, waving the sympathetic Theseus away,

¹⁹ Denys I. Page (*Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* [Oxford, 1934], p. 115) believes this to be, in part at least, a stage direction which has crept into the body of the text. See also Murray's note in *apparatus criticus*.

²⁰ See note 6.

and points to the dead children near by,—horrible evidence of his crime.

Aeschylus indicates a series of gestures to express the hatred of Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 1404-5 [οὗτός ἐστιν Ἀγαμέμνων, ἐμὸς πόσις, νεκρὸς δὲ τῇσδε δεξιῷ χερὸς], 1433 [τόνδ' ἔσφαξ' ἐγώ], 1437, 1438) as she points triumphantly toward the corpses of her husband and Cassandra. Likewise Orestes (*Cho.* 973, 980) makes gestures toward the hated corpses of his mother and Aegisthus, and helps attendants hold up the garment that he may point out the shameful trap with which his father was murdered. An action which Euripides uses for the distress of love is the restless tossing and turning of Phaedra on her couch (*Hipp.* 198-204).

The exit is strikingly used by the dramatists for the portrayal of emotion. It is not the manner of exit,—though that is usually hasty, often silent,—but the exit itself, the fact of unexpected departure, that shows emotion. Thus Eurydice, Creon's wife, in *Antigone* 1244, suddenly leaves when she has heard the grievous news of the messenger. Jocasta's distress and shame are revealed as she leaves Oedipus' presence (*O.T.* 1072). Deianeira slips away in sorrow and remorse at the news of the dreadful effect of her love charm (*Trach.* 813). Clytemnestra leaves Achilles' presence (*I.A.* 851-2) in shame at her discussion of a marriage with her daughter about which he knew nothing. The exit effectively portrays anger also; Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 1068) leaves in a huff when she cannot persuade Cassandra to speak or to follow her. Menelaus, indignant at Teucer's defiance of his authority, says ἀπειμι (*Ajax* 1159) and with an insulting remark leaves the scene of their altercation. In *Antig.* 765, Haemon, furious with his father, cannot bear to speak to Creon further, and rushes away.

Manner of entrance is effective for the portrayal of emotion. The anguish of Philoctetes (*Phil.* 212 ff.) is apparent as he limps in, bent and stooped, dragging his wounded foot. Polymestor, just blinded by the women friends of Hecuba (*Hec.* 1056-8), enters crouching to the ground on hands and feet, with the step of a τετράποδος θηρὸς. Hippolytus (1347, 1353, 1358-9) enters supported by the hands of servants, after he has been fatally wounded by his steeds.

Another unusual entrance,—a bit ludicrous from our less demonstrative point of view,—is used by Aeschylus to show the

priestess' fright at the sight of the Furies (*Eum.* 34-8) in Apollo's precinct; he causes her to run on stage crawling on all fours, too weak from fear to walk. Creusa, in *Ion* 1250, probably (cf. 1253) runs in, fearful of what Ion may do if he catches her who attempted to poison him. The frightened Phrygian slave, trying to escape Orestes (*Or.* 1369, cf. 1371-2) climbs through a space near the roof of the house between the columns and slips to the ground outside,—a unique entrance, certainly.²¹

Rushing in haste into the sight of the audience shows anxiety several times,—that of the servant for his mistress Clytemnestra in *Cho.* 875 (in all probability, cf. 878), of Theseus in *O.C.* 887 (cf. 890), and of Pylades for his friend Orestes (*Or.* 726, cf. 729). Phaedra's lovesickness (*Hipp.* 170 ff.) is indicated when she enters languidly leaning for support on her nurse and handmaids.

Another interesting stage device which the dramatists use to portray emotion is silence. Several times (*Antig.* 1245, *O.T.* 1075, *Trach.* 813) it is used in connection with sudden departure, being remarked on by the chorus, and even, in *O.T.* 1071-2, by Jocasta herself! The captive maiden Iole in *Trach.* 307-28 is made to show her grief by her refusal to speak. Clytemnestra's silence in *I.A.* 1368-1433 (remarked on by Iphigenia in 1433) is evidence of her despair. Grief-stricken Hecuba falls *ἀνανδός* to the ground in *Tro.* 462-5. Electra grieves *ἄφθογγος* after hearing the messenger's report of her impending death (*Or.* 957-9). Anguish is shown when Philoctetes (*Phil.* 730-1), seized with racking pain, grows suddenly silent,—or so Sophocles would have us believe; a choral song is just over, during which time no one spoke, so Neoptolemus says *τί δὴ ποθ' ὦδ' ἐξ οὐδενὸς λόγου σιωπᾶς*; Neoptolemus too, in *Phil.* 230-1 and 804-5, pities Philoctetes' plight so that he cannot bring himself to speak.

Creon (*Phoen.* 960-1), hearing the prophecy that means his son's death, maintains a silence that helps to show his apprehension. Aeschylus makes noteworthy use of this device to

²¹ The tradition recorded by the scholiast concerning line 1366 (see Murray's note in the apparatus criticus) is doubtless correct; the theme of the creaking door which warns of someone's approach, occurring as it does in other Euripidean plays (*Ion* 515-16; *Helen* 859) and so often in New Comedy, probably offered itself to actors of the fourth century as a convenient way to simplify the manner of entrance.

portray the horror of Cassandra in *Ag.* 1035-71. It denotes the hesitation of Ion (*Ion* 582) to accept Xuthus' plans for the future. Phaedra, ashamed at the outburst which betrayed her love, remains silent despite the pleas of her nurse (*Hipp.* 297). Heracles, too, in a passage noted before (*H. F.* 1173-1228) consistently remains silent for shame in the presence of his friend Theseus.²² For the portrayal of anger, Theseus (*Hipp.* 911) is made to refuse to answer Hippolytus; so also Oedipus shows hatred when he refuses to speak to Polynices (*O. C.* 1271). It is an interesting fact that Sophocles, ahead of his time, believed silence to be expressive of a deeper grief than much clamorous wailing. He says this in so many words in *Antig.* 1251-2, where the chorus speaks: ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν ἢ τ' ἄγαν σιγὴ βαρὺν δοκεῖ προσεῖναι χῆ μάτην πολλὴν βοή.

The manner of delivery of a character's words has everything to do with the convincing portrayal of emotion. Here again, as in the matter of action, when we seek evidence of the dramatists' wishes concerning vocal delivery, we are brought up short by the comparatively few indications in the dramas. We know, of course, that the dramatist was his own διδάσκαλος,—even, earlier, the protagonist himself,—so that indication was perhaps not so often necessary. Those actual indications of the way in which words were to be spoken occur mostly in the expression of grief and anger. The word ὀξύφωνος, for instance in *Trach.* 963, is a clue to the manner of delivery of the sorrowful passage 947-70. Xerxes' demand in *Pers.* 1058 also implies shrill vocal expression of sorrow: ἀντὶ ὀξύ. The Suppliants of Aeschylus cry out λιγέα βαρέα (113) with both shrill and deep low tones. Euripides uses the word ἐπορθροβοάσω in Electra's despairing monologue, *El.* 142. The verb βοάω is often used, as for instance in *Pers.* 572: βαρὺν δ' ἀμβόασον where βοάω seems to imply deep tones in contrast to high shrill ones. Eight of the indications to express sorrow give the noun βοά as a clue to manner of delivery (*Pers.* 954 [an actual *direction*, here]; *O. C.* 884-6 [cf. 887]; *Hec.* 154-76 [cf. 177]; *Hipp.* 569-70 [cf. 571]; *Antiope* [*P. Petr.*, I, 2, 11]; *Tro.* 588, 1310; *Or.* 1385). Xerxes says (*Pers.* 1050): ἐπορθίαζέ νυν γόοις, implying a high wailing tone; cf. *Ag.* 1153. In *Cho.* 151 Electra bids the Choephoroi sing the lament

²² Perhaps more that he may not defile the guiltless by speaking with them? Cf. 1219.

ἐξανδωμένας. Sometimes the word μέγας indicates vocal delivery; for example Sophocles intended Electra's words (*El.* 830) of wailing to be given in a loud voice, for he makes the chorus say μηδὲν μέγ' ἀύσης. Aeschylus wished the grief of Io to be similarly expressed for he has Prometheus (743) address her σὺ δ' αὖ κέκραγας κἀναμυχθίζῃ. The chorus speaks of ὄμαδος, the noise or din, in connection with the sorrowful speech of Helen (*Helen* 164-81, cf. 185 and ἀνεβόασεν, 184).²³ Anguish too was expressed in much the same way. Philoctetes must utter terrible cries as the chorus' words indicate (*Phil.* 208, 209, 216, 218: αὐδά, θροεῖ; βοᾷ, προβοᾷ . . . τι δεινόν), while Polymestor (*Hec.* 1091) suffering the dreadful pain of his blinded eyes, calls βοάν βοάν αὐτῷ βοάν in such a voice that Agamemnon comes in, κραυγῆς ἀκούσας (1109). Sometimes voices from off stage are heard crying out in anguish (*Ag.* 1343, 1345) or anger (*Hipp.* 581) or apprehension (*Med.* 1271-2), even when no words are spoken, as when Helen's anguished shouting is heard and wondered at by Hermione in *Or.* 1331-2.

A few times such indication is made for the expression of fear. For example, the apprehensive cries and words of the Suppliants of Aeschylus, before line 871, were meant to be delivered in a howling shrieking manner, as the words (872, 874-5; ἰνζε, λάκαζε, βόα) will testify. Shrill tones were to be employed in *Sept.* 320, cf. ὀξύβοος.

Anger and hate, as we might expect, were shown by loud shouting tones, as in the altercation of Agamemnon and Teucer in *Ajax* 1226-1315, when Odysseus comes in saying that he heard the βοήν (1319). In *O. T.* 532-629, Jocasta comes out disturbed at the sound of angry voices and says: στάσιν γλώσσης ἐπήρασθε (635). Surely δεινὰ φυσᾶς (*I. A.* 381) gives an idea of the way Euripides wished the anger of Menelaus (304-79) to be portrayed. Theseus says of his own angry speech in Euripides, *Suppl.* 456, ταῦτα . . . ἐξηκόντισα, implying the hurling out of speech like a weapon.

Whenever it was possible, the dramatist also made use of external appearance to supplement his portrayal of emotion. The majority of the indications in the plays concern the state of

²³ The reader will be able, both here and elsewhere throughout the paper, to supply many other examples which space does not permit to be listed in the text or notes.

dress or hair. Thus the women of *Cho.* 22 ff., lamenting as they enter with Electra, are dressed (cf. line 11) in φάρεσιν μελαγχίμοις. Sophocles' Electra (191) is dressed in ἀεικεῖ στολῇ. Oedipus in *O. C.* (1258-61) appears with wretched unkempt locks and aged filthy garments. Euripides' Electra has raggedly cut hair and tattered clothing (184-5, 241). Menelaus (*Helen* 421) wears nothing but rags and looks generally ἄγριος (544). Unkempt hair and clothing are indicated for the Suppliants of Euripides (97: *κουραῖ τε καὶ πεπλώματ' οὐ θεωρικά*), shorn hair for Hecuba (*Tro.* 142, 279), and the dress of mourning for the chorus in *Alc.* 923. Euripides tries, ineptly in view of the self-conscious effect which it produces, to indicate Antigone's emotional state—abandonment of grief (*Phoen.* 1485-91)—by having her describe her loosened garments and her head from which the veil or covering is flung. Philoctetes' tatters and general appearance are indicated by the word ἀπηγριωμένον (*Phil.* 226). All these cases naturally portray grief. Properties or objects carried in the hand are indicated in a number of instances to help show distress or apprehension. The Danaids of Aeschylus (*Suppl.* 21-2, 191-2) are mentioned as carrying in their left hands white wreathed suppliant boughs. The distressed chorus members in Euripides' *Suppliants* (cf. 36) also probably carry them, as well as those in the *Septem* (cf. 101) and the children of Heracles (*Heracl.* 124).²⁴ Polynices (*Phoen.* 267) enters the enemy city warily armed with a sword for protection.

Indications of the appearance of body and of face,—the mask,—are few. Electra's face (Euripides, *El.* 239) is to be streaked with blood, showing that she has been tearing at her cheeks with her nails, and thus evidencing her sorrow. Hippolytus (1343-4) for his last anguished scene has bloody head and limbs. The chorus' horror at Oedipus' appearance after his blinding (*O. T.* 1297) is enough to show that his mask was properly prepared with streaks of blood as a visible indication of his anguish. This may also be the case with Polymestor (*Hec.* 1119), for Agamemnon immediately notices his blindness.²⁵ The "clouded" or contracted brow also gives a hint as to the emotional expression

²⁴ Possibly the chorus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* also, cf. 19.

²⁵ On mask change see O. Hense, *Die Modifizierung der Maske in der griechischen Tragödie* (Freiburg, 1902), pp. 209-36; R. Flickinger, *The Greek Theatre and its Drama*, pp. 221-3.

of the face (*Trach.* 869-70; *Phoen.* 1308; *Hipp.* 172), though these may be only suggestions not actually carried out in mask design.

Up to this point we have dealt with actual stage business which the playwright indicated as a means of portraying emotion. The second division of the subject is that of simulated or suggested stage business, which, though it could not be actually carried out, the dramatists indicated in the belief that the suggestion of it alone would be sufficient for expressing an emotional state.

The most frequent type of suggestion is that of weeping. The distinction between the producing of actual tears and the attitude of weeping is not as absurd as it may at first sight seem. In view of the realism of the modern stage it at least deserves mention, and may be illustrated by the words of Admetus in *Alc.* 1067-8 concerning himself as he looks at the mysterious veiled figure Heracles brings: ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων πηγαὶ κατερρώγασιν or of Heracles (*H. F.* 1355): ἀπ' ὀμμάτων ἔσταξα πηγὰς or of Orestes (*Or.* 1239): δακρύοις κατασπένδω σε. More important, however, are the cases where weeping is indicated yet could not actually be carried out even in attitude. In *I. A.* 650, for instance, when Iphigenia is embracing her father, an attitude of weeping for the distressed Agamemnon would be quite impracticable; yet Iphigenia is made to suggest his emotional state by saying κάπειτα λείβεις δάκρυ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων σέθεν; The very suggestion of tears is enough to show pity when, in conversation with Heracles (*H. F.* 1238), Theseus says κλαίω χάριν σὴν κτλ. or the old man in *Ion* 940, in a long conversation with Creusa, says to her ὡς ἀπαντᾷ δάκρυνά μοι τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις.

Trembling is suggested to portray the apprehension of Megara in *H. F.* 627. Agitation of this sort is indicated also for the distress of Admetus (*Alc.* 1067-8) and the anger of Pentheus (*Bacch.* 214). Palpitating or tempestuous breathing is suggested²⁶ for portraying the anger of Menelaus (*I. A.* 334-79; cf. 381) and of Eteocles (*Phoen.* 446-51, cf. 454), and for Heracles' confusion (*H. F.* 1092-3). The suggestion of hair rising on the head occurs to show apprehension in *Sept.* 564.²⁷

²⁶ It may have been actually carried out, as it could be on the modern stage. The size of the theater would perhaps have prevented its effectiveness, however, unless it had been also suggested.

²⁷ Note that a Sophoclean fragment, 875, uses the expression ὀρθοκέρως φρίκη.

In the matter of appearance, facial expression is suggested by Sophocles (*Antig.* 528; *Trach.* 869-70) by the mention of overclouded or contracted brow where probably no change of mask had been, or could be, made. Agamemnon's troubled look is noted by Iphigenia (*I. A.* 648), and those of his wife and daughter by Agamemnon in the same play (1127-8). The chorus members of *Hipp.* 873 are made to say that they see an ill omen in Theseus' face. Jocasta's remark (*O. T.* 746), implying a terrible expression on Oedipus' face, helps portray his apprehension. Jason mentions the pallid cheek and "pale tears" of Medea (922-3), helping to convey her distress to the audience. Iolaus suggests Demophon's perplexity (*Heracl.* 381) with mention of his worried look (*σύννοιαν ὄμμασιν*). Beads of perspiration suggested for Philoctetes (823) help to portray his anguish.

Eteocles' anger is shown by the suggestion of facial expression which Jocasta makes (*Phoen.* 454: *δεινὸν ὄμμα*). Phaedra's unnatural affection (*Hipp.* 172, 175) is effectively portrayed by the suggestion of *νέφος* on her brow and of the changing color,—from blush to pallor back to blush again,—implied in the word *ἀλλόχροον*.

In the same way the suggestion of blood-streaked face is made in Euripides, *Suppl.* 77 and *Or.* 962 to help portray the sorrow of those who rend and tear their faces during a scene when no change of mask can be made; blood-shot eyes are suggested for the anger of Menelaus (*I. A.* 381) and the terrible hate of Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 1428). Suggestion of the spurting blood of Philoctetes' wound (825) helps to make his anguish more real. Even bodily appearance is possibly suggested to intensify the portrayal of distress, when the wasted condition of Electra (Euripides, *El.* 239) and Menelaus (*Helen* 421-2) are suggested.

It will be interesting, and instructive by way of comparison, to see what the dramatists considered fitting action and appearance when they described them in reporting scenes of emotion which did not take place upon the stage. An analysis of the passages of reported emotion reveals that the emotional actions as the dramatists conceived them when not bound by the limits of stage presentation correspond with almost all the devices of stage business which we have noted for portraying emotion. Thus we have:

Violence to oneself, including rending of face, garments, hair, as expressive of sorrow (*Pers.* 465-8, *Aj.* 634, *O. T.* 1243), remorse (*Aj.* 310), and horror (*O. T.* 1243); beating of the head and breast for sorrow (*Aj.* 632-3, *O. C.* 1607-9), remorse (*Aj.* 308), and apprehension (*Or.* 1465-8); other cases of violence for sorrow (*O. T.* 1260-2, 1270-2) and anguish (*Trach.* 779-80); suicide for sorrow (*O. T.* 1241-50, *Antig.* 1221, 1235-7, 1301-5, *Trach.* 913-26, *Phoen.* 331-3 [attempted], 1457-9).

violence to others for anger (*Antig.* 1233) and hate (*Aj.* 296-303).

various acts of supplication as expressive of sorrow (*Hec.* 239-49, 273, *I. T.* 362-77) and apprehension (*H. F.* 964, 974, 986-8, Euripides, *El.* 1214-17, *Bacch.* 1117-21).

bowed head and downcast eyes for sorrow (*Ag.* 234, *Alc.* 176-91), pity (*I. A.* 1581), and horror (*O. C.* 1650-1).

weeping for sorrow (*Ag.* 204, 887-9, *Trach.* 905, 909, 919, 941, *Phil.* 278, 360, *O. C.* 1607-9, 1621, 1646-7, *Alc.* 176-91, 201, *Med.* 25, *Phoen.* 1434, *I. A.* 1549-50), pity (*Hec.* 518-20, *Tro.* 1130-1, *Phoen.* 1441, Moschion, frag. 9), and vexation (*Phil.* 367).

sinking to the ground for anguish (*Bacch.* 1112).

lying prostrate for sorrow (*Med.* 27) and remorse (*Aj.* 323-5).

turning away for sorrow (*I. A.* 1549-50) and jealous hate (*Med.* 1147-8).

looking or turning this way and that for apprehension (Sophocles, *El.* 897).

rushing about, wandering or pacing here and there for sorrow (*O. T.* 1254-5, *Trach.* 907, *Alc.* 187-8), anguish (*Med.* 1190), apprehension (*H. F.* 971-4), and hesitation (*Antig.* 225-6).

struggle to be free of restraint for anguish (*Med.* 1214) and apprehension (*Or.* 1465-8).

embrace for sorrow (*Trach.* 938, *O. C.* 1607-11, 1620-1, *Alc.* 201, *Med.* 1205-6, *Phoen.* 1433; these last two references might justify the same action for Heracles in *H. F.* 1367,—throwing himself down to embrace the bodies of his children).

veiling head or eyes for sorrow (*I. A.* 1549-50) and jealous hate (*Med.* 1147-8).

hair rising on the head for horror (*O. C.* 1625).

gestures of other kinds, such as writhing in anguish (*Trach.* 786-7), beating the ground with one's staff in grief (*Ag.* 202-3), clasping hands in pity (Moschion, frag. 9).

Two interesting reported actions are found which have not been noted for the portrayal of emotion before the audience. One is throwing oneself to the ground for anguish in *Trach.* 790. The other is spitting, for Haemon's anger in *Antig.* 1232. This latter action is interesting in view of the fact that there are a number of cases in emotional passages in the dramas where the word ἀπέπτυσσά is used. On the basis of this action in a reported emotional scene, we may be justified to add these cases of ἀπέπτυσσά to the list of actions really carried out on the stage for the portrayal of emotion. Hippolytus' intense anger (614) might then be shown by the act, or at least the gesture of spitting. Hecuba appears to show her hatred thus in her altercation with Polymestor (*Hec.* 1276). Clytemnestra, at the news that Agamemnon plans to sacrifice her daughter, says, and probably accompanies with action: ἀπέπτυσ', ὦ γεραίέ, μῦθον (*I. A.* 874). Helen (*Helen* 664) evidently makes the same gesture for distress.²⁸ Spitting, then, might very well be considered a real action indicated to show emotion.

Silence is found in reported scenes for sorrow (*Med.* 28-30), pity (*Phoen.* 1439), and remorse (*Aj.* 311), and for anxiety (*Pers.* 206) and anger (*Antig.* 1232). Reported passages where manner of delivery is noted indicate wailing, howling, loud crying, and shrieking for sorrow (*Pers.* 465-8, *Aj.* 631, Sophocles, *El.* 750, *Antig.* 427, 1226, *O. T.* 1252, 1260, 1265, 1287, *Trach.* 904, 932, *Phil.* 278, *O. C.* 1609, 1646-7, *Med.* 1206, *Phoen.* 335, 1432) and remorse (*Aj.* 308, 317, 322, 327, 319-21); these and screaming for anguish (*Trach.* 772, 787, 805, *Med.* 1184 ff., *Bacch.* 1112-32); screaming and loud crying for apprehension (*Cho.* 533-5, *H. F.* 975-6, Euripides, *El.* 1214-17, *Or.* 1465); shrieking for horror (*Ag.* 1599); and loud shouting for hate (Sophocles, *El.* 295). These reported indications expand in great measure our knowledge of the way in which the dramatists wished lines to be delivered in actual emotional scenes acted before the audience.

²⁸ The latter two instances might be cases of superstitious ritual, a sort of preventative action.

Appearance rarely is mentioned in reported emotions; when it is, however, it agrees with what we have already found indicated: dismal robes and shorn hair for sorrow (*Phoen.* 323, 325); wild-eyed look for anger (*Antig.* 1231, *Med.* 187-9).

Interesting results may be obtained when the three great dramatists are compared in respect to their use of stage business for portraying emotion. Mention of acts of violence and excess against oneself such as beating the breast or tearing the hair are absent from Sophocles, while acts of violence against others are not indicated by Aeschylus. Supplicatory actions are indicated by all three, though seldom in the case of Sophocles. Thus Sophocles seems to have avoided and Euripides to have adopted Aeschylus' use of extravagant tearing of cheek, etc., and supplication,—with this difference, however, that Euripides adapts to the use of the individual actor, also, what Aeschylus indicated for the action of a whole chorus.

Mention of the bowed head and downcast eyes is given only by Euripides. Sophocles does, however, imply an attitude of weeping several times, and Aeschylus once. Fainting or sinking to the ground and lying prostrate are Euripidean devices which Sophocles used once also in his late play *Philoctetes*. Such actions as turning away, looking this way and that, or starting at a fancied sound are used occasionally by all the playwrights. Wandering or pacing back and forth, and running to hide are indicated only by Euripides. The embrace Aeschylus uses perhaps once, and that not at all certainly; Sophocles indicates it hardly more often, while Euripides makes very frequent use of it. Veiling the head is indicated by all three; tearing off veils and wreaths, by Aeschylus and Euripides. In general, indications of action for expressing emotion are almost twice as frequent in Euripides²⁹ as in the other dramatists, Sophocles using them somewhat less often than Aeschylus. Of course the reason for this might very well be that, unlike Aeschylus, and Sophocles in his earlier career, Euripides may not have had close supervision of the rehearsals and performance of the play, and so incorporated directions in the text. More likely, however, is the

²⁹ The number of extant plays makes no difference; this and other statements of comparison are based on the proportion of lines of emotional material which must be portrayed by each dramatist.

general trend in the late fifth century toward freedom of expression, evident in the use of rhythm and in art.³⁰

The use of exit or departure to portray emotion is Sophoclean, though Aeschylus and Euripides each use it once. Unusual entrances are employed by all three, slightly more so by Euripides, however. Silence, too, is favored by Sophocles as a means of portrayal, Aeschylus and Euripides indicating it comparatively seldom for emotional expression. The number of indications of manner of delivery and of appearance seems to show that all three dramatists attached approximately equal importance to these methods of portraying emotion on the stage.

Euripides again is the dramatist who most uses the suggestion of weeping; this is the case with the suggestion of trembling, etc., which Sophocles uses once, Aeschylus not at all. The suggestion of appearance impossible to carry out on the stage is employed by Sophocles and Euripides,—only once by Aeschylus. In general, Euripides uses suggestion of action most often of the three dramatists.

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³⁰ Cf. the last sections of T. B. L. Webster's *Greek Art and Literature* (Oxford, 1939).

COMIC ITERATION IN ARISTOPHANES.

Of the many devices evolved and utilized by the genius of Aristophanes to provoke laughter, perhaps none is more constantly encountered than verbal iteration. This technic is used to arouse other emotional reactions also,¹ but the comic response is the primary motive involved in its occurrence. The repetition may be on a broad scale, that of situation or episode or idea, frequently with a reversal of circumstances;² it may be the repetition of complete lines,³ resulting in humor of various shades; and it may be the iteration of single words or phrases, repeated according to several different schemes and eliciting reactions which run the whole gamut of the comic emotion,⁴ according to the particular circumstance of the iteration. The effect of the repetition of these *mots de caractère* and *mots de situation* may be highly irrational, and may be immediately perceptible or not, depending upon the manner in which the iteration is introduced and developed. It is probable that the recognition of such comic intentions by the poet is less immediate when the comedy is merely read than would be the case when the comedy is performed. For this kind of humor would be greatly accentuated in a performance by the development of the action of the play, by the attitudes and gestures of the actor, and particularly by the intonation and inflection of the actor's voice in delivery. The alertness of the Athenian audience at dramatic performances to

¹ E. g., there is emphasis in the iteration in *Nub.* 557-8 and *Vesp.* 1060-2; insistence in that of *Ach.* 310-13 and *Vesp.* 628-30; urgency in *Eq.* 725-7; pathos in *Nub.* 860-1; rhetorical iteration in *Eq.* 1-2, *Plut.* 237-42, and in the four-fold *ἐνρεῦθεν* in *Ach.* 528-39; the iteration of *πρῶς* in *Ach.* 34-5 is in preparation for the pun which follows. There is also much fortuitous and ineffective repetition of words, as of *λέγει* in *Ach.* 105-6, 108.

² E. g., *Nub.* 847 ff. repeats the episode of 662 ff. and *Nub.* 1248 ff. repeats that of 670 ff., in both cases with reversal of situation.

³ Cf., "Repetition of Lines in Aristophanes," *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 26-36.

⁴ It would be inappropriate to discuss here the source of the comic response inherent in repetition. The whole topic, however, including the comic effect of word-repetition, is analyzed by Bergson. Cf. *Le Rire*, chap. 2.

every sort of word-play, however tenuous, would insure the ready appreciation of humor arising from verbal iteration.⁵

In rare instances Aristophanes introduces into a later play words which have already been used in an earlier play for their comic effect. The motive for the repetition is not, I think, simply the desire to use again a successful comic device; rather, it is Aristophanes' desire to remind the theatre of the comic circumstances of the earlier occurrence and from the reminiscence of the previous associations of the words to evoke additional humor. In the *Acharnae* Aristophanes had described Lamachus in a highly parodic passage with the bombastic *ὁ δεινός, ὁ ταλαύριμος* (964). When, four years later, he applied the same adjectives to Polemus (*Pax* 241), his purpose was to incite laughter by the reminiscence of the previous occurrence. Similarly, the poet had introduced the word *μορμόνα* (*Ach.* 582) as a jest *κατὰ ἐξαλλαγὴν φωνῇ* on *Γοργόνα*, the emblem on Lamachus' shield, at which he repeatedly jests in the *Acharnae*. When, in the *Pax*, Lamachus is addressed and the same pun recurs (473-4), it is clearly for the comic effect of the reminiscence, for in the *Pax* the two lines are wholly irrelevant to the context. The proximity of *Pax* 561 to this passage suggests a similar motivation for this line also, for throughout the *Acharnae* many jesting remarks are made on Lamachus' "crests" and Gorgon-emblem.⁶ Again in the *Pax* (313-14) *Κέρβερον* and *παφλάζων* are reminders, for comic purposes, of Cleon-Paphlagon in the *Equites*, who is there described by the word *παφλάζει* (919) and is termed a *Κέρβερον* (1030). Slightly different is the recurrence (*Lys.* 975 and *Thes.* 61) of *ἐυστρέψας καὶ ξυγγογγυλίσας, sensu obsceno*. The latter context does not imply deliberate reference to the earlier use by Aristophanes, though the performance of the plays in consecutive years would facilitate reminiscence by the audience.

⁵ The repetition of words to permit jests *καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν* (equivocation) or jests *κατὰ ἐξαλλαγὴν φωνῇ* is not included in this study. In all such places, though iteration may occur, it is not the repetition which provides the humor, but rather the equivocation or punning. Many of the iterated words mentioned below are repeated in exactly the same form; others are changed to suit the context in which they reoccur. I mention only the chief examples of the several types of iteration; many others could be added if an exhaustive list were desired. Iteration naturally occurs almost exclusively in the dialogue.

⁶ Cf. *infra*.

Certain words, in some few instances, because of their frequent occurrence with a particular force throughout a portion of a play, become almost a comic *leit-motiv* with a strong cumulative effect. The voice of the actor, by imparting a peculiar stress in delivery, would doubtless serve to accentuate the iteration. Such a word is *πτωχός* in the *Acharnae*. Borrowing the beggar's habiliments from Euripides, Dicaeopolis, quoting from the *Telephus*, exclaims:

δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον (440).

Thereafter, *πτωχός* ὦν occurs within one hundred lines no less than six times, with obvious reference to the first usage (cf. *Ach.* 493, 558, 577a, 579, 593, 594).⁷ As already mentioned, the Gorgon-emblem of Lamachus' shield is the target of much recurring jesting of various types (cf. *Ach.* 574, 582, 964, 1095, 1124, 1131, 1181). A similar comic effect arises in the *Vespae* from the reiteration of the prefix *φίλο-*, in the conjectures as to Philocleon's disease (cf. *Vesp.* 75, 77, 79, 82, 83, 88, 133).⁸ Comic also is the iteration of *τυραννίς* (cf. *Vesp.* 417, 464, 487, 488, 495, 498, 502, 507) and of *ξυνωμότης* (cf. *Vesp.* 345, 483, 488, 507, 953), both words occurring in a variety of situations producing humor.

A comic effect frequently results when a word or phrase previously used by the poet is introduced again later in the same play under circumstances designed to inspire humor. The first usage may have been in itself comic; in that case, the reoccurrence reminds the audience of the earlier comic association of the word. Or the previous occurrence, not in itself comic, may now be so used in mimicry or derision, frequently with reversal of situation, as to provoke laughter. An instance is the use of *λόφος* in the *Acharnae*. Using this word in a comic surprise, Dicaeopolis addresses Lamachus as ἥρως τῶν λόφων καὶ τῶν λόχων (575). He further derides Lamachus' "crests" in two episodes (586 f. and 965 f.), and when the Herald summons Lamachus to battle, it is with the words τοὺς λόχους καὶ τοὺς λόφους (1074). Aristophanes gratuitously reintroduces the words here to recall

⁷ Starkie (on *Ach.* 497) thinks that there may be in this repetition an indication that Aristophanes had been recently charged by Cleon with *πτωχεία*. If so, the repetition would be naturally the more pointed and comic. It seems unnecessary to detail the source of the humor of each occurrence of these words.

⁸ Cf. Rogers' note on 134 on the inflection of the actor's voice in pronouncing the name Philocleon.

to the theatre the previous humorous occurrence (cf. further, *Ach.* 1109-11). Similarly, μάχαι καὶ Λάμαχοι (*Ach.* 1071) is employed to refer to the earlier occasion of their use (269), with the comic force of equivocation and *annominatio*. Slightly different is the repetition of the joke: φαίνεις ἄνευ θρναλλίδος (*Ach.* 826, 917) in the two Informer-episodes. Here, the humor arises from the ambiguity in the meaning of the verb, and is repeated in episodes quite parallel in form. And the comic coinage κομπολακίθου (*Ach.* 1182) surely reoccurs as a reminder of the earlier passage (589) in derision of Lamachus. The *Equites* also contains a number of examples of this technic. Thus, Agoracritus boasts that, when he had stolen meat, he denied it, ἀποκρυπτόμενος εἰς τὰ κοχώνα (*Eq.* 424). Somewhat later the Chorus urges him on, repeating to him his own words (484). So, Θεμιστοκλῆς (*Eq.* 884) is designed to recall Paphlagon's claim that he had done more for the city than Themistocles (812) and Agoracritus' scornful rebuttal (813, 818). There is comic design, too, in having Demus (*Eq.* 946) adopt the words of Agoracritus: φάσκων φιλεῖν (870) in condemning Paphlagon. The words ἀνὴρ γεγένησai (*Eq.* 1255) are a reminder of the comic promise to Agoracritus (178-9). And Paphlagon's protest: ἐραστής τ' εἰμὶ σός (*Eq.* 732) is comically adapted by Agoracritus in rebuking Demus (1341). It is the *Nubes*, however, which seems to present, in the development of the action of the play, the most opportunities for the use of this technic. Thus, νόσος ἵππική (*Nub.* 243) is a jesting reminder of the etymological jest in ἵππερος (73). Betraying the influence of the "new learning," Strepsiades swears (*Nub.* 667) νῆ τὸν Ἀέρα. As the Scholiast remarks on the passage, he is imitating the oaths of Socrates (*Nub.* 264, 627).⁹ The words ψυλλῶν ἴχνη (*Nub.* 831) are a reminiscence for the audience of the episode in which Strepsiades first encounters sophistic learning (145-52). In *Nubes* 802, Strepsiades repeats his earlier threat (122) and *Nubes* 815 is a comic suggestion referring to Pheidippides' boast (124). Strepsiades, turning instructor, reveals to his son the new knowledge: οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεὺς (*Nub.* 827) with the same words Socrates had used (367). A similar im-

⁹ Cf. also a similar oath in *Nub.* 814, and the Scholiast. Much of the humor of situation of the latter part of the play revolves around Strepsiades' attempts to make use of his "new learning," and, later, his renunciation.

parting of knowledge, with change of situation, occurs in τῶν μετεώρων πραγμάτων (*Nub.* 1284, cf. 228, 490). In the contest with his father, Pheidippides exclaims deridingly: πάττε πολλοῖς τοῖς ῥόδοις (*Nub.* 1330), echoing the ῥόδα μ' εἴρηκας (910) and χρυσῶ πάττων (912) of the Unjust Reason. Later on, he ironically retorts upon him Strepsiades' idea and word, διδασκάλῳ (*Nub.* 1467, cf. 871). In the *Vespae*, κωλακρέτον γάλα (724), a comic surprise, recalls Philocleon's refusal to barter his court life for ὀρνίθων γάλα (508). Bdelycleon makes an ironic reference in *Vespae* 666 to Philocleon's words (593). The use of λόγοι δεξιοί (*Vesp.* 1394) is intended to refer comically to Bdelycleon's λόγον ἀστείον (1258). Συβαρίτης (*Vesp.* 1427) and ἐν Συβάρει (*Vesp.* 1435) are intentional reminders of Bdelycleon's proposals earlier (1259) and their results.¹⁰ In the *Pax* Aristophanes repeats the comic indictment: Μήδοισιν . . . προδιδόναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα (108, 408) in ridiculous circumstances. When Trygaeus exclaims παῖε τὸν Βάκιν (*Pax* 1119), he is playing upon the triple iteration of Bacis (1070-1). In the same manner, Trygaeus' retort: τὴν Σίβυλλαν ἔσθιε (*Pax* 1116) is a comic reference to Hierocles' oracles (1095). In his phrase, οἰωνῶν ταναοδείρων (*Aves* 1394), Cinesias, the bird-lover, adopts the Hoopoe's words (253). In the *Ranae*, Xanthias (582) retorts Dionysus' answer (531),¹¹ and the same purpose is evident in κακὸν ἤκει τινί (*Ran.* 552, 606). The use of πιεῖν (*Eccl.* 157) refers to the previous comic use (132-3). In the *Plutus* (862, 957), Cario mimics the application of τοῦ πονηροῦ κόμματος to the Informer.

Various shades of humor—irony, mockery, derision—result when a second speaker seizes upon a word just used and retorts it, without change of meaning of the word but in an altered context, at the expense of the first speaker. Here either the word or the thought of the previous speaker is consciously ridiculed. In many of these examples, the reoccurrence of the word in the same form and at the same place in the line lends emphasis to the comic effect.¹² An illustration occurs in the *Acharnae* where Theorus explains:

¹⁰ Although verbal iteration is lacking, Philocleon's tragic lament in *Vesp.* 997-1002 is designed to remind one of the oracle he quoted in *Vesp.* 158-60.

¹¹ As the Scholiast remarks.

¹² There is, of course, no comic effect intended in those many places

χρόνον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἤμεν ἐν Θράκῃ πολύν (136)

and Dicaeopolis breaks in with an "aside" aimed at the audience:

μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μισθόν γε μὴ ἔφερες πολύν (137).

Similarly, in the *Acharnae*: δραχμάς, 66-7; κατακείμενοι, 150-2; χρόνον, 139-41; παρνόπων, 150-2; δραχμάς, 159-61; ἐγγελευν, 962-3; *Nubes*: δρόμους, 28-9; ἵππιον, 83-4; *Equites*: ὤγαθε, 71-3; κακὰ κακῶς, 189-90; πίνων, 349-51; ἀσπίδων, 846-7; *Vespae*: κατάβα, 979-80; *Pax*: μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ, 401-2; *Aves*: Φαρνάκῃ, 1028-30; *Ranae*: ὠδέλφ', 58, 60; *Lysistrata*: ἀπόλλυτε, 1134-6; *Thes.*: ἀλλὰ τοῖς παθήμασι, 199, 201; Ἑλένην, 850-3; *Eccl.*: μαρτύρων γ' ἐναντίον, 448-51; μύρον, 524-5; *Plutus*: ὑπὸ φιληδίας, 307-11; σφηκώδεις, 561-2; κοσμότης, 564-6; πρὸ τοῦ, 1005-6. The comic effect of such a technic is perhaps stronger, though less directly observable, when the retorted word does not occur immediately but is held back for some lines. Thus, in *Thes.* 43, Agathon's servant in his proclamation uses the phrase νήνεμος αἰθήρ, which is comically retorted by Mnesilochus a little later (51). The following examples have the same motive, in *Equites*: εὐδαιμονεῖς, 151, 172-5; κόβαλα, 417, 450; *Aves*: πράγματα, 128-135; τὸ μεταξύ, 968, 985; μετρήσω, 1004, 1020; *Ranae*: εὐδαίμων, 1182, 1195; *Lysistrata*: ψῆτταν, 115, 131; *Thes.*: μήτ' ἀκούω μήθ' ὀρώ, 19, cf. 5-7; καλλιπής, 49-60; *Plutus*: κοτίνου στεφάνῳ στεφανώσας, 585, 592; βούλομαι, 908, 918, 921; οὐ πολλὰ ἡσχύνετο, 981-8; ἐκνομίως, 981, 992; εὖ πεπεμμένον, 1126-36, 1142. Aristophanes also uses several formulae to express comic irony, scorn, or contempt. One of these devices is an elliptical question, introduced by ποῖος, and repeating the word or words of a former speaker in the same form. There is no interrogation here, but either the terminology or the thought of the speaker is ridiculed. Thus, in *Ach.* 61-2, the Herald announces: οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως, to which Dicaeopolis replies in derision: ποίου βασιλέως. This device

in the dialogue in which the second speaker answers the first speaker with his own word. This is the normal method of dialogue in Aristophanes and is omnipresent. Even when the word is echoed in an elliptical question, except for the special devices mentioned below, there is no comic effect, though frequently incredulity and repudiation are implied. In the examples quoted the repetition is not necessary to the development of the dialogue but occurs expressly for the sake of humor.

reappears in *Ach.* 109, 157, 761, *Nub.* 367, 1233, 1337, cf. 247, *Eq.* 32, 162, 1082, *Vesp.* 1202, 1369, 1378, *Av.* 1346, *Lys.* 730, 922, 1178, *Thes.* 30, 874, *Plut.* 1046. The use of *ποῖ* in *Lys.* 193, 383 is exactly the same. Another formula of comic irony is *ἰδοῦ γε* plus the repetition of a word just used by another speaker. When Strepsiades swears by *πατρῶν Δία* (*Nub.* 1467), Pheidippides derides him with the words *ἰδοῦ γε πατρῶν Δία* (1468). So, also, *Nub.* 818, 872,¹³ *Eq.* 87, 344, 703, *Pax* 198, *Lys.* 441, *Thes.* 206, *Eccl.* 93, 133, 136, cf. *Ran.* 1205. Occasionally, *ἦσθην* plus a repeated word is employed for comic effect, as in *Nub.* 174, 1240, *Av.* 570, cf. 880.

In another type of comic iteration, a second speaker consciously imitates the word of the former speaker, expressing with it an opposing thought or idea derogatory to and incongruous with the original. This mimicry usually exhibits the highest degree of parallelism of form.¹⁴ The comic response, somewhat irrational, arises chiefly from the mimicry of one character by another. Thus, in *Ach.* 1105-6,¹⁵ Lamachus' exclamation and Dicaeopolis' mocking answer are:

*καλόν γε καὶ λευκὸν τὸ τῆς στρούθου πτερόν.
καλόν γε καὶ ξανθὸν τὸ τῆς φάττης κρέας.*

Similar examples are in *Equites*: *τοῦτονί*, 278-80; *καῖτ' ἐπιπιών*, 354-7; *ἐλάνθανεν*, 461-5; *κατατμηθείην*, 768-9; *οὐ δεινόν*, 875-8; *γενέσθαι δεῖ σε*, 963-4; *ἀλλ' οἱ γ' ἐμοὶ λέγουσιν*, 965-7; *κοῦχ ἅπαντας ἐκφέρω*, 997-8; *καὶ μούδόκει ἡ θεὸς αὐτή*, 1090-2; *Nubes*: *μοι δοκεῖς*, 1276-7; *Pax*: *οὔποτε*, 1083-4, 1086; *Aves*: *τὸ δ' ἐμὲ . . . πειθόμενον*, 5-7; *Lysistrata*: *τοιγάρ, ἦν δοκῇ*, 901-2; *Eccl.*: *ἀλλ' ἡ γυνή*, 460-1; *Plutus*: *καὶ τὰς γ' ἐταίρας φασί*, 149-53; *βούλομαι*, 1088-90.

Even when derision and mimicry are lacking, the echoing of a word by another character may stimulate humor involving the situation or action of the drama. The source of the humor seems to be comic emphasis or contrast of ideas or comic characteriza-

¹³ In this place the pronunciation of the speaker is ridiculed.

¹⁴ The structure of the whole line, or of several lines, may be quite parallel. The iterated word serves to draw attention to the parallelism of form but incongruity of idea, thus heightening the humor.

¹⁵ *Ach.* 1097-1142 and, again, 1190-1225 (a parody of the tragic threnody) contain many words repeated by Dicaeopolis in mockery of Lamachus, all of which it is unnecessary to list.

tion. The five-fold iteration of εἶθός (*Nub.* 1357-9, 1365, 1371-3) is an illustration in point. Other examples are, in *Acharnae*: Ἀχαρνέας, 200-3; μηδαμῶς, 297 and 324, 334;¹⁶ κέραμον, 905 and 928, 953; κικλῶν, 961-70; *Equites*: κολλώμενα, 463-70; λαβὴν δέδωκεν, 841-7; *Nubes*: τοῦντερον τῆς ἐμπίδος, 160-8; διὰ τοῦτ' ἐγένοντο, 354-5, cf. 352; ἀποστερητικός, 728, 747, cf. 730;¹⁷ *Vespa*: Σαβαζίων, 9-10; Κλεώννυμον, 19-20; καταπροίξει, 1366, 1396; *Pax*: ὦ Ζεῦ, 58-62; μυττωτόν, 273, cf. 247; *Ranae*: πιέζομαι, 3, 30; θλίβομαι, 5, 20; δικαῖος ὁ λόγος, 623, 637; *Lysistrata*: ὁ γοῦν ἐμός, 102, 104-5; εἰ τᾶρα νή . . . , 435-9, 443-7;¹⁸ πολὺ μᾶλλον, 501-5; ὑπὸ μίσους, 792, 814; *Plutus*: οὐχὶ διὰ τοῦτον, 170-1, 174-6, cf. 178-81; ἐς τὴν κεφαλὴν, 650-1.

Reiteration of a word or phrase by the same speaker may also arouse the comic response. It may be quite ludicrous and irrational, as the nine-fold iteration of ὥσπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ in *Ecclesiazusae* 221-8,¹⁹ of κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν in *Plutus* 833-6, and μαρώτατος in *Pax* 185-7, 194.²⁰ But frequently, the humor is more rational, serving to characterize the speaker comically, or expressing derision against another. The four-fold iteration of ἐξ εὐρυπρόκτων by the same speaker develops a jest directed against the audience (*Nubes* 1090-9). In *Acharnae* 575-8, the repetition of ὦ Λάμαχ' ἦρως is in derision. The following list contains examples of the same technic. *Acharnae*: ἀθάνατος, 47, 51, 53; χρύσιον, 102-3; ἀθλιωτέρον, 420-2; cf. 425;²¹ ὦ γλυκύτατ' Εὐριπίδη, 462-7, cf. 475; *Equites*: κράτιστ', 30, 73, 80, cf. 85;²² οὐκ αὖ μ'

¹⁶ The reversal of situation between Dicaeopolis and the Acharnians is marked by an accompanying interchange of language, involving especially ἀκούω and the listed word.

¹⁷ The ingeniousness of Aristophanes in the use by Strepsiades of the word ἀποστερήτριδα in *Nub.* 730 and the later use in 747 of the word used in 728 is fully analyzed by C. W. Pepler, "The Termination-κός as used by Aristophanes for Comic Effect," *A. J. P.*, XXXI (1910), p. 434.

¹⁸ The structure of all four lines is exactly parallel.

¹⁹ The same technic is illustrated in *Eccl.* 773-6; 799-803 and 862-4.

²⁰ This is the more comic because Trygaeus adopts, in ridicule, the excessive iteration of the word by Hermes in 183-4 (cf. *Ran.* 466). In 194, Trygaeus ironically repeats the word when the situation has changed.

²¹ The comic coinage in 425 changes the word but repeats the idea.

²² Lines 80 and 83 are quotations from tragedy, and the iteration thus more effective.

ἑάσεις, 336-8; παρίει, 436-40; κᾶγωγ' ὅτε δή, 632, 658;²³ ἡ βουλὴ πάλιν, 657, 663; οὔκουν δεινὸν ταυτί, 810, 820; μή σε δολώσῃ, 1067, 1081; *Nubes*: πάνν, 484-5; γενήσομαι, 502-4; ἀνοήτους, 898, 918; *Vesprae*: μισθὸν λήψομαι, 785-6, 813; κατεύγῃ, 1428, 1436; *Rax*: εὐθὺ τοῦ Διός, 68, 77; Βάκιν, 1070, 1071 *bis*; *Aves*: ἄδουσι, 40-1; ὥσπερ νὼ ποτέ, 114-16; ἐρᾶς, 135, 143; αὐθις αὐ κατέπτατο, 789-92; ἐχρησμολόγεις, 964, 990; εἰ με λυπήσει, 1246, 1253; πτέρου, 1436, 1453; *Ranae*: πλὴν, 3, 5, 11; τούτου πάνν τοῦργον, 563-8; γεννάδας, 640-738; φημὶ κἀγώ, 954-8; *Lysistrata*: σιώπα, 529, 538; κἀγὼ ἔκδύομαι, 920-5; καίτοι, τὸ δεῖνα, 921-6; μή μοί γε, 922, 938; καταγέλαστος εἰ, 1020-4; *Thesmophoriazusae*: οὐχ ἑώρακας πώποτε, 32-3; τίς, 136 f.; ποιεῖ, 168-70;²⁴ ὦ Θράττα, 279-80, 284, 293; ἄρ' ἄρμόσει μοι, 260-3; κακόν, 789 *bis*, 794, 796, 799; *Ecclesiazusae*: δοκεῖ, 197-8; ἐμὲ μόνον, 438-9; κρίνειν ἐμέ, 1155-7; *Plutus*: πώποτε, 236, 241-5; κατέπλασεν, 717, cf. 721-4; σοὶ λέγει, 926-7; οὐχ ὑγιαίνειν μοι δοκεῖς, 1060-6; οἶμοι, 1126-8, 1132; ἐγὼ κατήσθιον, 1128-30.

When the repeated word is tragic and used in parody or paratragedia of the tragic poets (or, as in a few instances, epic or especially poetic words or Aristophanic coinages), the iteration is particularly noticeable because of the prominence of the word in its context. The Athenian audience was proverbially acute, and such word-play would scarcely pass unremarked. An illustration occurs in the *Aves*, where Iris, threatening Peisthetaerus in a highly paratragedic passage, uses a tragic word (particularly Euripidean) καταθαλώ.²⁵ She warns that Zeus καταθαλώσει σου Δικυμνίαις βολαῖς (1242). Peisthetaerus, adopting her word, first retorts with a parody of Aeschylus: καταθαλώσω πυρφόροιςιν αἰετοῖς (1248), and later, using the word metaphorically of ἔρως (as the Scholiast remarks): καταθαλώσεις τῶν νεωτέρων τινά (1261). Similarly, in the *Acharnae*, the servant describes

²³ The whole passage parodies the speeches of messengers in tragedy, and the repetition ridicules one feature of such speeches.

²⁴ The structure and idea of the three lines are developed alike throughout.

²⁵ The word occurs only in these three places in Aristophanes and once in Aeschylus, besides the occurrences in Euripides. The usage of most of the tragic words discussed in this section is stated by E. W. Hope, *The Language of Parody*, and illustrated in the case of some words by the commentators.

²⁶ From the *Niobe* (frag. 160, Nauck²), as the Scholiast says.

Lamachus with several Homeric epithets and concludes: *κραδαίων τρεῖς κατασκίους λόφους* (965). Dicaeopolis, using the same word, rejoins: *ἐπὶ ταρίχει τοὺς λόφους κραδαινέτω* (967).²⁷ In the *Nubes*, Strepsiades is admonished by Socrates²⁸ to invent a *νοῦς ἀποστερητικός κἀπαιώλημα* (729). When later he is assured by Socrates that his son has learned "the logic," he exclaims in a lofty tone: *ὦ παμβασιλεί' Ἀπαιώλη* (1150), personifying the word.²⁹ In each of these places, the repetition of a word by a second character, with various degrees of derogation or mimicry, intensified by the nature of the word, is a source of humor. Other iterations for comic purposes of tragic words in parody or paratragedia are, in the *Acharnae*: *δόμων*, 450-6, 460; *ὄχληρός*, 460, 472; *σελαγοῖντ'*, 924-5; *αἰαῖ*, 1082-3; *ἀπταται*, 1190-8; *Equites*: *βρέτας*, 31-2; *μεγάλως*, 151, 172, cf. 1162;³⁰ *Pax*: *Πηγάσιον πτερόν*, 76, 135; *ῥώ*, 236, 242-6, 250; *λακίσσεται*, 381-2, 384;³¹ *Aves*: *κρυεράν*, 951-5; *πτεροδόνητος*, 1390, 1402;³² *πνοαῖσι*, 1396-7; *Ranae*: *αὐλῶν πνοή*, 154, 313; *λῆμα*, 463, 500, 603, 899³³ and *ληματιᾶς*, 494;³⁴ *Thes.*: *καταίθειν*, 727-30; *ἐξώπιος*, 881-4; *οἰκτείρω*, 1058, 1107-10.

A comic effect is also apparent when the tragic word is repeated by the same speaker. Sometimes derision and irony are intended, but, when these are lacking, even the mere iteration of the tragic word in a grandiloquent manner may be humorous. This is the effect when Dicaeopolis thrice addresses his soul with the tragic *ὦ θυμέ* (*Ach.* 450, 480-3). Comic, also, is the recurrence of *εὐδαιμονοίης* (*Ach.* 446, 457), the second with derogatory intent, when Dicaeopolis thanks Euripides with a common Euripidean tag. So, also, in *Acharnae*: *ῥηματίους*, 444-7;³⁵

²⁷ There may be a jest *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* in the whole line (cf. Starkie, but contrast Van Leeuwen), but in any case the repetition is very noticeable because of the poetic word.

²⁸ Lines 727-9 should be given to Socrates, following the *codd.*, not to the Coryphaeus, as Willems proposes.

²⁹ The two words occur only here in Aristophanes, and in tragedy.

³⁰ Neil, on *Eq.* 151, surveys the use of this word in classical Greek.

³¹ The word is particularly Euripidean.

³² As the Scholiast remarks.

³³ This tragic and poetic word is repeated by Xanthias to Dionysus thrice.

³⁴ Variant: *ληματίας*. Occurring nowhere else, the word is apparently a coinage, designed to refer specifically to line 463.

³⁵ The word is always used by Aristophanes with reference to Euripides.

ποθουμένη, 885-890; στυγερός, 1191, 1207; *Equites*: ἀντιφερίζεις, 813, 818;³⁶ *Nubes*: φρουῖδος, 718-22 (five times); ἰὼ τέκνον, 1165, 1170; *Vespaie*: ψυχή, 756 bis; *Aves*: ἔτυμος 114-18; cf. 119; *Lysistrata*: πόλεμος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει, 520;³⁷ 538; *Eccl.*: ὄλβιος, 1129-31; *Thes.*: πολύπλοκον, 463, cf. 434;³⁸ πλάτη, 770-3; πόσις, 866, 901-14; *Plutus*: φθείρον, 598, 610.³⁹

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AN ALLUSION TO A RIDDLE IN SUETONIUS.

In his account of Caligula's birth, Suetonius refers to some verses that were in circulation shortly after the emperor took office. They are:

In castris natus, patriis nutritus in armis,
Iam designati principis omen erat.¹

He cites them in connection with references by Gaius Lentulus Gaetulicus and Pliny Secundus to Caligula's birth at Tibur or Ambitarvium respectively, where there were Roman camps. He rejects the story for several reasons and along with it the verses, "quod ii sine auctore sunt."

The anonymous or, in other words, traditional quality of the verses can be demonstrated in a way that Suetonius may have had in mind but did not specifically mention. They make three statements regarding the birth, rearing, and later life of Caligula. Precisely this combination of statements constitutes a formula in riddling. See, for example, the Hungarian riddle for a wooden sieve with a horsehair bottom: "It grows in the woods, it gets fat

³⁶ As Neil says on the passage, an Epic word.

³⁷ *Lysistrata* quotes *Iliad*, VI, 492, which she proceeds to parody.

³⁸ Probably with special reference to Euripides. Cf. Rogers' note *ad loc.*

³⁹ The Euripidean imprecation, here in parody. Cf. Starkie's account of the word, on *Ach.* 460.

¹ Chap. 8.

in the meadows, it plays among the women" ² or the variant, "It grows in the woods, it prospers in the meadows, they slap it in every house." ³ The parallelism of the statements often leads, in the course of oral transmission, to a loss of variety as in the Lettish riddle for heartwood, "Born in the wood, grown up in the wood, it has never seen the sun" ⁴ or to the disappearance of an element as in the Argentinian Spanish candle riddle, "I was created on the mountain and I came to my end at the altar," ⁵ which refers to bees making wax out of doors, or the canoe riddle, "I am born on the mountain, I live in the water," ⁶ in which the speaker, intrigued by the contrast of mountain and water, has neglected a possible third element.

There are, furthermore, traces of this formula in classical literature. Athenaeus gives the following enigmatic description of a snail, ἰλογενής, ἀνάκανθος, ἀναίματος, ὑγροκέλευθος.⁷ Cicero has another version: Terrigena, herbigrada, domiporta, sanguine cassa.⁸ Both of these riddles differ from our formula: they contain four elements, they do not suggest a biography, and they name characteristic anatomical details belonging to a snail. Such descriptions are used in later times in riddles for a snail. If classical riddlers knew the formula "Born in a forest" (as I conjecture they did), it is not surprising that they transferred such words as ἰλογενής and *terrigena* from it to the snail riddle. Such contaminations occur frequently in the process of oral transmission. Another transformation of our formula is probably seen in a riddle for salt:

ὕδατος ἐκγενόμην, τράφε δ' ἥλιος αὖτις·
ἀθάνατος· θνήσκω δέ γε μητέρι μούνη.⁹

² *Magyar Nyelvőr*, II (1873), p. 43; III (1874), p. 38; XII (1833), p. 286; XIV (1885), p. 189, No. 3.

³ *Magyar Nyelvőr*, IX (1880), p. 37; XIII (1884), p. 285; XXV (1896), p. 239.

⁴ A. J. G. Bielenstein, *Tausend lettische Rätsel* (Mitau, 1881), p. 114, No. 911.

⁵ Robert Lehmann-Nitsche, *Adivinanzas rioplatenses* (Buenos Aires, 1911), No. 53.

⁶ Lehmann-Nitsche, No. 45.

⁷ *Deipnosophistae*, II, 63 b.

⁸ *De divinatione*, II, 64.

⁹ *Anthol. Pal.*, Append. VII, 81. Wolfgang Schultz conjectures that the answer should be *raindrop*, but the folklore parallels do not support

The three elements in this formula are intended to conflict in their implications and should at the same time be held together to achieve an enigmatic effect. The riddler gains a greater degree of unity when he clearly implies, as in the verses quoted by Suetonius and in some of the parallels already cited, that these elements belong to a single creature. This creature is of course not the answer to the riddle. Some inventions are extremely ingenious. The Lithuanians and the Letts, for example, describe the long wellsweep beside the house by this formula and at the same time suggest a dog: "Born in the wood, grown up in the wood, it comes to the house, it lifts up its tail."¹⁰ Another way of suggesting a dog occurs in the Lithuanian and Hungarian flail riddle: "Grown in the forest, it barks when at the house."¹¹ This theme of an outcry is adapted to suggest a person in the Georgian mortar and pestle riddle: "I was born in the forest, I grew up in the forest, and when I entered the house, I began to shout loudly."¹² A Kashmiri riddler suggests a person in still another way when he is describing a churn stick: "It was born in the jungle, it gave birth in the jungle, on coming from the jungle it went out to dance."¹³

I need not add more evidence to prove what is already obvious. The anonymous verses cited by Suetonius employ a formula familiarly used by classical and later riddlers.

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him. See *Rätsel aus dem hellenischen Kulturkreise*, I (Leipzig, 1909), p. 63, No. 95.

¹⁰ Kleofas Jurgelionis, *Misliq Knyga* (Chicago, 1913), No. 454. For the translation I am indebted to Mrs. Alice Rakstis. Bielenstein, *Tausend lettische Rätsel*, No. 31.

¹¹ August Schleicher, *Litauische Märchen, Sprichworte, Räthsel und Lieder* (Weimar, 1857), p. 198; *Magyar Nyelvör*, IV (1875), p. 180; XIII (1884), p. 285; XXXVII (1908), p. 188.

¹² M. W. Glushakov, *Sbornik . . . Kavkaza*, XXXI, iii (1903), p. 24, No. 14.

¹³ J. H. Knowles, "Kashmiri Riddles," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, LVI (1887), pp. 126-154, No. 31.

THE CONCILIAR AND CIVIL CALENDAR IN

I. G., I², 324.

Athenian public finance in the Fifth Century was based on the conciliar year, as is shown in the dates of the loans in *I. G.*, I², 324, an inscription of great importance for the reconstruction of the Athenian calendar.¹ The dates of the loans from Athena Polias and Athena Nike (lines 2-51; 51-3), made in 426/5-423/2 and 423/2 respectively, are expressed in terms of the conciliar year, i. e., by the name of the prytany-tribe, its order, and the day of the prytany. The dates, however, of the loans from the Other Gods (lines 54-97), made in 423/2, are expressed in terms not only of the conciliar but also of the civil calendar (lines 58, 79). The addition of the dates according to the civil calendar in the case of the loans from the Other Gods raises a significant question. Why here alone? What need was there to coördinate the conciliar with the civil calendar in the case of the loans from the Other Gods and not those from Athena Polias and Athena Nike?

The answer to this question is probably to be found in the fact that the temples of Athena Polias and Athena Nike were located in Athens itself whereas most of the temples of the Other Gods (at least thirty-five deities) were located in the rural and coastal districts of Attica (lines 59-92).² The treasure of the Other Gods consisted of *ex-votos* of those rural Athenians whom Thucydides and Aristophanes characterized as conserva-

¹ For the text and importance of this inscription see B. D. Meritt's monograph, *The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928); *idem*, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 136-143; O. Broneer, *Hesperia*, IV (1935), pp. 158-159; A. Oguse, *B. C. H.*, LIX (1935), pp. 416-420; cf. M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 137-146. The writer is indebted to Professor Meritt for suggestions on the problem in this paper.

² Cf. *I. G.*, I², 310 = *A. J. A.*, XXXV (1931), pp. 31-43; W. S. Ferguson, *The Treasurers of Athena* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), p. 106; S. Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte u. d. Einigung Attikas* (Lund, 1931). For an account of the agrarian cult and treasure of Athena Pallenis cf. R. Schlaifer, *Harvard Stud. in Class. Philology*, LIV (1943), pp. 35-67.

tive and as attached to their rural homes.³ When the decree of Callias in 434 brought this treasure into the Opisthodomos the Board of Treasurers of the Other Gods must have been careful not to offend the conservatism and local sensibilities of these rural Athenians in the secularization of local treasures. As Ferguson says, "The secularization of religious properties that were used in worship or consecrated in the shrines to serve as monuments of the piety of individuals . . . must have gone against the grain of a large portion of the population of Attica as well as of the personnel attached to the various shrines."⁴ We have evidence of the care not to offend the conservatism of the rural Athenians in the bookkeeping of the Board of Treasurers of the Other Gods and in the coördination of the date of the loans in the conciliar and civil year.

The detailed accounts of the Board of Treasurers of the Other Gods, as shown in *I. G.*, I², 310, are in marked contrast to the bookkeeping of the Board of Treasurers of Athena. As Ferguson has pointed out,⁵ the complete accounts of the latter were not publicly recorded. "What *was* inscribed on stone *stelae* and set up on the Acropolis was in the first place records of the 'loans' made by the *Tamiae* to the state (which, following general practice, we have called 'accounts'), and in the second place records, commonly called inventories, of the *ex-votos* of the Pronaos, Parthenon, and Hekatompedon, and of the golden *Nikae* of Athena Nike." In contrast to them the Board of Treasurers of the Other Gods kept complete accounts, published annually. Unlike the so-called accounts of Athena they included, besides a detailed inventory of the treasure in the Opisthodomos from each temple, the annual receipts (*ἐγκυκλ[ί]ο καρπὸ ἐκ [τῶν] ἱερῶν*: *I. G.*, I², 310, line 209) and no doubt the expenditures.⁶ This contrast between the accounts of the moneys of Athena and of the Other Gods is also reflected in the dating of loans in *I. G.*,

³ Thucydides, II, 14, 16; V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes* (Oxford, 1943), pp. 56-73.

⁴ Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁶ The feature of receipts and expenditures may have been carried over from local cult records, for we see that the cult of Athena Pallenis had, besides its dedications, other sources of income, such as properties, the regular revenues of which defrayed the costs of the rites; cf. Schlaifer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 51-57.

I², 324. The pains taken to coördinate the conciliar date of a loan from the Other Gods with the civil date are another reflection of the scrupulous care shown in the publication of the records of the moneys of the Other Gods. This must be attributed in part to the conservatism and interest in their treasure of the rural Athenians and personnel attached to the various shrines. Secularization did not uproot the local attachment to the *ex-votos* which represented vessels of local cult worship and monuments of local family or individual piety. It is this fact which accounts for the detailed and complex bookkeeping of the moneys of the Other Gods as contrasted with the simplicity of the new style of bookkeeping (cf. *I. G.*, II², 1686-7) when the individual *ex-votos* of the treasure were melted in 406/4 to finance the war.⁷ Even after this date the combined boards of Athena and the Other Gods took pains to list surviving objects belonging to such rural cults (see commentary on *I. G.*, II², 1401).

The antiquity and conservative character of the local cults make it likely, as the date in the civil calendar shows, that the records of the local cults had been kept in the civil calendar. It is only the secularization of their treasure in 434 that made it necessary to use the conciliar calendar in connection with the moneys of the Other Gods. In publishing the loan with a double date care was taken to respect the conservatism of the rural Athenians with respect to their calendar. The farmers must have wanted the record kept in their old calendar anyway, even though they knew and understood the new one. Some light is thrown on this by Aristophanes. In the *Clouds* (615-626) and the *Peace* (406-415) we get a glimpse of the discontent among conservative elements caused by some anomaly in the calendar.⁸ In the double date, therefore, we may see a sign of respect for the conservatism of rural Athenians who clung firmly to traditional forms even in the bookkeeping of their shrines' treasures.

There is perhaps an alternative or supplementary reason which might have led to recording the loans with a double date. In Aristophanes we find evidence of some lack of familiarity on the part of farmers with the activities of the Assembly. The farmers in the *Peace* (line 618) say, πολλά γ' ἡμᾶς λανθάνει. We find some

⁷ Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁸ Cf. Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar*, pp. 103-107.

farmers with little interest in politics even willing to pay to be spared office (Aristophanes, frag. 100). It is not strange, therefore, to find a considerable group back home in the small towns who were not so familiar with the term of the Council as the urban Athenians. The conciliar calendar was primarily a city institution thoroughly familiar only to the urban Athenians who mostly made up the membership of the Assembly. In contrast to the moneys of Athena where proprietary concern may always have centered largely in Athens, concern for the moneys of the Other Gods was spread even to the remote hills. One can well imagine some conservative mountain demesman wondering what was being done with the money from his shrine in the hills. It may have been also for the sake of this remote demesman, who paid little attention to politics, that the inscription coördinates the dates of loans in the conciliar year with the rural Athenian's more familiar and traditional calendar. Apart from its importance for Athenian chronology, this inscription throws light on another of those *minutiae* which make for vividness in our knowledge of Athenian democracy.

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PLINY, *NATURALIS HISTORIA*, XVIII, 97.

This well-known but obviously corrupt passage describes the grinding of corn and the making of groats, by means of mortar and pestle. The grain is *far*, or spelt, a primitive wheat with a long slender ear, and a husk so thick that the grain must be roasted before it can be husked; cf. Varro, *De Re Rustica*, I, 69: *Messum far promendum hieme in pristino (? lege pistrinum) ad torrendum*, etc. It belongs to a primitive husbandry: *Farra tamen veteres jaciebant, farra metebant; Primitias Cereri farra resecta dabant*. The farmer made use of a rainy day to do his roasting and grinding: *nunc torrete igni fruges, nunc frangite saxo*; and the crew of Aeneas did the same thing when they got their rations: *frugesque receptas / Et torrere parant flammis*. To these operations Pliny undoubtedly refers, but the obscurity of the passage is recognised by all commentators, and one word

after another is open to question; I shall not try to cope with the whole passage, but deal only with a few hard words. It begins as follows: *Pistura non omnium facilis, quippe Etruria spicam farris tosti pisente (al. pinsente) pilo praeferato, fistula serrata et stella intus denticulata, ut nisi intenti pisant concidantur grana ferrumque frangatur.*

1. For *stella* I do not hesitate to read *sitella*, the urn-shaped vessel, or mortar, in which the grinding took place. The translators do their best with *stella*, but they find it a hard word. "Un pile armé de fer et percé en étoile," says Harduin; "un pile dont le bout porte une espèce d'étoile, garnie de dents en forme de scie," says Littré. Philemon Holland tries hard, as usual, to be literal: "A pestill headed at the nether end with yron, or else fistulous and hollow within, yet bound about with a hoop or ring of yron, and the same withinforth toothed in manner of a starr." *Sitella* gets rid of all difficulty, so far.

2. *Ferrumque frangatur* is easy to translate, but hard to understand. If mortar or pestle, either or both, were made of iron, the handling would needs be rough and careless indeed to break them. Moreover, *concidantur grana* and *ferrum frangatur* are parallel clauses, and ought surely to be related in meaning. Again, *frangere* is a common word for "to grind." We have in Lucretius, *frangere fruges robore saxi*; in Valerius Flaccus, *farra frangere*; in Pliny, *hordeum molis frangere*; and in Palla-dius, *frumentum frangere*. I suspect here *farreum* (or perhaps *frumentum*) *frangatur*.

3. If we get rid of "iron" in *ferrum frangatur*, it still lurks in *pilo praeferato*; and yet, for the careful husking of wheaten grain, an iron mortar and an iron pestle seem one as unsuitable as the other. Pliny tells us, a little further on, that *zea*, which is only another kind of spelt, should always be husked in a wooden mortar, lest it be bruised and spoiled in one of stone; and the women in an Indian village sit pounding their grain in a mortar all day long, and both mortar and pestle are always of wood. Nevertheless *praeferato* would scarcely be noticed as a stumbling-block did we meet with it only here, but a line in Plautus (*Pers.* 22) alters the case; for there we find this uncommon word actually and technically applied to a shackled slave, and to the very slave who toiled in the mill:

plusculum annum / Fui praeferatus apud molas. And in the very passage about the wooden mortar which we have just mentioned (XVIII, 112), we find those same fettered slaves clearly referred to: *tunditur granum eius (i. e. zae) in pila lignea ne lapidis duritia conteret, mobili ut notum est pilo, vincitorum poenali opere*. I begin to suspect that *pisente* or *pinsente* was in the indicative after all, and that the unhappy slaves were nominative to it.

There are other difficulties besides these in this hard passage, and I do not claim to solve them.

4. *Fistula serrata* might pass, but I feel pretty sure it is at fault. It seems to correspond to Cato's *fistula ferraria* (*R. R.*, 10); but the reading is too uncertain to help us much; and there are variants *ferraria* and *fiscella farinaria*. Gesner said of it long ago: "*Vox nondum satis explicata lexicis*"; and the fact remains that neither *fistula* nor *serrata* is a plain and certain word.

5. Even *nisi intenti pisant* is difficult, and seems the more uncertain the more one considers it. My friend Professor L. J. Richardson suggests *nīsī*, with which *intenti* may have been interpolated as a gloss; and on the same lines, and still more plausibly, W. L. Lorimer suggests *nisu*. Surely the sense lies in this direction: *si nisu pisant*,—provided they grind with a will.

The whole passage remains difficult enough, and the latter half of it especially so; but the meaning of the first half seems to me to be fairly clear:—*Spicas farris tosti pinsunt pilo praeferati (homines), fistula serrata (?) et sitella intus denticulata*.

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REVIEWS.

WILLIAM CHASE GREENE. *Moirai. Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought.* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1944. Pp. viii + 450.

As the title indicates, this book deals with the ancient Greeks' idea of Fate, Good, and Evil and of the rôle which they play in human life.

In a very short introductory chapter the author sets the theme and discusses briefly the main Greek terms and concepts which play a dominating rôle in the historical survey which follows. The rest of the book can be roughly divided into three sections, comprising chapters II and III, IV to VII, and VIII to XI respectively. In the first of these sections, the author deals with early Greek lyrical and epic poetry, specifically with Homer and Hesiod (including the so-called Homeric hymns and the poems falsely attributed to Hesiod), with Archilochus, Callinus, Semonides of Amorgos, Solon, Mimnermus, Theognis, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar, and Bacchylides, and also with the early religious speculation which reveals itself in the theogony attributed to Hesiod, in the fragments of the works of Epimenides of Crete and of Pherecydes of Samos, in the remainders of an "Orphic religion," in so far as there was such a thing, in the Eleusinian Mysteries, or rather in what we can infer or guess concerning the religious beliefs connected with this mystery cult, and finally in the stories of religious impact with which the work of Herodotus is interspersed. The second section begins with a chapter on the "Idea of Tragedy" and then devotes one full chapter to each of the three great tragic poets. The last section, finally, follows the problem from Socrates and the sophists who are discussed in the same chapter, through Plato and Aristotle, who receive one chapter each, to later Greek philosophy down into the Christian era. The last chapter consequently covers not only Epicurean, Stoic, Academic, Peripatetic, and Neoplatonic philosophy from the last decades of the fourth century B. C. to the sixth century of our era, including a special discussion of Cicero and Plutarch, but concerns itself also with the early Christian polemics against the pagan notion of fate, and the correlated Christian speculations concerning providence. On the very last pages the author even manages to cast a glance at the ideas of Dante, Hugo Grotius, and Milton.

This summary of contents may perhaps give some idea of the enormous scope of the work under review. It is all the more remarkable that every smallest part of it is obviously based on first-hand knowledge of all the relevant material and that the author, in addition, has read and digested a very great part of the immense modern literature on the various phases of his subject.

At the same time it is obvious that a treatise covering so great a period of time must inevitably be subject to certain limitations both in regard to the treatment of the problem as a whole and especially in regard to the attention which can be paid to questions of detail. Perhaps the most serious limitation of the first kind lies in the fact

that the author has, on the whole, confined himself to Good and Evil in so far as they happen to human beings and has brought in the question of good and evil as qualities of human actions only in connection with the discussion of the old and troubling problem of whether the evil which befalls us is largely independent of our actions or whether it is mostly the consequence of our own errors and misdeeds. And even then the author does not dwell on the ethical side of the problem more than is absolutely necessary. While he can hardly be blamed for this omission, since his work would otherwise have grown beyond all bounds, it sometimes does prevent him from doing full justice to all the aspects even of his main and proper subject. Another serious limitation of the same kind lies in the impossibility of giving a full account of the political and social conditions from which a specific formulation of the problem has originated. The limitations, on the other hand, in regard to the attention paid to questions of detail are naturally felt most severely in those chapters, i. e., II, III, XI and, to some extent, VIII, which cover the most ground while they are much less conspicuous in those parts of the work in which a whole chapter is devoted to a single author.

Perhaps it is permissible to illustrate these statements by an example in which all the limitations mentioned, to some extent, seem to come in, and to begin with a question of detail. In his discussion of Solon's famous elegy, *εἰς ἑαυτόν*, on pp. 36 ff., the author finds a certain discrepancy between lines 65-70 of this poem and the rest. For while the rest of the poem clearly expresses the belief that only those goods which are acquired justly will last and that injustice and crime will finally always lead to ruin, lines 65-70, according to the author, imply a very different, almost opposite, view of human life. The discrepancy, however, is perhaps much less great than the author believes, if it exists at all.

The Greek text of the lines in question is this:

65. Πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν,
 ἧ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένον.
 'Αλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
 ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεισεν
 Τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
 70. συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

In lines 67 and 69 of this passage the author translates *εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος* by "he who strives to act nobly" and *κακῶς ἔρδοντι* by "him who acts ill." If this translation were correct, Solon's beautiful poem would hopelessly break apart. *Κακῶς ποιεῖν* and *εὖ ποιεῖν*, if followed by an object, it is true, mean to do harm or to do good to a person. But even in this case the result for the person in question is stressed and not the moral value of the action as such. In fact, to do harm to one's enemy, if one has a just cause against him, is not at all an immoral or evil action in Solon's opinion, as lines 5 and 6 of the same poem clearly state. In the expressions *εὖ πράττειν* and *κακῶς πράττειν* the absence of any moral connotation in the adverbs *εὖ* and *κακῶς* is even clearer. *Εὖ ἔρδειν* and *κακῶς ἔρδειν* in lines 67 and 69 of our poem must then be interpreted along the same line and not be given a preponderantly moral meaning.

What *κακῶς ἔρδοντι* in the second expression means is explained by Solon himself by *ἀφροσύνης* in the following line: to act without foresight and coördination. This, in turn, shows that the words of line 67 are very carefully chosen. For here Solon does not say *εὖ ἔρδων* in direct correspondence with *κακῶς ἔρδοντι* of 69, but he says *εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος* and follows this very pointedly with *οὐ προνοήσας*. In other words he speaks of a man who tries to act with foresight and according to a beautiful plan but does not foresee the outcome. This certainly does not mean that this man is subjectively foolish and should have known better. On the contrary—and so far, but only so far, the author's translation "nobly" is justified—he has a beautiful plan to bring about a noble end—*ἔσθλά*, as Theognis would, or rather will,¹ say—; he tries to do his best, but since human foresight is essentially and inevitably limited, his plan may well come to nothing while the man who has acted without sense and coördination may be spared the consequences of his rashness and folly.

If the lines are interpreted in this way they are by no means at variance with the rest of the poem. Quite to the contrary, they are the necessary complement to it, if it is not to be hopelessly unrealistic and totally unworthy of the great statesman that Solon undoubtedly was. It is Solon's contention that the success of the good and just man, who acts wisely and with coördination, if and when he is successful, will be more lasting than the success of the unjust and of the fool. But he is realist enough to point out at the same time that the good and just man is by no means always successful even with his most noble and well thought out plans, while the fool may often have an unexpected, though temporary, success. This philosophy may not take into consideration the most tragic possibilities of human life; but it is on the whole good practical wisdom and in no way at variance with itself.

There is another small point in the same poem which may perhaps be mentioned. In the lines which follow:

71. Πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται.
οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον
Διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὅπασαν ἀθάνατοι.
75. Ἄτῃ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει,

the author accepts F. Wehrli's interpretation of *ἐξ αὐτῶν* in line 75, according to which the phrase means *from them*, i. e., "from the human beings," instead of referring to *κέρδεα* in the preceding line. But this forced interpretation which, against the evidence of Solon's other poems, presupposes that Solon did not know how to write well, since any reader will naturally refer *ἐξ αὐτῶν* to *κέρδεα*, is quite unnecessary. For in the whole passage Solon speaks of men who find no end or limit in their pursuit of wealth. About these men he says that, while the gods may and very often will give them wealth—which is quite true, as ancient and modern experience shows—,

¹ See, for instance, Theognis, 355, where the word *ἔσθλά* is also used without a moral connotation.

sometime and in the end *ate* will come out of *this* wealth and for *such* men.

These may seem small and very special points. But the initial error has further consequences. The analysis of Solon's poem is followed by a discussion of the poetry attributed to Theognis. Here the problem becomes much more complicated. For now one not only must consider whether two seemingly contradictory passages represent really different but correlated parts of the same philosophy of life, as was the case in the passage discussed above, or whether they are expressions of changing moods, just as Solon, frag. 15, undoubtedly expresses a more pessimistic mood than the rest of his poems, but one must also consider the possibility that the passages belong to different authors.

Professor Greene is certainly right when he finds those sections of the Theognidean collection especially interesting which consist of almost, but not altogether, literal repetitions of passages from the elegies of Solon. He tries to show that the slight changes in wording give these passages a new and different meaning and draws his conclusions from this result. But, if one accepts the interpretation of the Solon passages given above, the difference in meaning which he finds in the corresponding verses in the Theognidean collection (585-590 and 227-232) disappears almost completely, except that the imitation is usually less well worded and less pointed than the original and sometimes seems to have misunderstood Solon's thought, as possibly in verse 589. These passages then reveal themselves as nothing but paraphrases of the corresponding lines in Solon. The same, I believe, could be proved of the other imitations of Solon in the Theognis collection.

This result is perhaps not quite without significance. Nobody, of course, can prove with any degree of certainty that the Solon imitations are actually the work of Theognis of Megara or belong to the same author as most of the rest of the collection. But nobody can fail to notice—and this is also pointed out by Professor Greene—that the Theognidean collection does contain sections expressing a moral philosophy which is hardly reconcilable with Solon's convictions and that some of these sections nevertheless are closely connected with passages which express a very Solonian view. The author rightly lays very much stress on verses 383-392. Here, the poet says that "even men who keep their *θυμός* away from *δειλὰ ἔργα* and love justice nevertheless fall into poverty, the mother of want and embarrassment (*ἀμνηχανίη*), which leads the *θυμός* of man astray, harming his mind (*φρένες*: really, his ability to act according to reason) under the strain of dire necessity. And then a man will bear it to endure many shameful things, giving in to want which teaches a man, even against his will, many bad and unworthy things, lies, deception, and destructive strife, so that nothing seems criminal to him any more." But this is followed immediately by a passage (893-898) which says that amid poverty and when want holds them in its grip the cowardly man and the man "who is much better" stand out more clearly. For the one in whose heart there are always straight thoughts will always have just deeds in his mind, while the other's, the coward's mind, has no direction (follows neither good nor bad).

It would be a dangerous method to attribute these lines to a different poet, merely because they disagree with what precedes. For there are many parts in the collection which reveal the troubled mind of a man who sometimes despairs of the possibility of upholding his aristocratic principles of conduct in a changing and troubled world and then again exhorts himself and his friend Cynus to stick to them in spite of adverse circumstances.

Before going further into this question, however, it may be advisable to cast a glance at still another poet whose attitude may throw some light on the relation of Theognis to Solon. In the second chapter of his book Greene discusses the famous scolion of Simonides of Ceos which is addressed to Scopas.² As everybody knows, Simonides in this poem criticizes the famous saying of Pittacus of Mytilene that it is difficult to be a good man, foursquare in foot, hand, and mind, without blame and blemish. For, he answers, nobody, when misfortune, which makes men helpless, befalls him can help falling short of this standard,³ etc. Then he goes on to say that he is willing to praise anyone who does not do anything base of his own free will, and praises, in contrast to the ideal of a man who has all the aristocratic virtues, the "sound" man who is not reckless and knows how to practice that justice which is good for the community.

Greene is quite right when he points out that this implies a democratic code of ethics and in a way reflects the spirit of fifth century Athens; and likewise, when he says that Simonides takes Pittacus' statement in an aristocratic sense and implicitly rejects the aristocratic code of an earlier period. But he does not mention the fact that the actual Pittacus was not an aristocrat and that the *ἑσθλότης* of which he spoke was probably also rather the civic virtue of a political leader who tries to steer his community safely through party strife and social dangers than the virtue of an aristocratic knight.⁴

It is, then, perhaps not quite without interest to connect this with the relation between Theognis and Solon and to compare the attitudes of the four men. Solon belonged to the Athenian aristocracy, but he was also a civic leader who laid the foundations for the development of Athenian democracy. His ethical concepts are still largely the old aristocratic ones. Yet they begin imperceptibly to be filled with a new content. Solon himself, it seems, was not aware of or did not believe in a break or inevitable conflict between the old and the new ethical standard. While he had to struggle and was well aware that the purest intention and the best laid plan do not always lead to success, he had no reason for despair, except perhaps in a temporary mood. The general tenor of his poems, therefore, is positive and optimistic, and his philosophy, though it tries to consider all aspects of human life, is all of one piece.

Pittacus, like Solon, was a political leader in the struggle against the abuses of a purely feudalistic régime. But, since he was not an aristocrat himself, the party hatred which he aroused in his oppo-

² Greene, pp. 67 f.; Simonides, frag. 4, Diehl.

³ Literally: "can help becoming *κακός*." But *κακός* in this connection can hardly be translated except by "not coming up to the standard of the *ἑσθλός ἀνὴρ*."

⁴ Cf. Alcaeus, frag. 87, Diehl; cf. also scholium on Plato, *Crat.* 384 B (p. 16, ed. Greene); Zenobius, VI, 38; Plutarch, *Amat.* 763 E f.; etc.

nents was much more violent than the opposition with which Solon had to struggle. He, like Solon, expressed himself in the terms of the old aristocratic code. But in his case it is even clearer that these terms are partly given a new content. If there is any truth in the stories which are told about him, the meaning of his famous saying must be on the one hand that it is difficult in a situation like his to live up to all the demands of the old aristocratic code of honor, which, as usually happens in a time like his, he probably still respected, even while fighting the aristocrats themselves. It must also, however, mean that it is difficult to remain steadfast and unshakable in the pursuit of the good of the community against the pressure exercised by various parties and political groups. Both aspects of being *ἐσθλός* were probably inseparable for him. But his troubles were greater and his view is less optimistic than that of his great contemporary Solon. If it is true that he made his famous statement when he abdicated, it does not necessarily mean that he found it impossible to remain an *ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ*, but it does mean that he found it impossible to remain an *ἐσθλὸς ἀνὴρ* and at the same time to continue to be the ruler of his city.

The aristocrat Theognis, who lived in a time when not only the privileges of the aristocracy were breaking down but also the aristocratic code of honor, was in a different position. Alcaeus already, when exiled, had quoted⁶ the dictum of the Spartan Aristodamus, "Money makes the man. No poor man is ever noble (*ἐσθλός*) or honored (*τίμιος*)."⁷ But here *ἐσθλός* obviously refers only to the social station and has hardly any kind of ethical connotation. True, an exiled nobleman of the time of Alcaeus was not always in an enviable position; but he could always find noble friends. Noble birth was still more or less universally acknowledged. Alcaeus lived always in the hope that his exile would be only temporary, and all his poems show clearly that he never lost his aristocratic pride or spirit. These conditions had changed at the time of Theognis. The time in general was no longer very favorable to aristocratic aspirations, and while the struggle between oligarchic and democratic forces was continuing in full force an aristocrat without money and political influence had but little claim to distinction and public consideration. In these circumstances it was natural that a conflict should develop between the desire to uphold the old code of aristocratic ethics, which must have been difficult enough in a changed world, and the desire to regain a high station in life by any means whether noble or ignoble. This is the background of Theognis' poems and of the conflicting philosophies we find in them. As pointed out before, it is impossible to prove that the paraphrases of passages from Solon's poems which are found in the Theognidean collection belong to the same poet as do most of the rest. But there is no serious reason to doubt that they belong in the same general setting. If they do belong to Theognis it is rather pathetic to see how this aristocratic reactionary consoles and exhorts himself with fragments from the work of the great aristocratic progressive of two or three generations before.

Simonides of Ceos is again a forward looking man. He deliberately rejects the aristocratic ideal as incapable of realization in the

⁶ Frag. 101, Diehl; cf. also frag. 142.

world as it is, and replaces it by an ideal of more simple civic virtues. But it is perhaps not beside the point to stress the fact that he does not merely reject a more or less arbitrary code of honor but that his code is altogether much more modest in the moral demands which it makes on the individual person than the code of the great aristocratic-democratic statesman Solon and of the popular leader Pittacus. Remembering Socrates' opinion of Athenian democracy and the actual internal breakdown of this democracy in the last quarter of the fifth century, one may add the perhaps not untimely remark that a democracy which reduces its ethical—and intellectual—ideal to the capabilities and achievements of the average man may not be the most desirable form of democracy. The democracy which Solon may have envisaged was of a different kind.

This very inadequate attempt to carry the analysis of one infinitely small part of the author's subject a little further will nevertheless suffice to show that the opinions of ancient poets and thinkers about fate, the gods, and the origin of the evil which befalls us are largely dependent on their ethical concepts and on the political and social conditions in which these concepts were formed. These factors must be taken into consideration if we wish to know not merely what the ancients thought about fate, good, and evil and how they differed in their opinions, but also why they came to such different conclusions.

That it was impossible for the author to pursue these questions in all directions—an adequate analysis of the *Theognis*-collection alone from this point of view would almost have required a book—does not detract from the value of his work. It does, however, indicate in what way the present work should be used. It will certainly not be put to the best use if it is accepted as the last word on the subject. But it presents extraordinarily rich material for thought, both philosophical and historical. With the enormous wealth of problems that can be found in it, it may perhaps also help to overcome the strange notion which still seems prevalent among young classicists and in the outside world, that the field of the classics is exhausted and that nothing new can be done unless new material is discovered.

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CORA E. LUTZ, editor. *Dunchad: Glossae in Martianum*. Lancaster, Pa., Lancaster Press, 1944. Pp. xxx + 68. \$1.50. (*Philological Monographs*, American Philological Association, XII.)

The history of classical studies during the Middle Ages, which should be of equal interest to classical scholars and to medievalists, is still a little known subject. Students of medieval literature have been chiefly concerned with poetry and theology, whereas classical scholars have either disregarded the medieval glosses and commentaries on ancient authors or merely searched them for fragments of lost ancient materials. Consequently, most of these glosses and commentaries have remained unpublished and even unnoticed, and Sir J. E. Sandys, in his authoritative *History of Classical Scholarship*, devotes to them hardly a passing remark, while concentrating on the

classical quotations found in the works of medieval poets and philosophers. A history of classical scholarship in the nineteenth century, conceived along the same lines, would thus consist of the classical quotations found in the works of novelists and scientists, without paying any attention to the achievements of contemporary philologists or historians. For the medieval glosses and commentaries are the works of the medieval school teachers who were the successors of the ancient grammarians and the predecessors of the Renaissance humanists and the modern philologists. The content of these glosses reflects the learning of their time; the limits of the knowledge of the commentators, and even their errors, are as important as their actual insight, if we are to determine their place in the history of classical scholarship as compared with their predecessors and their successors. It is for this reason that every edition of medieval glosses should be gratefully acknowledged as a valuable contribution to our scanty knowledge of that kind of literature.

Miss Lutz who some years ago published the glosses of Johannes Scottus Eriugena on Martianus Capella (see this Journal, LXIII [1942], pp. 480 ff.) has now added to her former work a critical edition of the glosses of Dunchad on the same author. These glosses, which cover Book IV as well as parts of Books II and V, had been edited in part by Manitius, but are now published for the first time in their entirety. The edition is based on the single extant manuscript, Paris. lat. 12960, from Corbie. The author, about whom very little is known, was an Irish bishop who taught in Rheims during the early ninth century. The glosses seem to be based on his class lectures.

Most of the glosses are short explanations of words or names. Occasionally, the author refers to textual variants found in different manuscripts (p. 6). There are references to Christian theological conceptions as well as to some widely known ideas of ancient philosophy and cosmology, such as the four elements two of which are active and two passive (p. 3), the harmony of the spheres (p. 4), the world soul (p. 8). He distinguishes grammatical and dialectical genus (p. 21). In discussing the origin of accidents, he supports a theory of reminiscence that is vaguely similar to Plato, but combines it in a curious fashion with the dogma of original sin (pp. 22 f.). He tries to relate the five *Isagogae*, that is, the five concepts treated in Porphyry's *Isagoge*, to the ten categories of Aristotle (p. 33). Plato and Archimedes are classified as astrologers (p. 12), Aristotle as a musician (p. 13), Parmenides as an Egyptian city (p. 18). Equally curious are the remarks on other ancient philosophers (p. 13), or the following statement on Aristotle: "Ante Aristotelem ignorabant homines nomina rerum, sed ipse eis dedit nomina" (p. 15). Some non-classical expressions are interesting as possible contributions to medieval Latin terminology, such as *descriptionalis* (p. 16), *accidentia* (for accidents, p. 23), *noscibilitas* (p. 30).

The text has been carefully transcribed and emended by the editor, and very few of her readings are open to doubt or discussion. On p. 3, line 9 (69, 14) I should propose *tunc quum* instead of *tua quae*. On p. 15, lines 32 f. (151, 9) I do not understand *et licet*. On p. 21, line 36 I propose *forma est* instead of *formae sunt*. I do not understand the sentence on p. 31, lines 14 ff. Perhaps the reading should

be *containeri* instead of *continere*, but *sola vero corpora* remains obscure.

The editor has verified most of the quotations found in the glosses, and illustrated the text with useful notes (pp. 51-56). In the appendix, she discusses the relation of Dunchad's text of Martianus to that of Dick's edition (pp. 57-59), and the value of a ninth-century manuscript of Martianus in Naples that was not utilized by Dick (pp. 60-62). The nicely printed volume contains useful indices, and a learned introduction in which the editor discusses the content, sources, and style of the glosses as well as the condition of the unique manuscript, and her own method of editing the text. She emphasizes that the glosses of both Dunchad and Johannes Scottus are probably based on an earlier, lost commentary, and that both were utilized in the influential commentary of Remigius of Auxerre.

Miss Lutz should be congratulated upon her competent performance of an ungrateful, but important task, and it is to be hoped that she will continue her work in this field and eventually publish a critical edition of the commentary on Martianus Capella by Remigius of Auxerre.

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DELIGHT TOLLES. *The Banquet-Libations of the Greeks*. Ann Arbor, Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1943. Pp. vii + 114. (Bryn Mawr Diss.)

In three chapters entitled *The Banquet*, *The Formal Banquet-libation*, and *The Sacred Drinks* the author assembles and discusses the evidence, almost entirely literary, for the offerings of wine and the circumstances of these offerings in the domestic ritual of the Greeks during the fifth and fourth centuries. The evidence is classified according to the kind of literature in which it is found. The task is systematically and competently done. The reader may not accept all the conclusions and may feel that the investigation at some points should have been carried further. The subject presents opportunities for varied interpretations.

The first banquet-libation was for Zeus and the Olympians, the second for the heroes, the third for Zeus Soter. The sacred drinks supplementary to the libations were dedicated to four deities, Hygieia, Hermes as guardian of the house, Zeus Soter as its protector, and Agathos Daimon as divine agent of good fortune. These offerings were inspired by reverence for the gods and concern for the individual. The author concludes that of the libations only one, that to Zeus Soter, was definitely associated with domestic cult (p. 60). The heroes who received the second libation were in origin public heroes. It is, however, hard to believe that the heroes who received the scraps of food which fell from the table to the floor of a house were not the same as those who received a libation of wine in the same house. They thus received both food and drink. Apparently the heroes were male only, a limitation which may mean that the offering in origin was for a dead man.

The alliance of the ritual of sacrifice and that of the banquet discussed by the author (pp. 10, 19, 33-34) is of great importance. Sacrifice sometimes was followed by a blood-offering to the dead as in the case of the hero Phocos (Pausanias, X, 4, 10). The libation of wine to heroes may have been a substitute in some cases for one of blood. There can have been hardly any essential difference in idea between the offerings to the hero Phocos and to the shades of the dead by Odysseus on the one hand and the libation to the heroes at a banquet on the other. In all three libations may have lurked the idea that the drink induced a spiritual presence. Such identity would give added point to the figure of speech which the author cites from the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus (p. 63). Clytemnestra "snared" Agamemnon in a net (like a hunted animal?) and compared the third blow which she dealt him to the third banquet-libation poured to Hades, the *soter* of the dead. The blood of Agamemnon which streamed forth after the third blow is thus compared to the wine of the third libation. The author accepts the conventional interpretation of the figure, but the poet here seems to be alluding to the ancient *bouphonia* of the Athenian acropolis, comparing Agamemnon to the ox which was annually slain at the altar where it ate of an offering to all the gods. The *bouphonia* was first performed in order to put an end to a terrible drought which afflicted Athens, and regularly commemorated thereafter to safeguard Attica against a repetition of the disaster. The cessation of the drought explains the poet's comparison of Clytemnestra's rejoicing to that of growing corn in the rain. As the blood of the sacrificed ox by bringing rain caused the corn to rejoice, so the blood of Agamemnon caused Clytemnestra to rejoice. It is possible that the victim of the *Bouphonia* was a theriomorphic Zeus. Aeschylus may well have known that Agamemnon was worshipped as Zeus at Sparta. The third libation with which Clytemnestra compares the blood of Agamemnon was poured to Zeus Soter. To Zeus Olbios of taurine character a bull was sacrificed (cf. Mendel, *Catalogue des Sculptures*, III, pp. 39-40).

The author believes, and rightly, that the nature of the banquet-libation can be illuminated by a study of the deities to whom it was poured. In accordance with this principle the libation from the first crater to Zeus and the Olympians should be considered in the light of the procession in honor of Dionysus which stopped at the altar of the twelve gods in the agora at Athens. In the early period the banquet-libation was addressed to all the gods of Olympus. Was a libation poured to them as a rite of the Dionysiac procession? Furthermore, this intimate association with the Olympians is shown again by the seating of the priests of many deities on either side of the priest of Dionysus Eleuthereus in the theater at Athens and by the *κοινοβωμία* in its orchestra. Particular significance should be given in this connection to the fact, noted by the author, that Attic comedy is a main literary source for the banquet and the sacred drinks. The feast, like the marriage, was an integral part of comedy. There was a *ἐστιατόρειον* in the Bakecheion at Athens (*Ath. Mitt.*, 1894, p. 260, line 140) which need not have been a late innovation. As gods of the symposium Zeus Meilichios and Zeus Soter were probably Dionysiac in character like Zeus Philios. The statue of the latter

at Megalopolis (Pausanias, VIII, 31, 4) held a cup in one hand and a thyrsus in the other. Upon the thyrsus was perched an eagle. The Sophoclean title of Zeus Pausilypos is unusual, as the author remarks, but readily intelligible in the light of the Zeus Philios of Megalopolis. Aeschylus calls Zeus Soter *οικοφύλαξ*, which probably refers to the god in the form of a snake, *οικοφύλαξ ὄφης*. Zeus Meilichios appears on an Attic stele (Cook, *Zeus*, II, p. 1108, fig. 944) as a snake or in human form holding a cornucopia, and therefore resembles Agathos Daimon. The titles Meilichios, Soter, Philios, and Agathos, like that of Zeus Olbios, are all euphemistic.

The libation to Zeus Soter was poured by all the feasters together, whereas the sacred drink was consumed by the individual. The author concludes that the god was addressed as protector of the house when the third libation was poured and as protector of the individual when the drink sacred to him was consumed. His cup "may have been a token of gratitude for the safe outcome of the feast" (p. 96). These conclusions do not seem adequate to the reviewer. They do not satisfy the chthonic character of Zeus Soter. He is rather Soter for the dead. The libation to him does not seem to differ essentially in its purpose from that offered to the heroes. The Orphic tablets tell initiates that they will be gods instead of mortals. They were apparently to exceed the status of heroes and become deities. The heroes are in origin the heroized dead of the household, although the author notes that there is no clear proof that the libation for the heroes was for the dead of the private house (p. 59). The public heroes are very probably secondary, developing from kings like the Argive Adrastus. The royal palace was a house.

The sacred drinks are explained as propitiations of the powers directly concerned with the needs of the banqueters (p. 105). The cup of Agathos Daimon was the most usual. For it comedy is the main source of information. This cup was passed to each banqueter for a sip of its unmixed wine. The possibility that the unmixed wine served a chthonic purpose is hinted by the fact that in Homer the libation of such wine was used only in the sanction of an oath. Not all oaths were in the name of the deities of Hades, but Hera in Homer swears by the Styx and calls upon the divinities in Tartarus as witnesses. The interpretation of the cup of unmixed wine "as an appeal to divine principle which attended the individual and through which he attained good fortune" (p. 83), the interpretation of the banqueters' remark *Ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος* as "Take the cup of Agathos Daimon" (p. 88), and thirdly the interpretation that "both pure wine and a daimon were capable of harming a human being; a small taste of the wine and the adjective *agathos* insured that neither would prove injurious" (p. 90)—these interpretations seem to the reviewer to miss the deep significance of the rite. The banqueters' sip of unmixed wine was a pagan communion of value both to the living and the dead. Dionysus the god of wine, with whom Agathos Daimon has been identified by some scholars, was also a god of immortality. The Vedic cousins of the Greeks exclaimed "We have drunk *soma*, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known the gods." The cantharus is disproportionately large in an archaic Spartan grave-relief because of the mystic meaning of the content of that cup. In Middle Helladic graves

at Corinth T. L. Shear found cups pressed close to the mouths of the skulls (*A. J. A.*, XXXIV [1930], p. 406). Perhaps these cups assured the dead of a return to consciousness and articulate expression as did the offering by Odysseus which Teiresias drank. Hesiod called the souls of men of the golden age δαίμονες. The Agathos Daimon was perhaps closely akin to them. These δαίμονες are the cousins of the κῆρες of the Anthesteria. The theory is confirmed by the Boeotian festival which corresponded to the Athenian Anthesteria. It began with a sacrifice to Agathos Daimon when the new wine was opened on the day called Ἀγαθοῦ Δαίμονος. The value of this evidence is underestimated by the author (p. 81).

The importance of the libation is seen in the fact that all the religious elements of the symposium were connected with it (p. 27). Wreaths were distributed and incense used before the libation was poured and the paean was sung immediately afterward. These elements seem to the reviewer to share the originally chthonic character of the banquet-libations. In a scene on an Apulian crater (Furtwaengler-Reichhold, *Griech. Vasenm.*, pl. 10) an Orphic initiate places a wreath upon his head as he approaches the palace of Hades. Aristophanes has one of his characters say "We should not thus lie in state crowned and anointed unless the moment we descended (to Hades) it were necessary to drink" (Kock, *Com. Att. Fragm.*, I, p. 517). Garlands of gold leaves and alabaster for ointment have been found in graves and are represented together with the fillets of prophecy (Philostratus, *Imagines*, II, 33) in a frieze painted in a tomb at Kertch of the late fourth century (Rostovtzeff, *Ancient Decorative Painting*, pl. XXVI). Perhaps the participants in a banquet not only wreathed but anointed themselves before pouring the libations and partaking of the cup of the Agathos Daimon, the god of the daimones. The Orphic *mystai* in their symposium in Hades (Plato, *Republic* 363C) wore crowns. For them eternal intoxication was "the finest reward of virtue." The wreath was therefore something more than a "symbol of joy in the feast and a guarantee of the purity of those who poured the libations" (p. 29). It may have been a symbol of victory which would explain Pindar's complicated comparison of libations and *epinicia* cited by the author (p. 55). The libation to Zeus Soter and the banquet-wreath may be the mystic counterpart of the martial invocation of Ζεὺς σωτὴρ καὶ Νίκη (Xenophon, *Anab.*, I, 8, 16). The Mithraic initiate when offered a crown upon a spear refused it saying that Mithras was his crown, thus playing upon the word μίτρα "victor's chaplet." A banquet marked the end of the mission of Mithras upon the earth (Cumont, *M. et M.*, I, p. 175). Perhaps the banquet in Greece in origin commemorated the death of a warrior, and the garland his victory over death. The garland of flowers on the altar which Xenophanes mentions as in the room of a symposium is perhaps the early prototype of the garland carved on Roman sepulchral altars, in imitation obviously of real garlands so used. A garlanded βωμός can hardly have been a hearth (p. 22). The garland of the altar at a symposium must have expressed the same idea as that on the head of the symposiast.

The choral paean which was sung after the libation has been derived from a primitive cry to dispel evil (pp. 30-31). It may

rather have been a paean of victory, thus sharing the character of the wreath. In the Apulian vase-painting cited, Orpheus plays the lyre as the foremost of his initiates crowns himself. The paean of Philodamus invoking Dionysus with the words *ἦ παιάν, ἔθι σωτήρ* suggests a close connection of the god's functions as healer and as saviour. As Paian and Soter at Delphi he encroaches upon the functions of Asclepius, the healer, who raised the dead to life at the same sanctuary.

The Agathos Daimon is very probably to be identified with Zagreus, who was seized and slain by seven Titans and then buried at Delphi where he arose from the dead. This identification would explain the curious expression in the *Peace* of Aristophanes which troubled a scholiast. Trygaeus calls upon seven groups of men—farmers, merchants, craftsmen, workmen, metics, foreigners, and islanders—to seize Agathos Daimon: *ἀρπάσαι ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος* (300). The author takes *ἀρπάσαι* to mean "drink deep" but the infinitive alludes rather to the seizure of the young Dionysus by the seven Titans. In the next verse (301) the chorus calls upon the seven groups to take the straight road to *σωτηρία* "salvation." The deity to be resurrected is Peace who is *φιλαμπελωτάτη* (308). The passage is quite Dionysiac in its allusions. When Philocleon in the *Wasps* (525) vows never to drink the *ἀκράτον μισθὸν ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος* if he does not abide by the decision of the judges, the *μισθός* is not a fee to Agathos Daimon as the author believes (p. 84) but rather a wage, i. e. a reward, which the Daimon pays. Plato in the passage cited describes the eternal intoxication in Hades as a *κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθόν*. Philocleon in other words, if he does not show *ἀρετή*, says he should not receive the pay for it. In the archaic Spartan grave-stelae one sees Dionysus or Agathos Daimon offering the reward, the cantharus of wine, to those newly arrived before his throne.

The larger criticism of the dissertation which the reviewer makes is that the rites of the banquet are not considered as closely related to a central idea. For such, it seems, one is justified in seeking. The conclusions that "the libations to a particular god are an act of reverence because of special circumstances rather than because of any association of the god with the banquet" (p. 46) and that the efficacy of wreaths and the paean was no greater than that of the modern knocking on wood (p. 34) do not tell the whole story. The fact that the Homeric libation was poured *χάμαδις*, "on the ground," indicates an original offering to the deities of earth and an ancient tradition behind the statement of a Pindaric scholiast that the second libation was poured to Ge and the heroes. The Orphic initiate tells the guardians of the spring of Memory that he is a child of earth and heaven and of heavenly lineage. Thus any offering on his behalf would logically include the powers of the underworld as well as the Olympians.

The theory that the deities of the banquet were a closely related group receives some support from a chapter of Athenian topography. Pausanias on entering the city (I, 2, 5) saw a colonnade which contained sanctuaries of the gods in which was a house consecrated to Dionysus Melpomenus with statues of the healing Athena, Zeus, Memory, the Muses, Apollo and a mask of the Dionysiac Acratus.

Beyond the *temenos* of Dionysus was a house containing a representation in clay of Amphictyon feasting Dionysus and the other gods. Aeratus "Unmixed" may be another name for Agathos Daimon for whom unmixed wine was sipped. Hygieia is here Athena Hygieia. Of particular interest are Memory and the Muses. The Orphic drank from the spring of Memory when he descended to Hades. In the worship of Epicteta and her family as heroes a banquet was served in a sanctuary of the Muses (p. 16, note 31). Apollo belongs with the Muses but he may owe his presence here to his close association with Dionysus at Delphi. The citation of the passage is the more germane because this Amphictyon instituted the custom of drinking unmixed wine.

The belief of the reviewer is that a common idea underlay the libations, sacred drinks, and the minor appurtenances of the banquet and that the banquet in origin was in honor of the dead, who, conceived as heroes on their way to divinity, were capable of bestowing or refusing to bestow blessings upon their descendants according as they provided or failed to provide these heroes with food and drink, and propitiated the gods with whom they and the banqueters after them would be *συμπόται*. The symposium was in a sense an anticipation of that which would be their *κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθόν*. According to Xenophanes the libation was accompanied by a prayer that those who poured it might have the power to act justly. These symposiasts who hymned the god with *εὐφήμοις μέθοις* must be *εὐφρονας ἄνδρες*.

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M. I. ROSTOVITZEFF, A. R. BELLINGER, F. E. BROWN, and C. B. WELLES, editors. The Excavations at Dura-Europos. Preliminary Report of the Ninth Season of Work, 1935-1936. Part I: The Agora and Bazaar. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 270; 98 figs.; 30 pls. \$5.00.

The excavations started in 1928 at Dura-Europos, the royal Seleucid colony, a kind of half-way house on the road from Syrian Antioch to Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, are among the most important of recent years, and it is a remarkable achievement that they have been published so promptly. This is the ninth such monograph issued and, though called a preliminary report, is an exhaustive study of the agora and bazaar unearthed in the ninth campaign of 1935-1936, called Part I. The second part will include the Palace of the Dux and the Necropolis, and later will be treated the Dolicheneum, the temple of Zeus Megistos, the temple of the Gaddé, the house of Lysias, some other private houses, and the ramp outside the walls. Part I lacks a much needed general index which it is hoped will be included in Part II.

Section G comprises eight blocks, the geographical and vital center of the city, which in Hellenistic times was the agora, and in the Parthian and Roman periods the quarter of the bazaars. The agora area of 23,510 sq. meters was about five per cent of the total city

area, a little less than that of the agora at Magnesia-on-the-Meander or of the south agora of Miletus, but four times that of the Priene agora. Main Street and Streets D, 4, and 5 were the main arteries of traffic and were wider than any other streets, just as at Olynthus Main Street (Avenue B) and other avenues were wider than the streets. The bazaars consisted of small private houses and shops opening on streets, many of which fail to fall into alignment with the regular plan of the rest of the city. More than three-fifths of Area G, equalling 24,000 square meters, has been excavated in the course of fourteen years. Most of the houses are more compact and have more rooms than the houses of Hellenic Olynthus. They are distinctly Hellenistic, using a unit foot of 0.352 m. instead of the Olynthian foot of 0.295 m. or 0.328 m. Dura blocks (bigger than those of Priene and Miletus) were 100 by 200 ft., but Olynthian blocks were bigger and longer, 120 by 300 ft. Streets at Dura are generally 18 feet wide; at Olynthus east-west streets were about 17 ft. wide, but north-south avenues were 24 (Avenue B) to 30 ft. wide (Avenue E, to be published in *Olynthus*, XII). Dura has some streets 24 ft. wide, and Main Street is 36 ft. wide. In the final period (100-256 A.D.) most of the ordinary streets were less than 6.33 m. wide. Dura is another example of the Hellenistic standardized Seleucid mass production of cities with blocks with a length to width ratio of 2 to 1. In many cases, however, one sees at Dura the influence of Olynthus, confirming the idea that Macedonians founded Dura-Europos (cf. Strabo, 525). The dwelling at the southwest corner of Block G6 (Fig. 77), known as Cumont's House, has a long andron (D2H in Block G6) with raised border on all sides of a central sunken area, which is decidedly Olynthian, and one could cite other Dura parallels (as for example B42 in Block G2; D6 in Block G3; A58 in Block G4; C2 and E3 in Block G5; H2 and 3 in Block G7; B2 in Block G8; etc., cf. Fig. 78). Court 89 with a cistern and entrance to 92 (like the Olynthian pastas) and with 3 rooms (70', 70, and 90) north of 92 is certainly of an Olynthian type, but Brown thinks that the pastas-like room is the main living room (p. 40, Figs. 13 and 80).

Methods of construction of foundations and walls, of doorways and antefixes, and certain features of the agora buildings are purely Greek or even Olynthian and have no parallels in the later Parthian architecture of other Dura buildings or in the earlier architecture of the East. The agora buildings have the Greek or Olynthian tiled gabled roof with antefixes, in contrast to the later city of flat roofs. The pottery is much later than that of Olynthus, some of it, however, as early as the third century B.C. Most of the houses are of a very different and later type. A few of the finds remind one of Olynthus. The neck of a stamped Thasian amphora (p. 169, No. 938, Pl. XX, where the last letters given in the text are not clear in the illustration), with the name Πρηξίπολις, must be early, since such Thasian stamped inscriptions (not with the same name, however) were found at Olynthus dating shortly before 348 B.C. References to Grakov, *Old Greek Ceramic Stamps* (in Russian, Moscow, 1928), and to the frequent occurrence of the name (though not in Pape) in Thasian inscriptions might have been added (cf. *I. G.*, XII, 8, index, p. 197). The Dura agora buildings are certainly Hellenistic and must have been started about 300 B.C. They continued till about 120 B.C.,

as is shown by inscriptions, potsherds, and pieces of architecture. Part of an antefix, with a female mask, Fig. 88, Pl. XVIII, 1 (pp. 11, 165), found beneath the agora, seems to be of local clay, but the type is archaic and comes from north Greek facial antefixes. It is surely the oldest piece in Dura, not later than 300 B. C., and probably comes from a mold made in Macedonia or even Olynthus before the founding of Dura.

After the chapters on The Hellenistic Agora, The Bazaar Quarter, and Houses and Shops of the Final Period, with 85 figures in the text (but fourteen of them actually are on separate thin loose sheets awkwardly placed in a pocket inside the back cover without consecutive numbering, and without any clear indication of the Euphrates, the citadel, the Roman camp, the Mithraeum, the baths, the church, the synagogue, or any of the street names), F. E. Brown devotes pages 159-168 to Sculpture and Painting. The gypsum relief of Hercules slaying the Nemean lion (Pl. XV) is crude and stiff and conceptual, breasts, navel, lion's mane, and texture of club indicated by circles. The relief of Hercules (Pl. XV, 2) holding a cantharus (wrongly spelt *cantherus*, p. 160) is bolder and better. Pl. XVI shows a pair of graceful bronze Hellenistic statuettes, cast solid, of a syrinx player and a piper. Pl. XIX shows a most interesting plaster painted relief plaque of Venus Anadyomene, cast from a mold, similar to some published by Cumont, *Fouilles de Dura-Europos*, p. 226. Brown says (p. 167) that she was "the tutelary divinity of the guild of entertainers and prostitutes who made House C their headquarters." The inscriptions from Block G3 are published by Brown (pp. 168-176), those from Block G7 by C. B. Welles (pp. 176-185). One has the alphabet, but to it are added $\alpha \omega \beta \psi \gamma$, which I should interpret as an attempt to recite the alphabet at the same time forwards and backwards, $\alpha \omega, \beta \psi, \gamma \chi, \delta \phi$, etc.

The Greek inscription (p. 177) honoring Julius Terentius, a well-known Dura tribune ($\chi\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\nu$, which is the usual spelling, cf. *Sardis*, VII, 1, p. 70, No. 56), seems to be a sepulchral epitaph, and yet it was found in a house. Was it a copy of the real tombstone or a monument erected apart from the tomb or a temporary burial to be removed to the cemetery later? $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\phi\rho\acute{\alpha} \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\psi\alpha\iota \tau\epsilon \gamma\alpha\iota\alpha$ is the Latin "sit tibi terra levis," for which a reference might have been given to Hartke, *Sit tibi terra levis, formulae quae fuerunt fata* (1901). I believe that the formula arose in Rome from those acquainted with the Greek anthology but almost died out there, though it flourished in Africa, Asia Minor, Spain, and Germany. It was common in the Romanized portions of the Empire, used by slaves, freedmen, and soldiers (cf. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, pp. 65 ff.). Generally the Greek has $\kappa\acute{o}\upsilon\phi\alpha$ (so *I. G.*, XII, 151, 3-4, Rhodes, 1st century B. C., and $\kappa\acute{o}\upsilon\phi\eta\nu \gamma\alpha\iota\alpha\nu$ in Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca*, 569, 5, Rome), but in *I. G.*, XII, 1, 148 (Rhodes), we have $\gamma\alpha\iota\alpha$ [$\epsilon\lambda\alpha\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}$], in Preisigke, *Sammelbuch Griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten*, No. 315 (Alexandria) $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\phi\rho\acute{\alpha} \sigma\omicron\iota \gamma\grave{\eta} \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\tau\omicron$, and in Kaibel, *op. cit.*, 195 (Crete, 1st century of our era) $\gamma\alpha\iota\alpha\nu \epsilon\chi\omicron\iota\varsigma \epsilon\lambda\alpha\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$. In *I. G.*, XII, 1, 153 (Rhodes) we have $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omicron\iota$, but the combination of $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}$ and $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\psi\alpha\iota$ is unknown to me.

In Appendix I (pp. 187-202) K. Lehmann publishes an interesting thin slab of cast bronze representing a Roman pelta or

Amazon shield, in the form of a crater from which a vine springs between griffins' heads, a standard finial. Appendix II on Dipinti (pp. 203-267) dating between 250 and 256 A. D. is a dissertation presented to Yale University by Heinrich Immerwahr. Here is recorded a group of entertainers and prostitutes with interesting names and spellings such as *εἰσενίκης* = *εἰσενέγκης*, *δίδει* = *δίδωσι* (p. 214). Much new information is here brought to bear on dancers, actors, and mime-performers, especially those who followed the army. I should prefer *κομσὴ* (= *κομολή*) as on pp. 213, 269, to *κόμση* on p. 270, and Cassius Dio (p. 258) to Dio Cassius (p. 256).

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HAROLD B. JAFFEE. *Horace: An Essay in Poetic Therapy*. Chicago, Illinois, 1944. Pp. v + 100. (Diss.).

This University of Chicago dissertation is concerned with the ethical content of Horatian Odes and, specifically, with the motives that led Horace to choose lyric as the medium for expressing philosophical doctrines that are also included in his *Satires* and *Epistles*. In order to clear the ground for this investigation, the author devotes his first chapter to an analysis of the fundamental philosophical ideas in these non-lyrical works, which "contain all the doctrines found in the Odes" (p. 2).

Chapter II, entitled "The Therapeutic Theory," considers first the passages in the *Satires* and *Epistles* wherein the diseases of the soul are likened to physical ailments, the better writers and speakers to *meliores medici*. The poet himself appears first as a layman, consulting as physicians his literary predecessors; later as a *medicus* in his own right, prescribing for the spiritual ills of his contemporaries and successors. At this point the question naturally arises why Horace felt that he could "prescribe" most effectively in the lyric form. A clue to the answer Dr. Jaffee finds in *Epistles*, I, 2, in the poet's analysis of Homer's technique. In this passage Horace points out that there is not only an antithesis between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but that within each of these poems there is a principle of balance. This use of contrast which Horace uses successfully in his lyric poems "could reach only partial fulfillment in satire" (p. 27), since the satiric form lends itself to the criticism of *vitia* without offering opportunity for the praise of *virtus*. Continuing the medical analogy, "while satire had offered ample opportunity to expose the disease, the ode offered more ample means of healing it as well" (p. 28). Furthermore, Horace rejects satire as a vehicle for his therapeutic treatment because such writing lacks the emotional appeal that is associated with lyric poetry. He himself explicitly states that satire is not divinely inspired in the same sense, for example, as is the poetry of Ennius.

Having established the thesis that "the two principles of balance and inspiration" led Horace to abandon the satiric form, the author considers the reason for the choice of lyric in preference to epic or drama. So far as the former is concerned, Horace's own words

are used to show that he felt himself incapable of writing good epic. In addition to the passages cited (*A. P.*, 38-40; *Ep.*, II, 1, 250-9) Jaffee might have considered *Sat.*, II, 1, 12-15, where Horace in disclaiming his ability to write epic parodies the epic style successfully. Furthermore, in order to work out his therapeutic principles Horace felt that he must make use of precept and example and that he must stand in more intimate relation to his reader (the physician-patient analogy again) than do the writers of either epic or drama.

The final chapter is devoted to a study of representative lyrics, classified according to the poet's use of precept and example, which, the author shows, were sometimes used separately, and at other times combined in a single ode. Jaffee concludes that Horace's particular contribution to lyric poetry lay in his use of precept and example combined with the principle of balance and contrast. "These new techniques were created in answer to the demands of poetic therapy, since they were ways in which the treatment used could be presented most effectively against a therapeutic end" (p. 78).

Three appendices deal with odes in which Horace did not use the techniques elaborated in the preceding chapters. The group discussed in Appendix A the author believes was composed before Horace had crystallized his method. For the odes of the fourth book and the so-called Roman Odes, considered, respectively, in Appendices B and C, Jaffee feels that the technique developed to advance the therapeutic treatment would not have been effective.

To this reviewer the author's analysis of the odes and his conclusions concerning Horace's contribution to lyric poetry are more convincing than his theory as to the motives that led the poet to develop his new technique. Granted that Horace was interested in spiritual therapy and that he made use of precept and example as well as of the principle of balance and contrast in his lyrics, the relationship between these two facts does not seem to this reader to be established.

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E. M. W. TILLYARD. *The Elizabethan World Picture*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. viii + 108. \$1.75.

Within the compass of a hundred pages, Professor Tillyard, employing familiar passages from Spenser, Shakespeare, Raleigh, and Hooker for illustrations, reveals to us a web of thinking that he calls "the Elizabethan world picture." It is, he says, "the mediaeval world picture as modified by the Tudor regime"; and so he joins the band of scholars that has, in recent years, been denying the existence of the Renaissance as a cultural entity, preferring to think of it either as the *epigonus* of the Middle Ages or as the seminary of the Enlightenment. Tillyard, consequently, indicates that the word *order* is the hallmark of the Elizabethans and finds this term tropologically defined in the doctrine of the chain of being, in the macrocosmic-microcosmic hypothesis, and in the theory of harmonics, which he calls "the cosmic dance."

His study of these three ways of stating the central notion forces him to conclude that the greatness of the Elizabethan poets resided

in their belief in an established and integrated cosmography. Because of this assurance, they are "simple and strong," whereas their successors, with the exception of Milton, are "neat or elegant or florid" because they are troubled with doubts. His second conclusion is that the ideas of the great Elizabethans are not recondite; "divested of their literary form they are the common property of every third-rate mind of the age." Finally, he points out that we should not think of Elizabethan ideas as "queer" but remember that they were taken seriously. The fact that modern "scientifically minded intellectuals" regarded certain Central European ideas as "queer" brought death into the world and all our woe.

As I read this book, I constantly wondered for what sort of audience it was written. The specialist will find nothing in it that he has not known for a long time, and he will be able to think of many detailed monographs that rigorously analyze the basic notions of the book. The conclusions (especially the last, which is a sort of *non sequitur*) answered my question. The book is not written for the specialist at all. It is essentially a treatise for the amateur, the Sunday afternoon reader of Shakespeare, or for the beginning graduate student, who wants orientation in one aspect of Elizabethan thinking. For both of these groups, Tillyard has done an immense service in reducing a certain point of view to its minimum essentials and in clearing out the learned fungi with which so many editions of the principal Elizabethans are overgrown.

The professor who sends his graduate students to this book should see to it that they do not take Tillyard's title too seriously, for this is not the Elizabethan world picture but only one corner of it. It is the portrait that the English upper class admired because it kept them in power. It is the picture that the uncritical or patronized literary man clung to because he either refused to think or loved his golden collar. We do not expect a great poet to be a philosopher and a critic, so we should not interpret what he says as the governing philosophy of his age. Tillyard is, I think, aware of this in his concluding strictures on Donne and his school; and while I should be the first to admit that Donne is not so great a poet as Shakespeare, yet he is most cordial to all the new philosophical doubts that Shakespeare opposed. Now these new doctrines that Donne ponders in his poetry have been shown by current investigations to have been widely held. In other words, the certain mediaeval plan of Spenser and Shakespeare is conventional; the antithetical views of Donne are equally conventional. Which is the world picture?

In the presentation of a world picture, we must also learn to read the unprinted works of the suppressed majorities. I know of no Renaissance defences of atheism, but the multitude of treatises against atheism are an evidence to its reality. In similar wise, the fact that Sidney, Spenser, and Shakespeare speak of the lower classes and of democratic government with abhorrence suggests that the social cauldron was beginning to shake and bubble. The world view is, then, not always the articulate view. Finally, the intellectual aspect of no age is a geyser; it is more like a series of parallel canals. "There is nothing new," said a very ancient poet, "under the sun." When one is tempted, then, to think of Machiavelli as a political innovator, he must remember that the Florentine said very little that had not been said much earlier. When Donne's praise of

the fleshly aspects of love seems to rise like a thornbush in the garden of Petrarchism, one should not be bemused. It is a tradition that goes back through the humanists to Valla and so to the birth of time. The streams of thought widen and narrow with the passage of years, but the world picture is never the photograph of the widest channel.

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JOHN ALEXANDER MCGEACHY, JR. *Quintus Aurelius Symmachus and the Senatorial Aristocracy of the West*. Chicago, Private edition distributed by the Univ. of Chicago Libraries, 1942. Pp. iii + 203. (Diss.)

In his dissertation on Quintus Aurelius Symmachus and the senatorial aristocracy of the West, Dr. McGeachy has done exceedingly well with a particularly thankless subject. He has efficiently covered the available material on Symmachus, and he has arrived at conclusions which are sober and moderate.

Symmachus cannot be studied as representative, but only as a representative, of the senatorial aristocracy. McGeachy correctly notes that the interests of Symmachus were narrowly limited to Rome and Italy, and that he was a pagan at a time when many others of his class had become Christians. Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that Symmachus does represent a type which might be found in the society of Italy during the late imperial period.

McGeachy's conclusions may be summarized as follows:

Symmachus and the other rich landed aristocrats who belonged to his circle of friends were characterized by their complacency, their apparent unawareness of the disintegration of the ancient world, and their lack of profound intellectual interests. They were allowed to hold certain high political offices, but they enjoyed prestige rather than power. On the other hand, as far as Symmachus and his class are concerned, there is no concrete evidence to justify the charge of the Christian moralists that Roman society was corrupt and degraded.

In the only portion of his dissertation which deals with controversial material, McGeachy very properly rejects Hartke's theory regarding the authorship of the *Historia Augusta* (pp. 181-4).

TOM B. JONES.

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